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Executive Summary  
 
This report seeks to perform a comparative analysis of compliance mechanisms 
under selected multilateral environment agreements (MEAs). Nineteen MEAs 
were selected on the basis of their being global in scope, widely ratified and 
representative of treaty arrangements across environmental management 
sectors. In order to proceed further, it was first necessary to define compliance 
mechanisms.  
 
Definition of compliance mechanisms is less straight-forward than might be 
expected as there is no existing authoritative set of definitions. Fine distinctions 
need to be drawn between implementation and compliance, between 
international and domestic compliance mechanisms, between performance 
information and environmental baseline data, between verification and monitoring 
missions, between primary implementation assistance and non-compliance 
response assistance, and between penalties and compensation liabilities.  
 
Compliance mechanisms are defined in this report under four headings:  
1. a requirement for information reviewing national performance of MEA 
obligations (‘performance review information’);  
2. institutionalised multilateral procedures to consider apparent instances of 
non-compliance (‘multilateral non-compliance procedures’); 
3. multilateral measures adopted to respond to non-compliance (‘non-
compliance response measures’); and 
4. dispute settlement procedures.  
 
Comparative Compliance Mechanisms 
The 19 MEAs are analysed to identify their compliance mechanisms and to 
characterise them according to the four categories above. The comparisons 
between MEAs and general observations are made within each of those four 
categories. Almost all MEAs contain national performance review information 
provision requirements and most contain dispute resolution procedures but only 
a minority embody non-compliance procedures (Table 3.1). 
 
(A) PERFORMANCE REVIEW INFORMATION  
The most common MEA compliance mechanism and the one on which the 
majority of international studies and capacity building efforts focus is 
performance review information. Although scientific and technical data 
concerning environmental baselines and quality changes can feed into 
performance review information, it does not in itself assess national responses to 
international obligations. (Environmental changes may occur despite, or 
irrespective of, national environmental measures.) Similarly, data concerning 
operational information exchanges can be fed into performance review 
Executive Summary 
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information, but such exchanges do not in themselves review performance 
(Figure 1).  
 
Performance review information is gathered primarily through national self-
reporting but a few MEAs also provide for supplementary third-party verification 
or monitoring (Table 3.2). Almost all MEAs require Parties to self-report on their 
national performance. The majority of those MEAs provide guidelines or 
templates for this purpose. Just less than a third of those provide for verification 
of data in national reports or for third-party monitoring of national reporting 
systems. Among the five MEAs surveyed that regulate international transactions, 
the two most recent do not require Parties to report the details of regulated 
transactions, an omission that generates gaps in the available performance 
information for those treaties. 
 
Potential interlinkages in performance review information gathering arise 
between MEAs regulating closely related activities. In relation to self-reporting, 
the interlinkages can be created by harmonization of reporting formats and joint 
MEA reporting by a Party. For example, where MEAs regulate overlapping sites, 
species, substances or emissions, there is heightened potential for coordination. 
This performance review information will be most useful across MEAs when 
review requires the provision of statistical, transactional or other quantifiable 
data, rather than qualitative descriptive evaluations. The latter are typically more 
related to descriptions of policy measures that are customised to particular MEAs 
and may also be less factually objective.  
 
Research work on harmonization of performance reporting formats across MEAs 
has been undertaken by international organisations for a decade, particularly by 
the World Conservation Monitoring Centre concerning biodiversity-related 
treaties and by the United Nations University. The secretariats of several Rio and 
biodiversity-related MEAs engage in regular meetings to examine opportunities 
for coordination. 
 
However, to date, the research effort has focused on the biodiversity-related 
cluster of MEAs. It has produced proposals for harmonisation that include the 
development of information system models that would explore synergies during 
the various steps in the data collection and dissemination process, particularly 
through modular or consolidated reporting for the biodiversity-related MEAs. Also 
suggested to enhance performance review information delivery in relation to the 
biodiversity-related MEAs are: harmonising document cover sheets; adopting 
standard definitions; harmonising web sites; developing a meta-database to 
indicate the information that is available and its location; and developing a inter-
convention web site and search engine, as well as a lessons-learned network to 
encourage the sharing of experience.1 
                                                 
1 J. Harrison and M. Collins, “Harmonizing the information management infrastructure for biodiversity-





In relation to monitoring and verification, potential interlinkages exist in carrying 
out third-party monitoring operations and verification missions. Thus, a 
verification mission might be multi-tasked to assess aspects of compliance 
common to several MEAs.  
 
(B) MULTILATERAL PROCEDURES TO CONSIDER NON-COMPLIANCE  
Multilateral non-compliance procedures (NCPs) must be distinguished from 
traditional dispute resolution procedures, which are invoked only once sufficient 
damage has been done to the legal order for a conflict to arise. The purpose of 
such NCPs is to identify Parties’ compliance difficulties and to facilitate better 
compliance in a non-adversarial manner.  
 
Most MEAs have established or are in the process of developing a formal NCP 
(Table 3.3). They occur frequently under MEAs in the hazardous materials and 
biodiversity sectors and are most common for those concerning the atmospheric 
commons. In stark contrast, there are none in the marine sector. Although most 
of NCPs established set up an elected Implementation Committee or Compliance 
Committee to make recommendations, the final output is a decision by the 
Conference of the Parties (COP). A suggestion that a Party is non-compliant can 
usually be brought to the attention of an NCP administering body by the MEA 
secretariat, by the Party itself experiencing compliance difficulties or by other 
Parties, or, under a few MEAs, by a third-party body performing a monitoring 
role.  
 
Potential for interlinkages between NCPs is slight as each is specific to the 
sensitive balance struck during its negotiation processes. However, closer 
coordination between MEA secretariats could enhance their capacity to trigger 
NCPs. Protocols for coordination of performance information between 
secretariats could enable them to be more effective in triggering their respective 
NCPs. Such coordination would be likely to be useful across MEAs within a 
cluster but could also be useful across MEAs that regulate related activities, such 
as international trade. For example, evidence of corruption of customs authorities 
indicating a Party's non-compliance concerning its trade-related obligations might 
implicate that Party in similar non-compliance under more than one MEA. 
 
(C) NON-COMPLIANCE RESPONSE MEASURES 
Response measures can be classified into two categories: incentives - technical 
and financial assistance to support improved implementation; and disincentives - 
penalties such as stricter requirements for performance review information. 
 
Incentives include enhanced international cooperation with the non-compliant 





Party in support of implementation, such as the supply of technical or financial 
assistance. This priority assistance is referred to here as 'non-compliance 
response assistance' and must be distinguished from implementation assistance. 
Implementation assistance under an MEA is normally available at earlier stages 
in the implementation cycle, rather than as a response to non-compliance.  
 
All of the MEAs surveyed in this paper provide some measure of basic 
implementation assistance to Parties that may need it at those earlier stages, 
always in the form of  technical assistance and usually also as financial 
assistance (Table 3.4). A minority of the MEAs specifically also set out 
assistance as a non-compliance response measure. Where they do so, two 
provide that it is conditional on demonstration of the Party's adopting a national 
compliance action plan. 
 
Disincentives to continued non-compliance can be imposed in less than a quarter 
of the MEAs surveyed (Table 3.5). The disincentives include requirements for 
additional 'non-compliance response information' or the imposition of warnings or 
penalties. The latter comprise additional obligations, suspension of privileges, 
trade sanctions and liabilities. Trade sanctions occur under only three of the 
MEAs. Liability to undertake more onerous burdens in meeting the MEA 
obligations can be imposed under the Kyoto Protocol. Such liability must be 
distinguished from compensation liability that is determined between Parties 
bilaterally through an arbitral process, such as a dispute resolution procedure. 
Only the Basel Convention Liability Protocol defines liability to compensate and 
this is not truly part of a multilateral NCP in any MEA.  
 
Interlinkages across MEAs of considerations specific to a particular non-
compliant Party in selection of response measures during NCP decision-making 
processes could maximise the effect of non-compliance responses for the non-
compliant Party. Thus, the coordination of implementation assistance across 
MEAs to address recurrent non-compliance caused by a systemic lack of a 
particular environmental management capacity would be more effective than 
piecemeal or duplicative implementation assistance. Non-compliance response 
assistance measures could be easier to coordinate across MEAs than general 
implementation assistance measures because they are nominated as priorities 
through NCPs and are fewer in number than general requests for assistance. 
Similarly, the coordinated imposition of penalties against a serially non-compliant 
Party would have greater deterrent impact than ad hoc penalties. Coordination 
would be likely to be useful across MEAs within a cluster but could also be useful 
across MEAs that regulate common activities, such as international trade in or 
manufacturing of particular products.  
 
(D) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT  
MEA dispute resolution mechanisms are grouped in three clusters of compulsory 
procedures: negotiation, conciliation and arbitration. They may be conceived of 
as varying across a range of sophistication, from simple provisions that require 
Executive Summary 
12 
Parties to voluntarily negotiate bilaterally in good faith to compulsory binding 
third-party dispute resolution procedures.  
 
All but four MEAs have provisions on settling disputes between Parties (Table 
3.6). With the exception of the dispute resolution procedures of UNCLOS and the 
Fish Stocks Agreement, MEA dispute resolutions procedures tend not to include 
compulsory binding procedures. Instead, they comprise bilateral negotiation, 
compulsory conciliation and voluntary arbitration. Compulsory conciliation is 
invoked following the failure of negotiations, when one Party requests it, but it 
does not culminate in a binding determination??? Disinclination to submit to the 
binding decisions produced by the dispute resolution procedures of arbitral or 
judicial tribunals could be the consequence of their adversarial nature and 
unpredictable and potentially expensive consequences. The trend towards use of 
multilateral NCPs, as opposed to adversarial dispute settlement procedures, 
seems to herald a focus on managing political relationships so as maintain the 
viability and integrity of MEAs. 
 
Potential linkages are feasible in respect of common dispute resolution bodies, 
particularly within clusters, which could specify within their respective conciliation 
or arbitration annexes the nomination of standing panels of experts. However, 
this may rarely be of utility as there appears to be widespread avoidance of 
resort to third-party dispute resolution.  
 
Compliance Interlinkages 
The greatest concentration of existing interlinkages between international 
compliance systems occurs between the biodiversity-related MEAs, other than 
the UNCCD (Table 4.1). Their compliance system interlinkages concern 
performance review information. In this connection, as noted above, 
harmonisation of information requirements is being explored. Interconnectivity 
between their respective websites and implementation assistance clearing-
houses is gradually being introduced.  
 
It is noteworthy that the biodiversity-related MEAs also enjoy the greatest 
concentration of interlinkages for general implementation. Other areas of 
concentrated MEA interlinkages concerning general implementation occur within 
clusters, ie. the hazardous substances and atmosphere clusters, with the notable 
exception of the marine cluster. There is also a relatively high level of 
implementation interlinkage between the biodiversity-related and atmosphere-
related clusters, comprising the only significant area of interlinkages that extend 
across clusters. 
 
The success of interlinkages between MEA compliance mechanisms at the 
international level relies largely on the effectiveness of interlinkages in 
implementation across MEAs at the national level. In relation to take-up at the 
national level, capacity-building to enhance interlinkages in national 
Executive Summary 
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implementation of MEAs is being delivered by some intergovernmental 
organisations, such as UNDP, UNEP and WCO. Several international 
organisations that are partly non-governmental also seek to build implementation 
capacity. The most significant of these is the International Network for 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE), which has developed a 
set of environmental compliance and enforcement (ECE) indicators for assessing 
domestic program performance.  
 
Such capacity building seeks to enhance national systems for domestic 
implementation of individual MEAs and, to a lesser extent, to build domestic 
interlinkages between them. However, the UNU has conducted national case 
studies of institutional coordination in relation to the implementation of MEAs that 
touch specifically upon interlinkages in domestic implementation. A brief survey 
of national implementation data suggests that, except for countries in North 
America and Europe, domestic interlinkages in implementation across MEAs are 
at very early stages of development and mostly concern the establishment of 
integrated environmental monitoring databases rather than integration of 
performance information. 
 
Based on the conclusions drawn from the comparative analysis of compliance 
mechanisms and the synthesis of law and practice, a draft Action Plan on 
Building Interlinkages and Synergies Across Global MEA Compliance Regimes is 
appended (Annex I). The Action Plan recommends steps that might be taken by 
UNEP and other international organisations to promote interlinkages between 
MEA compliance systems. It addresses the following matters: 
• Consistent Concepts and Terminology 
• MEA Compliance Regime Manual 
• Harmonisation of Performance Self-Reporting 
• Performance Information Exchange and Integration 
• Model Standards for Inter-Secretariat Cooperation 
• Interlinkages Administrative Support  
• Interlinked Verification and Monitoring  




Chapter 1.  
Introduction 
Objectives 
This report investigates compliance mechanisms under selected multilateral 
environment agreements (MEAs). It seeks to contribute to UNEP’s work on 
implementation mechanisms for international instruments. It does so specifically 
by identifying strategic opportunities for inter-linkages and synergies in 
compliance mechanisms among MEAs.  
 
First, the report defines compliance mechanisms and the scope of those 
covered. Then it analyses the components of compliance mechanisms and 
compares them, with particular focus upon components involving reporting and 
verification procedures. Third, law and practice in the implementation of 
compliance mechanisms is analysed to identify lessons that can be learned. 
Then conclusions are drawn as to the opportunities to enhance synergies in 
compliance mechanisms among MEAs. Finally, a draft action plan is 
recommended. 
Background  
The mandate for this investigation has its roots in Chapter 39 of Agenda 21, 
which called upon United Nations members to undertake activities to promote the 
full and prompt implementation of international agreements (Implementation 
mechanisms - Activity B para. 39.7). It suggested that States could: 
 
(a) Establish efficient and practical reporting systems on the effective, full 
and prompt implementation of international legal instruments; [and] 
(b) Consider appropriate ways in which relevant international bodies, such 
as UNEP, might contribute towards the further development of such 
mechanisms. 
 
To this end, UNEP has undertaken activities to promote the implementation of 
MEAs, focusing on strengthening the rule of environmental law. Outcomes of 
particular note include: 
 
• The Malmo Declaration, Sweden, 29-31 May 2000, which provided that, 
whilst the evolving framework of international environmental law and the 
development of national law provide a sound basis for addressing the 
major environmental threats of the day, they must be underpinned by a 
more coherent and coordinated approach among international 





• The Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of 
Environmental Law for the First Decade of the 21st Century (Montevideo 
Programme III), that was adopted by Governing Council decision 21/23 to 
serve as a strategic framework for all UNEP environmental law activities in 
the present decade. Inter alia, it addresses the role of the judiciary in the 
context of capacity building for the implementation of environmental law; 
 
• The adoption of Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements by the Seventh Special Session of 
the UNEP Governing Council, Cartagena, Colombia 13-15 February 2002;  
 
• The Global Judges Symposium on Sustainable Development and the Role 
of Law, Johannesburg, 18-20 August 2002, that addressed building the 
capacity of judges to ensure the implementation of environmental laws. 
This Symposium was supported by a wide range of preparatory regional 
judicial symposia. It was followed by the Judges Ad Hoc Meeting for the 
Development of a Plan of Work as a Follow-Up to the Global Judges 
Symposium Relating to Capacity Building of Judges, Prosecutors, and 
Other Legal Stakeholders, Nairobi, 30-31 January 2003, and endorsed in 
UNEP Governing Council decision 22/17 II A on the Follow-up to the 
Global Judges Symposium; and 
 
• The Round Table Dialogue on Advancing the Millennium Development 
Goals through the Rule of Law, held at UNEP Headquarters, Nairobi, on 
16-17 February 2005. 
 
Within UNEP, efforts to enhance synergies across MEAs are reflected in its 
organisational structure. The Division of Environmental Conventions (DEC) was 
established in 1999 at UNEP headquarters in Nairobi. Within the Division of 
Environmental Conventions, the Interlinkages Unit addresses strategic 
approaches to increased collaboration between MEAs. Its activities involve:  
 
• Co-ordination of all work on linkages and synergies within DEC;  
• Identifying and encouraging substantive synergies between MEAs;  
• Development and implementation of a systematic approach for co-
ordination among MEAs;  
• Development of a strategic approach to track inconsistencies in the 
decisions of the COPs of the MEAs;  
• Encouraging the harmonization of information systems, information 
exchanges and access to information between MEAs;  
• Encouraging a coordinated approach to capacity building among MEAs; 
• Streamlining of national reporting on biodiversity-related conventions and 
Rio conventions; and 




Work related to MEAs is also undertaken by the UNEP Compliance and 
Enforcement Unit in the Division Environmental Conventions (DEC). It developed 
the UNEP Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements and is in the process of developing a Manual on 
Compliance With And Enforcement Of Multilateral Environmental Agreements.  
 
The Division of Policy Development and Law maintains UNEP’s Environmental 
Law Programme, which has the main carriage of environmental law development 
and capacity building for implementation. Major outcomes of its work include the 
development of international and national environmental law databases, 
provision of technical legal assistance for the preparation of national 
environmental laws, environmental law and policy training for governmental 
officials, and environmental law capacity building for the judiciary.  
 
Methodology 
The essential method adopted in this report is comparative. That is, it compares 
compliance mechanisms across MEAs.   
 
Initially, data is gathered, analysed and compared. The first step is to select 
MEAs, analyse each compliance mechanism into its components, categorise 
them and describe them by categories. The second step is to compare the 
components by category across MEAs.  This task includes survey of the 
academic, governmental and inter-governmental literature for information 
concerning the operational qualities of particular MEA compliance mechanisms.  
 
Then qualitative studies are undertaken. This entails the third and fourth steps in 
the methodology, i.e., case studies of available regional and national law to 
discern the qualities of State practice in implementing MEA compliance 
mechanisms and a literature survey of MEA compliance linkages and synergies.  
 
Finally, the comparative data and qualitative information will be synthesised to 
draw conclusions about the nature and location of opportunities for inter-linkages 
and synergies between MEA compliance mechanisms.  These will be distilled 




The approach to terminology used here is consistent with the emerging standard 
usage, as indicated in UNEP's Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement 




The term 'compliance' is part of a range of terminology used to describe patterns 
of conformity with legal norms. It is to be distinguished from related terms, such 
as 'effectiveness', 'enforcement' and 'implementation'.2  
 
Compliance  
The UNEP Guidelines are divided into two parts: Part I - Guidelines for 
Enhancing Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Part II - 
Guidelines for National Enforcement, and International Cooperation in Combating 
Violations of Laws Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements. In 
essence, Part I addresses compliance primarily from an international 
perspective, concerning the design of MEA regimes, although they also consider 
national legal regimes to enhance compliance. In contrast, Part II addresses the 
strengthening of national enforcement capacity. Part I is the more closely related 
to compliance interlinkages and synergies between MEAs because it focuses on 
compliance regimes and primarily on the international process. It defines 
compliance as  
 
'the fulfilment by the contracting Parties of their obligations under a multilateral 
environmental agreement and any amendments to the multilateral environmental 
agreement'.3 
 
This is the basic definition of compliance that is applied in this report. However, it 
should be observed that compliance is not an ‘all or nothing’ game. The fact that 
a Party is not fully compliant does not mean that it is fully non-compliant. Despite 
the binary nature of the language used, compliance occurs across a scale of 
shades of grey.4 
 
Compliance Mechanisms 
Compliance mechanisms are the systems adopted under MEAs to promote 
compliance. The components of compliance mechanisms can be analysed into 
four categories: (a) performance information; (b) multilateral institutional 
procedures; (c) non-compliance response measures; and (d) dispute settlement 
procedures. These are described at greater length in Chapter 2. 
 
Effectiveness 
                                                 
2 Ronald Mitchell ‘Compliance Theory: An Overview’in James Cameron, Werksman J. and Roderick, P., 
Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law (Earthscan London 1996) p. 24. 
3 UNEP Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environment Agreements 
(Nairobi 2002) Part I, p 2. It should be noted that the UNEP Guidelines Part II define compliance from a 
domestic perspective as 'the state of conformity with obligations, imposed by a state, its competent 
authorities and agencies on the regulated community, whether directly or indirectly through conditions and 
requirements, licences and authorizations, in implementing multilateral environmental agreements'. (p. 8) 
4 Harold K. Jacobsen and Brown Weiss, E. ‘A Framework for Analysis’ in Engaging Countries- 
Strenghtneing Compliance with International Environmental Accords (MIT Press 1998) p. 2. 
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Concern to assess progress towards a variety of goals in international 
environmental governance has resulted in a multiplicity of meanings for 
'effectiveness'. Effectiveness can, for example, relate to such goals as 
environmental problem solving, economic efficiency and desired changes in 
political behaviour.5 At times, however, effectiveness is confused with 
compliance. This occurs when what is assessed is progress to congruence with 
legal norms. For the purposes of this report it is important to distinguish 
compliance from effectiveness. Thus, the progress that effectiveness is taken to 
assess in this report is progress towards goals that concern environmental 
problem solving and changes in political behaviour. Thus, a statement of 
effectiveness entails measurement of environmental or social change over time 
generated by the MEA. It requires, first, proof of a causal link from the MEA to 
the measured change. It also requires an assessment of the relative success of 
the regime in solving the environmental problem that it was designed to address. 
The latter evaluation is possible in some cases, where the aims and objectives of 
the MEA are stated with precision to define quantifiable outcomes and impacts. 
Nevertheless, the process can be accused of being subjective when the aims 
and objectives of the MEA are not.6  
 
Enforcement 
Part II of the UNEP Guidelines define enforcement as 
 
'the range of procedures and actions employed by a State, its competent 
authorities and agencies to ensure that organisations or persons, potentially 
failing to comply with environmental laws or regulations implementing multilateral 
environmental agreements, can be brought or returned into compliance and/or 
punished through civil administrative or criminal action’.7 
 
Thus, the meaning of enforcement as set out in the UNEP Guidelines is the 
ensuring of conformity with national laws that implement MEAs. That is the 
meaning as applied in this report also.  
 
Implementation 
A State is said to implement an international norm at the domestic level when it 
adopts appropriate domestic measures for the purpose of meeting its obligations 
under the international treaty norm. Such measures might include enacting 
legislation, formulating policies or allocating resources. The UNEP Guidelines 
Part I define implementation as  
                                                 
5 Oran Young The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes (MIT Press Massachussetts 1998) 
3-6. 
6 Ronald Mitchell ‘Compliance Theory: An Overview’in James Cameron, Werksman J. and Roderick, P., 
Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law (Earthscan London 1996) p. 24. 
7 UNEP Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environment Agreements 




'inter alia, all relevant laws, regulations, policies, and other measures and 
initiatives that contracting Parties take or adopt and/or take to meet their 
obligations under a multilateral environmental agreement and its amendments, if 
any' (sic).8 
 
The mere fact that an implementation measure is taken does not mean that it is 
adequate to meet a treaty obligation nor that the State is necessarily compliant 
with its obligation. Implementation is said to occur in three phases: first, by 
adopting national legal measures; second, by enforcing them; and third, by 
reporting on the implementation measures.9 The latter, reporting, is an obligation 
that also forms part of an MEA's compliance mechanism. It is dealt with below in 
greater detail in the context of compliance mechanisms.  
 
Interlinkages  
Interlinking in the context of separate compliance mechanisms of individual 
MEAs is the construction of relationships between them. The nature of these 
relationships will usually take the form of coordination of inputs and outputs, such 
as compliance information inputs and assistance outputs. To identify coordination 
opportunities requires an analysis and understanding of the various elements of 
compliance mechanisms of MEAs. The elements are identified with the objective 
of generating synergies between them. Thus, identification of opportunities to 
construct interlinkages is the preliminary conceptual groundwork necessary to 
achieve synergies.  
 
Monitoring 
Monitoring can refer to scientific and technical monitoring of environmental 
conditions or to performance monitoring of implementation of MEA obligations. 
Scientific and technical monitoring is undertaken by bodies that are often 
independent of but work in cooperation with the MEA Parties and secretariat. 
However, the type of monitoring that is the focus of this paper is that of national 
performance in implementing MEA obligations. Performance monitoring may 
address a Party’s establishment of systems to implement the MEA but does not 
involve review of accuracy of particular data.   
 
Multilateral Environmental Treaties (MEAs) 
MEAs are treaties that are open to universal participation by States. Often, MEAs 
articulate objectives in addition to specific obligations. The objectives usually 
concern an MEA’s intended broad effect on the environment or society. They are 
relevant to a study of the MEA's effectiveness but less relevant to a review of 
                                                 
8 UNEP Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environment Agreements 
(Nairobi 2002) Part I, p 2. 
9 Philippe Sands Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd edn) (Cambridge University Press 
2003) p. 174. 
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compliance. For the purposes of clarity in a compliance review, it is helpful to 
refer to obligations individually, i.e. as set out in particular treaty provisions, 
rather than to compliance with a treaty overall as the latter involves an implicit 
generalisation.10 The methodology for selection of particular MEAs for analysis is 
set out in Chapter 2.  
 
Synergies 
Synergy is described in the Oxford Dictionary as ‘Interaction or cooperation of 
two or more organisations ... to produce a combined effect that is greater than 
the sum of their separate effects.’11 As applied to the study of compliance 
mechanisms of MEAs, synergy refers to the production of greater effectiveness 
and efficiency in effects than the MEA compliance mechanisms can achieve 
separately. For example, greater effects might be achieved through 
complementarity and mutual reinforcement. The complementarity and mutual 
reinforcement are the products of appropriate linkages between the separate 
compliance mechanisms of MEAs. Thus, synergy is the output of interlinkages 
between MEAs.  
 
Verification 
Verification is a process undertaken to test the accuracy of data or information 
provided by a Party to the MEA Secretariat. The process is undertaken by a third 
Party, such as the Secretariat or an NGO, or by them in combination with other 
Parties to the treaty.  
Scope 
This report studies inter-linkages and synergies in major global MEAs. The MEAs 
that are surveyed here are exclusively global. There are several pragmatic 
reasons for this approach.  
 
First, conferences of Parties and secretariats to global MEAs address relatively 
similar compliance regimes, resources and challenges. This creates likely 
opportunities for inter-linkages between various global MEAs at the international 
institutional level.  
 
Second, there is a high degree of overlap between the Parties to global MEAs. 
This is simply because they are intended to be universal and often are very 
widely ratified. Consequently, there are relatively rich opportunities for inter-
linkages between various global MEAs at the multilateral and national levels.  
 
Third, the circumstances to which regional environmental treaties apply are more 
diverse than those for global MEAs. Many of them are unconnected with UNEP. 
                                                 
10 Ronald Mitchell ‘Compliance Theory: An Overview’in James Cameron, Werksman J. and Roderick, P., 
Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law (Earthscan London 1996) p. 5-6. 
11 Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edn OUP 1999 
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The conferences of Parties and ecretariats that serve regional environmental 
treaties sometimes serve several treaties for the same region and, therefore, 
share very similar compliance regimes, resources and challenges. PParties to 
regional environmental treaties are typically also Parties to other environmental 
treaties for the same region. This suggests that there are very likely to be 
potential inter-linkages between environmental treaties for a particular region and 
that these can be conveniently examined as distinct regional groups.  
 
Inter-linkages between regional environmental treaties and global MEAs 
addressing similar subjects certainly do exist. As a separate further exercise, the 
opportunities for inter-linkages between subject-related global, regional and 
bilateral MEAs deserve examination. However, that task can be distinguished 
from the examination of inter-linkages between global MEAs. Due to the number 
and diversity of bilateral and regional MEAs (there are many more regional 
environmental treaties than global MEAs), they are beyond the practical 
resources available for the current exercise.  
  
Compliance mechanisms are the subject of this report. Although compliance 
mechanisms seek to achieve national implementation and enforcement of MEAs, 
so as to promote the international effectiveness of MEAs, implementation 
enforcement and effectiveness issues are not the subjects of examination here. 
'Compliance', 'Enforcement' and 'Effectiveness' are defined and distinguished in 





Chapter 2  
Compliance mechanisms of major global MEAs 
 
This chapter first selects MEAs, in order to analyse each compliance mechanism 
into its components, categorise them and describe them. It gathers and analyses 
data for each MEA. The data is compared across MEAs in Chapter 3.  
 
Major Global MEAs 
The nineteen global MEAs that are examined here are those that are considered 
'major'. They are so considered because they have entered into force and have a 
large number of Parties.  
 
The MEAs are organised for examination into groups that cover common, 
overlapping or related subjected matter. For example, those with objectives that 
concern primarily an aspect of nature conservation are clustered together. This 
approach might be contested because all aspects of the natural environment are 
inter-related. Further, it might be suggested that inter-linkages and synergies 
between MEAs could be strongly determined by factors other than their 
environmental subject matter. For example, factors such as common servicing by 
the same United Nations organisation might be a sensible basis for 
categorisation. Nevertheless, there is a tendency for MEAs with similar subject 
matters to be serviced by the same United Nations body. For example, UNEP 
services most of the hazardous substances conventions (concerning waste, 
persistent organic pollutants and aspects of genetically modified organisms, 
although regulated chemicals are administered jointly with FAO). Ultimately, 
however, this report also undertakes a comparative analysis of the MEAs across 
clusters. Therefore, the issue of clustering of MEAs according to primary subject 
matter is not of central importance as it does not predicate the outcome of the 
comparative analysis.  
 
This chapter examines compliance mechanisms within four clusters of MEAs: (1) 
nature conservation; (2) hazardous substances management; (3) atmospheric 
emissions controls; and (4) marine environment protection. The major global 
MEAs that have been selected for analysis in the four clusters are set out as 
follows:  
 
1. Nature Conservation 
 
• Wetlands – Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat 1971 
• Heritage – Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage 1972 
• Endangered species – Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 1973 
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• Migratory species – Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of 
Wild Animals 1979 
• Biological diversity – Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 
• Deserts – United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those 
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in 
Africa 1994 
• Plant genetic resources – International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture 2001 
 
2. Hazardous Materials 
• Hazardous wastes – Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 1989  
• Dangerous chemicals – Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International 
Trade 1998 
• Biosafety – Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity of 5 June 1992, 2000 
• Persistent organic pollutants – Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants 2001 
 
3. Atmospheric Emissions 
• Ozone layer – Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985 
• Ozone depleting substances – Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer 1987 
• Climate change – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
1992 
• Greenhouse gas emissions reductions – Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 1997 
 
4. Marine Environment  
• Whaling – International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1946 
• Sea dumping – Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
of Wastes and Other Matter 1972 
• UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
• Fish Stocks – Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 1995 
 
Identifying Components of Compliance Mechanisms of MEAs 
To compare particular compliance mechanisms across MEAs, it is necessary to 
first identify the details of what it is that we wish to compare. Therefore, each 
compliance mechanism is analysed into its detailed components, which are 




The components of the compliance mechanisms within each MEA are 
categorised under four headings:  
(a) performance review information - requirements for information reviewing 
national performance of MEA obligations;  
(b) multilateral non-compliance procedures - institutionalised multilateral 
procedures to consider apparent instances of non-compliance; 
(c) non-compliance response measures - multilateral measures adopted to 
respond to non-compliance; and 
(d) dispute resolution - dispute settlement procedures.  
(A) PERFORMANCE REVIEW INFORMATION  
Many MEAs require their Parties to exchange information as part of their primary 
operational obligations. For example, they might be required to provide 
information on proposed environmentally sensitive trade transactions or industrial 
developments, on ambient environmental conditions or on environmental 
technologies. This operational information is to be distinguished from MEA 
requirements for performance review information.  
 
In relation to their performance, Parties are often required to report on the 
measures they have taken to implement a particular MEA, usually by submitting 
annual reports on their relevant laws or policies. Some MEAs provide for a third 
Party, such as a Secretariat, to monitor or verify the performance and require the 
Parties to cooperate with such monitoring or verification of their performance. 
Often, operational and performance information are inter-related, as data from 
operational information exchanges are fed into performance review.  
 
A related form of performance review is regime review, which concerns review of 
the regime’s performance overall, rather than individual Party performance. For 
example, statistical data processed from sources including the Parties’ 
operational information exchanges and their performance information can help 
the Secretariat and the COP to assess whether targets have been met and to 
identify future priorities.  
 
Collection of performance review information is necessary to determine a Party’s 
compliance situation. Therefore, in examining compliance, this report focuses on 



































(B) MULTILATERAL NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES  
Most MEAs provide for the development of a formal, multilateral NCP. When 
developed, this usually comes in the form of an elected committee, called an 
Implementation Committee or Compliance Committee. A Party’s alleged non-
compliance may be referred to the Committee for consideration and the 
Committee then makes a recommendation on the matter to the COP. Usually, 
the final output is a decision by the COP. The purpose of such procedures is to 
identify compliance difficulties and to facilitate better compliance in a non-
adversarial manner and before the convention regime is undermined. In that 
respect, multilateral NCPs must be distinguished from traditional dispute 
resolution procedures, which are invoked only once sufficient damage has been 
done to the legal order for a conflict to arise.  
 
Despite the simple dichotomy in the notions of compliance and non-compliance, 
performance information will usually indicate a degree of compliance rather than 
perfect compliance or absolute non-compliance. A Party may be compliant to a 
degree, across a measure of shades of grey. The degree of compliance may in 
circumstances be so poor that the Party can be determined to be substantially 
non-compliant. Substantial failures to submit national performance information 
can conceal national non-performance of primary operational obligations and, 
therefore, is often treated as a failure to meet a primary operational obligation. 
 
(C) NON-COMPLIANCE RESPONSE MEASURES 
When an instance of substantial non-compliance is identified under a non-
compliance procedure, a response is necessary at the multilateral level. The 
response needs to be tailored to the particular circumstances of the case. Non-
compliance usually stems from lack of human, material and financial resources 
and/or lack of political will.12 The response measures available can be classified 
into two categories: incentives - technical and financial assistance to support 
improved implementation; and disincentives - penalties such stricter 
requirements for performance review information. These are sometimes referred 
to as ‘carrots and sticks’.  
 
(i) Incentives are the usual response and include enhanced international 
cooperation with the non-compliant Party in support of implementation, 
such as the supply of technical or financial assistance. Thus, a COP might 
direct priority financial and technical assistance to a non-compliant Party. 
This assistance may be subject to conditions such as the adoption of a 
national program of implementation actions. This priority or conditional 
assistance is referred to here as 'non-compliance response assistance' 
                                                 
12 Montini, M, ‘Improving Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements through Positive 
Measures: The Case of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change’ in Kiss, A, Shelton, D and Ishibashi, K 
(eds.), Economic Globalization and Compliance with International Environmental Agreements (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, 2003) p.159. 
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and must be distinguished from regular cooperative assistance under the 
MEA. 
 
Technical assistance includes: capacity-building mechanisms in the form 
of training and workshops, which address issues relating to lack of human 
resources and know-how; technology transfers and exchange of 
information mechanisms to address issues relating to the lack of 
materials; and financial provisions to address resource issues.13 (It is 
noteworthy that information exchange obligations arise also in the context 
of technical assistance.) Financial assistance often comes in the form of a 
Trust Fund or a financial mechanism from which the Parties provide 
funding for relevant projects. One of the most important financial 
mechanisms is the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which was 
established in 1991 by the World Bank to provide funding to projects 
falling within the categories of biological diversity, climate change, 
international waters and ozone layer depletion.14 When invoked under a 
NCP, technical and financial assistance might be made conditional on 
demonstration of the Party's demonstration of bona fides in redressing the 
non-compliance failure, such as by adopting domestic legislation or a 
national action plan. 
 
(ii) In some cases, disincentives to continued non-compliance can be 
imposed. For example, a COP might impose additional, stringent and 
customised performance review information obligations on a non-
compliant Party and direct that the information provided be subject to 
verification. The additional required information can be termed 'non-
compliance response information'. These additional reporting 
requirements must be distinguished from their regular performance review 
information counterparts.  
 
Other disincentives to non-compliance are warnings and penalties. The 
latter may include additional obligations or suspension of privileges. For 
example, a non-compliant Party might be warned that its rights under the 
MEA regime could be suspended. The suspension of rights may involve 
the imposition of limited trade sanctions, as can occur under the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention. 
Penalties imposed through the multilateral process of the NCP can be 
distinguished from compensation liabilities. The latter can be imposed 
under the terms of the MEA or a protocol but often need to be determined 
between Parties bilaterally through an arbitral process or other form of 
dispute resolution procedure. 
                                                 





Thus, responses to non-compliance vary, from requiring additional reports (non-
compliance response information as distinguished from regular performance 
review information), to recommending conditional assistance measures (non-
compliance response assistance, as distinguished from regular implementation 
support assistance), to imposition of liabilities and the suspension of a Party’s 
rights under the convention.  
 
(D) DISPUTE RESOLUTION  
MEA mechanisms to settle disputes can be grouped in three clusters of  
procedures: Negotiation, Conciliation and Arbitration. 
 
Negotiation  In the event of a dispute, Parties must submit to negotiation. Thus, 
there is no obligation to pursue binding arbitration. 
 
Conciliation Generally, these provisions provide that Parties must submit to 
negotiation or other peaceful means as the first port of call. If the dispute is not 
resolved within a specified period of time (usually 12 months), Parties must then 
submit to conciliation in accordance with a procedure that is either annexed to 
the Convention or to a COP resolution. The conciliation procedure is not 
automatically triggered. Thus, once the requisite period has lapsed, one of the 
Parties must request it. However, Parties can bypass the conciliation procedure 
in favour of arbitration before the International Court of Justice or in accordance 
with an arbitration procedure, which, again, is either annexed to the Convention 
or to a COP resolution. The arbitration process is not compulsory and can only 
be invoked where both Parties have notified the Secretariat that they accept this 
means of dispute resolution.  
 
Arbitration  Unlike conciliation, arbitration is binding. In marked contrast to the 
weak dispute resolution procedures described above, which avoid imposing 
compulsory, binding arbitration on Parties, UNCLOS sits in a category of its own. 
It has compulsory, binding arbitration for specific disputes (i.e. disputes 
concerning the sea-bed). Generally, however, the arbitration procedure is 
invoked if the dispute has not been resolved through negotiation. Conciliation is 
an option where negotiations fail, but is invoked only if one Party requests it and 
the other accepts the invitation. Otherwise, Parties have the right to invoke to 







1. Nature Conservation 
 
 
RAMSAR CONVENTION ON WETLANDS OF INTERNATIONAL 




The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat (the Ramsar Convention) entered into force on 21 December 
1975.  It provides that Parties must designate at least one wetland to be included 
in the ‘List of Wetlands of International Importance’, which should be selected 
according to its international significance in terms of ecology, botany, zoology, 
limnology or hydrology.15 Parties have a duty to promote the conservation of 
listed wetlands.16 However, Parties are also obliged to promote the conservation 
of wetlands and waterfowl by establishing nature reserves on wetlands 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
National Reports on the implementation of the Convention were presented at 
COP 1 (1980) at the invitation of the Bureau. COP 2 (1984) recommended that 
all Parties submit reports to the Bureau six months before each ordinary COP.18 
The Ramsar Bureau also conducts on-site monitoring to review implementation.19 
 
Performance review information is supplemented by the wetlands inventory 
program. In Resolution VII.20, the Parties recognised the importance of 
developing a national inventory of wetlands.20 The resolution urged Parties to 
give the highest priority to the task of completing a comprehensive wetland 
inventory. The Framework for Wetland Inventory was developed in response to 
Resolution VII.20 to provide guidance on developing a wetland inventory 
                                                 
15 World Heritage Convention, Article 2. 
16 World Heritage Convention, Article 3. 
17 World Heritage Convention, Article 4. 
18 Ramsar Recommendations 2.1 and 4.3. 
19 Vol. 11(2) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 2002, p.183. 
20 Ramsar Website, <http://www.ramsar.org/key_guide_inventory_e.htm> (7/10/05). 
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program and in conducting associated identification, monitoring and 
implementation activities. 
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures 
 
The Montreux Record was established at COP 4 (1990) and formalised at COP 5 
(1993).21 The Record focuses attention on threatened Ramsar sites listed on the 
‘Record of Ramsar sites where changes in ecological character have occurred, 
are occurring or are likely to occur’.22 It is coupled with a Monitoring Procedure 
that allows the Bureau to consult with a Party when it comes to the Bureau’s 
attention that a Ramsar-listed site within that Party’s jurisdiction is likely to be 
degraded due to anthropogenic interference. The Bureau can invite the Party 
concerned to submit additional reports, monitor the site, negotiate a solution and 
it may bring the matter to the attention of the Standing Committee, which can 
bring the issue to the COP.23 Technical assistance may also be provided. 
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms 
 
The provisions of the Ramsar Convention related to support for implementation 
can be applied by the Standing Committee to address non-compliance.  
 
Technical Assistance Parties must encourage research and the exchange 
of information and promote training regarding wetlands.24 The Convention also 
stipulates that Parties must consult with other Parties about the implementation 
of the Convention, especially with regard to transfrontier wetlands, shared water 
systems, shared species and development projects affecting wetlands.25 
 
Guidelines have been produced for the implementation of the wise use of 
wetlands,26 for developing and implementing National Wetland Policies,27 
reviewing laws and institutions to promote the conservation and wise use of 
wetlands28 and for international cooperation.29 
                                                 
21 Ramsar Resolution 5.4 and Recommendation 4.8. 
22 Annex 1 to Recommendation 4.7. 
23 Ramsar Recommendation 4.7. 
24 Ramsar, Article 4. 
25 Ramsar, Article 5. 
26 Ramsar Recommendations 3.3 and 4.10 and Resolutions 5.6 and 5.7. 
27 Ramsar Resolution 7.6. 
28 Ramsar Resolution 7.7. 




At COP-7 the Bureau was directed to establish a clearinghouse and liaise with 
other international organisations for information exchange on indigenous 
knowledge systems and participatory approaches.30 
 
Financial Assistance The Ramsar Convention was adopted before 
implementation assistance funds became widespread features in international 
multilateral environmental agreements. The COP adopts a core budget 
administered by the Ramsar Bureau.31 Contributions to the budget come from the 
Parties, who contribute in proportion to their usual percentage contribution to the 
UN budget, although there is also cooperation with funding institutions such as 
the World Bank and the GEF. A Ramsar Small Grants Fund was established in 
1990. Funds come partly from the Convention's core budget, but largely from 
donations by Parties and others. It is administered by the Bureau under the 
supervision of the Standing Committee, pursuant to the Terms of Reference for 
the Financial Administration of the Convention, for activities to implement wetland 
conservation and wise use projects.32 Developing countries can apply for 
assistance by official request from a competent national authority. 
 
 (d) Dispute Resolution 
 
COP-1 (1980) identified the need for a dispute resolution procedure.33 A Task 
Force was established to consider this and other proposed amendments. 
However, the dispute resolution amendment was eventually abandoned.34  
 
 
                                                 
30 Ramsar Resolution 7.8. 
31 Ramsar Website, <http://www.ramsar.org/brochure-e.htm> (8/9/05).  
32 Ramsar Resolution 4.3. 
33 Ramsar Recommendation 1.8 
34 Ramsar Website, <http://www.ramsar.org/lib/lib_legal_e.htm> (8/9/05).  
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CONVENTION CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF THE WORLD 




The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage (World Heritage Convention) entered into force on 17 December 1975. 
The World Heritage Convention defines world heritage in two categories: first, 
cultural heritage, which are monuments, buildings and sites of outstanding 
universal value in terms of history, art, aesthetics, science or ethnology;35 and 
natural heritage, being natural features, geological formations, threatened 
species habitats and sites of outstanding universal value from an aesthetic, 
scientific or conservation point of view.36 The World Heritage Convention leaves 
it for each Party to identify World Heritage properties within its territory.37 
However, it also places a general duty on each Party to actively identify and to 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
Each Party must submit a periodic report every six years on the implementation 
of the World Heritage Convention.39 Annex 7 to the Operational Guidelines 
outlines the formatting requirements and the explanatory notes. 
 
Operational Guideline 169 provides for a reactive monitoring system whereby 
Parties must submit a report to the World Heritage Committee each time 
exceptional circumstances occur or work is undertaken which may have an effect 
on the state of conservation of the property. Reactive monitoring is also required 
in respect of properties inscribed or about to be inscribed onto the List of World 
Heritage in Danger. Where a property is being considered for inscription onto the 
List of World Heritage in Danger, the Committee must develop a programme of 
corrective measures. In doing so, the Committee may send third-party observers 
to evaluate the threats to the property.40  
 
                                                 
35 World Heritage Convention, Article 1 
36 World Heritage Convention, Article 2 
37 World Heritage Convention, Article 3 
38 World Heritage Convention, Article 4 
39 World Heritage Convention, Article 29 and Operational Guideline 203. 
40 Operational Guideline 184. 
Compliance Mechanisms 
33 
The reactive monitoring procedures does make provision for information that may 
be received from third-party sources, although the secretariat will verify the 
source and the content of the information with the Party concerned and request 
its comments.41 Under Operational Guideline 171, the Committee requests that 
Parties cooperate with any Advisory Bodies which the Committee  may have 
requested to carry out monitoring and reporting on its behalf on the progress of 
work undertaken to preserve properties in the World Heritage List. 
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures 
 
There are no non-compliance procedures established by the Convention or the 
COP.  
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms 
 
Despite the absence of any formal NCP, the World Heritage Convention does 
have modest measures in place to assist Parties in their implementation. These 
measures can be usefully addressed to instances of likely non-compliance.  
 
Technical Assistance The Convention establishes a process for making 
requests for international assistance to protect listed properties.42 Assistance 
may involve: studies concerning the artistic, scientific and technical problems 
raised by the protection; conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of the 
cultural and natural heritage; technical assistance; training; supplying equipment; 
low-interest or interest-free loans; and the granting of non-repayable subsidies.43 
 
Operational Guideline 212 provides that the World Heritage Committee is to seek 
to develop capacity-building opportunities among the Parties to the Convention. 
One such capacity-building initiative is the Global Training Strategy, which is 
linked to the Global Strategy for a Representative, Balanced and Credible World 
Heritage List and Periodic Reporting.44 There are also provisions for cooperation 
in awareness raising and education.45 
 
Financial Assistance The World Heritage Fund for the Protection of World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage of Outstanding Universal Value was established 
under Article 15 of the Convention. It is a Trust Fund maintained through 
compulsory and voluntary contributions by Parties, as well as donations to 
                                                 
41 Operational Guidelines 174 and 194. 
42 World Heritage Convention, Articles 19-22. 
43 World Heritage Convention, Article 22 
44 Operational Guideline 213. 
45 Operational Guidelines 217-222. 
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provide assistance to Parties. Funding is available for world heritage 
identification and protection, emergency assistance, and for educational, 
information and promotional activities.46 Parties contribute a set amount every 
two years.47 Where the reactive monitoring procedures have been invoked, the 
World Heritage Committee may authorise the provision of emergency funding 
from the World Heritage Fund as well as technical assistance in order to prevent 
the deletion of any property from the World Heritage List.48 
 
In addition, the World Heritage Committee has established a Reserve Fund to 
meet requests for assistance resulting from natural disasters and emergencies.49 
Funds in trust are another source of funding; these are donations by specific 
countries to support specific projects.50 
 
Penalties  Failure to provide the compulsory contribution for the current year 
or the preceding year excludes the non-compliant Party from membership of the 
World Heritage Committee.51  
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
There are no dispute resolution mechanisms in the Convention. 
  
                                                 
46 Operational Guideline 235. 
47 World Heritage Convention, Article 16 
48 Operational Guidelines 170, 176, 183 and 189. 
49 UNESCO Financial Regulations, reg. 5.1. 
50 http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=150 (7/10/05). 
51 World Heritage Convention, Article 16.5. 
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CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF 




The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna (CITES) entered into force on 1 July 1975. It establishes a permit system 
to control imports and exports of wild fauna and flora. CITES lists controlled flora 
and fauna in three appendices.52 Appendix I covers all species threatened with 
extinction that are or may be affected by trade. Commercial trade in these 
species is essentially banned and can only be authorised in exceptional 
circumstances. Appendix II covers species which are not currently threatened 
with extinction but which may become so unless trade in such specimens is 
controlled under the Convention. Appendix III covers species that any Party has 
identified as being subject to national regulation for the purpose of preventing or 
restricting exploitation and as requiring the cooperation of other Parties to control 
trade. Parties are required to establish national Scientific Authorities, to advise on 
the endangered status of native species of flora and fauna, and a Management 




(a) Performance Review Information  
 
Pursuant to Article VI.6, each Party must maintain records of trade in species 
listed in Appendices I, II and III, which cover: the names and addresses of 
exporters and importers; the number and type of permits and certificates granted; 
the States with which such trade occurs; the numbers or quantities and types of 
specimens; names of species as included in Appendices I, II and III; and, where 
applicable, the size and sex of the specimens in question.  
 
In addition, Parties must prepare: 
• Periodic reports on their implementation of the Convention; 
• Annual reports containing a summary of the information specified in Article 
VIII, which must be transmitted to the Secretariat; and 
• Biennial reports on legislative, regulatory and administrative measures taken 
to enforce the provisions of the Convention.54 
 
Annual reports must be submitted by 31 October for the previous trade year, 
although extensions are available on written request.55 The requirement for 
                                                 
52 CITES, Article II. 
53 CITES Article  
54 CITES, Article VIII.7 
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biennial reporting has been largely unimplemented, although at COP-11 (2000) 
Parties were called upon to comply.56 
 
Resolution 11.17 consolidates all reporting resolutions and decisions. Guidelines 
on reporting were introduced in 1982 following Resolution 3.10, which have 
recently been revised and updated.57 Decision 13.90 directs the Secretariat to 
identify ways to reduce the reporting burden on Parties and report at COP-14 on 
the results of this work. 
 
The Scientific Authority of each Party has obligations to monitor the export 
permits granted by the State for Appendix II specimens and the actual exports of 
such specimens.58 Additionally, the Parties, NGOs such as the TRAFFIC 
Network and international bodies such as the World Customs 
OrganisationOrganisation and Interpol, perform monitoring functions and report 
infractions to the Secretariat.59 TRAFFIC is an international wildlife trade 
monitoring network that was founded in 1976 as a joint programme between the 
WWF and IUCN-The World Conservation Union.60 It works cooperatively with the 
CITES Secretariat in implementing the Convention, its mission being to ensure 
that wildlife trade does not threaten nature conservation.61 The Secretariat also 
conducts ad hoc verification missions to assess a Party’s compliance with the 
Convention.62  
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
Under Article VXIII, if the Secretariat is satisfied that any species in Appendices I 
or II is being adversely affected or that the Convention is not being effectively 
                                                                                                                                                 
55 CITES Resolution 11.17. 
56 CITES Doc. 7.19, ‘Report on National Reports under Article III, Paragraph 7, of the Convention’, 
prepared by the Secretariat for COP-7; CITES Decision 11.38 (ex-9.20); Reeves, R, Policing International 
Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, 
p.67. 
57 See SC45 Doc 13.2 ‘Guidelines for the Preparation of Annual Reports’; Reeves, R, Policing 
International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, Earthscan Publications, 
London, 2002, p.63. 
58 CITES, Article IV.3. 
59 Reeves, R, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, 
Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, p.69. 
60 http://www.traffic.org/about/what_is.html (3/11/05). 
61 http://www.traffic.org/about/ and http://www.traffic.org/about/what_is.html (3/11/05). 
62 Reeves, R, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, 
Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, p.75. 
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implemented it will communicate this issue to the relevant Party’s Management 
Authority. The Party must propose remedial action. 
 
COP-11 (2000) adopted a formal NCP, which can be invoked where Parties fail 
to meet their reporting requirements and potentially, their financial obligations 
under the Trust Fund.63 Resolution 11.3 states that if a major implementation 
problem is brought to the Secretariat’s attention, the Secretariat and the non-
compliant Party are to work together to resolve the problem. The Secretariat is to 
offer advice on technical assistance as required. If a solution cannot be readily 
achieved, the Secretariat must bring the matter to the attention of the Standing 
Committee, which may pursue the matter directly with the non-compliant Party to 
find a solution. The Secretariat must keep all Parties informed of such 
implementation problems and any actions taken to resolve them. Resolution 
11.17 provides that a failure to submit a report by 31 October for trade in the 
previous year constitutes a major problem, which the Secretariat must refer to 
the Standing Committee for solution in accordance with Resolution 11.3.  
 
The COP employs non-compliance responses, which include: requiring the 
Secretariat to issue security paper (i.e. watermarked and of identifiable 
authenticity) for permits and certificates to reduce instances of forgery and to 
confirm permits for a period of time; issuing formal warnings; the Secretariat 
suspending cooperation with the non-compliant Party; the Secretariat conducting 
on-site verifications; the Standing Committee recommending suspension of trade 
in CITES-listed species with the non-compliant Party and specifying the 
conditions to be met before the trade restrictions can be lifted.64 
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms  
 
At the Standing Committee’s 46th meeting, the Secretariat presented the 
Committee with a range of possible responses for non-compliance, some of 
which are already in use, in an attempt to revise Resolution 11.3. The range 
included: providing advice; informal warnings; additional self-reporting; public 
notification of non-compliance; on-site verification; action plans; suspending legal 
rights and privileges (i.e. suspension of trade in one or all CITES specimens, 
voting restrictions, ineligibility of Standing Committee membership and of 
participation in committees and working groups and ineligibility to receive 
                                                 
63 At the Standing Committee’s 46th meeting, the Secretariat considered that Article XI.3(a) and Resolution 
11.2 can form the basis of formal action for dealing with fiscally non-compliant Parties: Reeves, R, 
Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, Earthscan 
Publications, London, 2002, p.155. 
64 Reeves, R, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, 
Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, p.93. 
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documents for meetings); and financial penalties.65 However, the Committee 
declined to revise Resolution 11.3 and instead, directed the Secretariat to 
prepare a discussion paper for COP-12 (2002).66 An open-ended intersessional 
working group was established at the 50th meeting of the Standing Committee to 
finalise a set of guidelines for complying with the Convention, however these 
have not been completed.67 
 
Technical Assistance Resolution 3.4 encourages Parties to include 
technical assistance in bilateral and multilateral aid programmes. In addition, 
Parties receive assistance with the identification of CITES species pursuant to 
Article XII.2(f), which states that the Secretariat must periodically publish and 
distribute to Parties current editions of Appendices I, II and III together with any 
information that would facilitate the identification of specimens included in those 
Appendices. In response, the Secretariat and a Committee of Experts have 
developed an Identification Manual.68 
 
Capacity-building workshops are conducted for Management Authority staff and 
enforcement officers while legal officers are trained under the National 
Legislation Project. The latter aims to help Parties draft appropriate laws and 
policies for the implementation of the Convention.69  
 
Financial Assistance CITES has no funding mechanism to facilitate 
compliance. Initially, the Secretariat was funded by UNEP. However, the 1979 
Bonn amendment to Article XI, which entered into force on 13 April 1987, 
conferred financial powers to the COP, and funding from UNEP was gradually 
phased out. A Trust Fund was established with an agreed scale of contributions 
to finance, inter alia, technical assistance to the Parties. At COP-12 (2002) the 
Parties adopted procedures and guidelines for the approval of externally funded 
projects.70 
 
Penalties  The failure to nominate a Scientific Authority in accordance with 
Article IX of the Convention was dealt with by Resolution 10.3. It called upon 
Parties to refuse export permits from Parties that have not given the Secretariat 
                                                 
65 CITES SC46 Doc.11.3, ‘Possible measures for Non-compliance’, CITES Secretariat (March 2002); 
Reeves, R, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, 
Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, p.157. 
66 CITES COP 12, Doc.8, ‘Report of the Chairman’, para.40. 
67 UNCCD COP 7, Items 13(b) and (c) of the provisional agenda, Executive Summary, para.s 18-20. 
68 Reeves, R, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, 
Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, p.238 
69 CITES Resolution 8.4. 
70 CITES Resolution 12.2. 
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details of a Scientific Authority for more than one interval between regular 
meetings of COP. At the same time, it encouraged technical assistance to 
Scientific Authorities with a view to facilitating compliance.                              
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
Where there is a dispute over the interpretation or application of the provisions of 
the Convention, Parties can opt for negotiation. They can proceed onto 




                                                 
71 CITES, Article XVIII 
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CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION OF MIGRATORY SPECIES OF 




The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 
(CMS) entered into force on 1 November 1983.  It aims to conserve and manage 
migratory species of wild animals through the action of Range States, i.e. those 
States exercising jurisdiction within the range of any such species. Under Article 
II, Parties are encouraged to promote, cooperate in and support research relating 
to migratory species and to provide immediate protection to the endangered 
migratory species listed in Appendix I. Parties are also encouraged to conclude 
agreements with other Range States for the conservation and management of 
species having unfavourable conservation status listed in Appendix II.72  
                                                 
72 CMS Articles IV & V.1. These Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding include: 
• Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea 1990 (between Denmark, 
Germany and The Netherlands);  
• Agreement on the Conservation of Populations of European Bats 1991; 
• Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas 1991; 
• Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds 1995 
• Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and 
Contiguous Atlantic Area 1996; 
• Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles 1996;  
• International Agreement for the Conservation of Caribbean Sea Turtles 1998;  
• Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels 2001;  
• Memorandum of Understanding on Conservation Measures for the Slender-billed Curlew 
1994; 
• Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the Siberian 
Crane 1993; 
• Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for Marine Turtles of 
the Atlantic Coast of Africa 1999; 
• Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles 
and their Habitats of the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia 2001; 
• Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of the Middle-





(a) Performance Review Information 
 
Parties have obligations to report on their implementation efforts to conserve 
those migratory species in Appendices I and II that pass through their jurisdiction 
and also must monitor such migratory species and keep the Secretariat informed 
of the species’ status.73 Resolution 6.5 recommended that the format of national 
reports be simplified and that the content be standardised to encourage Parties 
to provide information that directly relates to the implementation of the CMS 
Strategic Plan. Parties were encouraged to trial this new reporting format for 
COP-7 (2002). At COP-7, Resolution 7.8 commended the new reporting format 
and recommended that the final version be sent to the Standing Committee for 
approval and adoption at its 26th meeting. The new reporting format requires, 
inter alia, performance review information with respect to how Parties are 
implementing the Strategic Plan.74 
 
Article V sets out criteria for the substance of regional Agreements negotiated 
under the auspices of Article IV. Such Agreements should establish the 
appropriate machinery to monitor their effectiveness and reporting obligations.  
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures 
 
The CMS and the COP do not specify any non-compliance procedures. 
  
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms 
 
As there is no formal NCP, so there are no formal non-compliance response 
mechanisms. However, a range of support measures for implementation can be 
directed to assist Parties experiencing compliance difficulties.  
 
Technical Assistance Workshops have been held to assist Parties in 
complying with their monitoring obligations. For example, in 1999 an international 
workshop took place in Bonn, Germany, to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
• Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation and Restoration of Bukhara 
Deer 2002 
• Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the Aquatic 
Warbler 2003. 
73 CMS Article VI. 





Convention and present new research and monitoring technologies.75 Resolution 
7.8 instructed the Secretariat to provide technical capacity to facilitate the 
transfer of knowledge on the CMS Information System to developing countries. It 
also calls for Parties to contribute to the ongoing development and maintenance 
of the CMS Information System and the CMS Global Register of Migratory 
Species. 
 
Financial Assistance UNEP-WCMC provides the Secretariat and 
administers the Convention’s Trust Fund. There are plans to launch a new 
fundraising strategy at COP-8 (2005), to be led by a new body called ‘Friends of 
CMS’.76  
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
Parties are to resolve disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the 
Convention through negotiation and, if necessary, arbitration at the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration. 
 
                                                 
75 CMS Website, <http://www.cms.int/news/PRESS/nwPR1999/nw990627.htm> (7/10/05). 
76 CMS Website, <http://www.cms.int/bodies/COP/cop8/cop8_mainpage.htm> (8/9/05). 
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The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) entered into force on 29 December 
1993. Article 1 outlines the three objectives of the Convention: the ‘conservation 
of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources.’ The CBD promotes inter-State cooperation for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity,77 and especially of technical and scientific 
cooperation.78 This has facilitated many bilateral and multilateral projects. The 
Convention aims to achieve the conservation of biological diversity by: identifying 
and monitoring of the components of biological diversity and of the processes 
and activities that threaten those components;79 providing for in-situ and ex-situ 
conservation;80 and integrating the conservation and sustainable use of biological 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
The reporting provisions of the CBD are sparse. Article 26 of the CBD calls upon 
Parties to report upon their measures to implement the CBD and the 
effectiveness of those objectives. COP-2 (1995) decided that the first national 
reports should be delivered to COP-4 in 1998 and adopted guidelines for the 
preparation of reports were adopted at COP-2.82 
  
In addition to the reporting obligations, Article 7 provides that each Party must 
monitor the components of biological diversity set out in Annex I for the purposes 
of in-situ and ex-situ conservation. 
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures 
 
There is no established NCP. However, Decision VII/30 established the Ad Hoc 
Open-ended Working Group on Review of Implementation of the Convention. Of 
                                                 
77 CBD, Article 5. 
78 CBD, Article 18. 
79 CBD, Article 7. 
80 CBD, Articles 9 and 18. 
81 CBD, Article 10. 
82 CBD Decision II/17. 
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particular interest is the Working Group’s mandate ‘to consider progress in the 
implementation of the Convention…to review the impacts and effectiveness of 
existing processes under the Convention, such as meetings of the Conference of 
the Parties, the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological 
Advice, national focal points and the Secretariat…and to consider ways and 
means of identifying and overcoming obstacles to the effective implementation of 
the Convention.’83 At its first meeting, the Working Group recommended that the 
COP investigate the obstacles to implementation at national level and ways to 
overcome those obstacles.84 This Working Group may potentially develop into a 
non-confrontational means of dealing with instances of non-compliance and 
providing non-compliance response assistance.  
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms 
 
Technical Assistance The CBD contains obligations on promoting and 
cooperating with respect to: research and training;85 public education and 
awareness;86 information exchange;87 and access to technical and scientific 
cooperation.88 The Convention established a clearing-house mechanism (CHM) 
to ensure that all Parties have access to the information and technologies 
required to implement the Convention. The CHM was set up at COP-1 (1994) 
and is funded through the Convention’s regular budget and through voluntary 
contributions.89 It promotes cooperation in six key areas: tools for decision-
making; training and capacity building; research; funding; technology transfer; 
and the repatriation of information.90 The CHM provides universal access to 
Convention records, case studies, national and other reports, initiatives and 
programmes and technical and scientific information.91 It also seeks to increase 
public awareness of the Convention’s programmes and links experts to relevant 
work programmes.  
At COP-4 (1998), Decision IV/2 recommended that Parties organise a CHM 
steering committee or working group to build up the information contained in the 
                                                 
83 Decision VII/30, para 23. 
84 Recommendation 5(b). 
85 CBD, Article 12. 
86 CBD, Article 13. 
87 CBD, Article 17. 
88 CBD, Article 18. 
89 CBD Decisions I/3 and I/9. 
90 CBD Website, <http://www.biodiv.org/chm/default.aspx> (8/9/05).  
91 CBD Website, <http://www.biodiv.org/chm/default.aspx> (8/9/05).  
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CHM at all levels, including country profiles, biodiversity strategies and action 
plans, legislation, scientific and technological information and financial sources. 
Numerous CHM regional workshops have been conducted since 1997. In 1999, 
an independent review of the pilot phase of the CHM took place, culminating in 
the development of a strategic plan and long-term program of work.92 
 
An Informal Advisory Committee, which is coordinated by the Executive 
Secretary, oversees the CHM.93 The continuation and mandate of the 
Committee, as well as its operational procedure, were reviewed at COP-7 
(2004),94 which decided to extend the Committee’s mandate and review its 
continuation and operation at COP-9. A network of CHM National Focal Points 
has been established to facilitate technical and scientific cooperation. 
 
Financial Assistance In relation to funding, Article 20 states that each Party 
is to provide financial support and incentives for national projects that implement 
the objectives of the Convention. Developed Parties are also expected to provide 
additional funding to developing Parties to enable the latter to implement the 
Convention. Developed Parties may provide funding through regional, bilateral 
and multilateral channels. 
 
Article 21 provides for a mechanism to provide financial resources on a grant or 
concessional basis to help developing Parties. COP-1 (1994) decided that the 
GEF would continue to serve as the institutional structure to operate the financial 
mechanism under the Convention on an interim basis, in accordance with Article 
39 of the Convention.95 COP-3 (1996) adopted the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the COP of  the CBD and the Council of the GEF. The 
Memorandum of Understanding allows the GEF, in permanently operating the 
financial mechanism under the Convention, to take guidance from the COP in 
funding activities to implement the Convention.96 COP-3 (1996) also requested 
the financial mechanism to provide funding for capacity building in developing 
countries, particularly in relation to IT training and pilot projects to implement the 
CHM.97 Guidance has also been provided to the financial mechanism at COPs.98 
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
                                                 
92 CBD Website, <http://www.biodiv.org/chm/default.aspx> (8/9/05). 
93 CBD Decision III/4 and IV/2. 
94 CBD Decision V/14. 
95 CBD Decision I/2 
96 CBD Website, <http://www.biodiv.org/chm/background.asp#> (8/9/05).  
97 CBD Decision III/4 




Article 27 provides that the Parties shall seek solution by negotiation where there 
is a dispute concerning the application of the Convention. If the dispute is not 
resolved, they may seek mediation by a third Party.  
 
The Convention provides that disputes can be settled through arbitration in 
accordance with Part I of Annex II, conciliation in accordance with Part II of 
Annex II or through the International Court of Justice. However, Parties must 
firstly submit a declaration that they accept Arbitration or the International Court 
of Justice as a compulsory means of dispute resolution. Otherwise, the dispute 
must be submitted to conciliation in accordance with Part II of Annex II if 
negotiation and mediation fail to reach a solution. 
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UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION IN 
THOSE COUNTRIES EXPERIENCING SERIOUS DROUGHT AND/OR 




The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa 
(UNCCD) entered into force on 26 December 1996. The objective of the 
Convention is to promote an integrated approach to combating desertification 
and mitigating the effects of serious drought and/or desertification, through 
effective actions at all levels, supported by international co-operation and 
partnership arrangements.99  
 
The Convention distinguishes between affected developing Parties and 
developed Parties. Article 5 requires affected developing Parties to give due 
priority to combating desertification, establish strategies within the framework of 
sustainable development plans, address the underlying causes of desertification, 
promote awareness of the problem and strengthen relevant existing legislation. 
Article 6 requires developed Parties to actively support the efforts of affected 
developing Parties to combat desertification by providing financial assistance and 
mobilising funding. 
 
There are five Annexes to the Convention dealing with the implementation of the 
Convention in five regions affected by desertification: (I) Africa; (II) Asia; (III) Latin 
America and the Caribbean; (IV) Northern Mediterranean; and (V) Central and 
Eastern Europe. The African Annex is the most detailed and contains provisions 





(a) Performance Review Information 
 
Article 9 of the UNCCD requires affected developing Parties and Parties that are 
members of Regional Implementation Annexes to prepare National Action 
Programmes in order to identify the factors contributing to desertification in their 
countries, and to describe practical measures to combat them. The Regional 
Implementation Annex for Africa and the Northern Mediterranean specify that 
their national action programmes must contain provisions for monitoring the 
implementation of the Convention.100  
 
                                                 
99 UNCCD, Article 2.1. 
100 Annex I, Article 8.3(e) and Annex IV, Article 5(f). 
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In addition, Parties must communicate to the COP at its ordinary sessions 
reports on implementation measures.101 Affected developing Parties must 
provide reports of strategies developed pursuant to Article 5 and their NAPs.102 
Developed Parties must provide information on the measures undertaken to 
assist in the preparation and implementation of Action Programmes, including 
information on financial resources they have provided.103 
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures 
 
Under Article 27, the COP is empowered to consider and adopt procedures and 
institutional mechanisms to resolve issues regarding implementation. At COP-6 
(2003), the Parties convened an Open-Ended Ad Hoc Group of Experts to make 
recommendations on such procedures and institutional mechanisms.104 A report 
has been complied which summarises non-compliance mechanisms that have 
been developed in other biodiversity-related as well as the cluster of chemical 
Conventions. The report recommends that COP-7 (2005) may wish to consider 
requesting the Group to develop a compliance model for consideration.105 
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms 
 
Technical Assistance Numerous articles provide for technical cooperation 
between Parties. Article 6(e) requires developed Parties to promote and facilitate 
access by affected Parties to appropriate technology, knowledge and know-how 
in combating desertification. Article 16 provides that Parties agree to integrate 
and coordinate the collection, analysis and exchange of short-term and long-term 
data and information to ensure the systemic observation of land degradation. 
Article 17 states that Parties undertake to promote technical and scientific 
cooperation. Article 18 provides that Parties undertake to promote, finance 
and/or facilitate the financing of the transfer, acquisition, adaptation and 
development of environmentally sound, economically viable and socially 
acceptable technologies relevant to combating desertification. This cooperation is 
to be conducted bilaterally or multilaterally. Parties are also required to fully 
utilize existing national, subregional and international information systems and 
clearing houses for the dissemination of information on available technologies; 
facilitate technology cooperation through financial assistance; and facilitate 
access by affected developing Parties to technology on favourable terms. Finally, 
Article 19 provides that Parties recognize the importance of capacity building. 
                                                 
101 UNCCD, Article 26. 
102 UNCCD, Article 9.1. 
103 UNCCD, Article 9.2. 
104 UNCCD Decision 22/COP 6. 




Financial Assistance In relation to financial assistance, Article 4.2(h) 
provides that in pursuing the objectives of the Convention, the Parties will 
promote the use of existing bilateral and multilateral financial mechanisms and 
arrangements that mobilise and channel substantial financial resources to 
affected developing Parties.106 While all Parties must make every effort to ensure 
that adequate financial resources are available for programmes to combat 
desertification,107 the financial burden to provide, seek out and mobilize funding 
is the responsibility of the developed Parties.108 
 
Article 21 establishes a Global Mechanism to promote the mobilisation of funds 
to developing Parties. The International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD) was selected at COP-1 (1997) to house the Global Mechanism, which 
operates in conjunction with the World Bank and the UNDP.109 The mechanism 
provides financial assistance to the Convention's national or regional Action 
Programmes and seeks to promote greater coordination of funding and greater 
effectiveness in the use of funds. 
 
COP-5 (2001) enhanced the UNCCD’s financial base following strong support for 
a proposal by the GEF Council to designate land degradation as another focal 
area for funding.110 
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
Disputes must be settled through negotiation or other peaceful means.111 Parties 
have the choice of opting for arbitration under procedures to be adopted by the 
COP in an annex as soon as practicable, or in the International Court of Justice, 
provided they have given written notice. If the dispute takes more than 12 months 
to settle or the Parties have not opted for arbitration, it must be submitted to 
conciliation. Arbitration and conciliation procedures are yet to be adopted.112 
 
 
                                                 
106 See also UNCCD, Article 4.3. 
107 UNCCD, Article 20. 
108 UNCCD, Article 5. 
109 UNCCD Decision 24/COP.1. 
110 UNCCD Decision 9/COP.5. 
111 UNCCD, Article 28. 
112 COP 7 UNCCD, Items 13(b) and (c) of the provisional agenda, p.14. 
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INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD 




When the text of the CBD was adopted in 1992, member countries also adopted 
Resolution 3 of the ‘Nairobi Final Act’, which recognised the need to resolve 
issues relating to plant genetic resources under the auspices of the United 
Nations Food and Agricultural OrganisationOrganisation.113 The International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture was signed on 3 
November 2001 and entered into force on 29 June 2004.  
 
The objectives of the Plant Genetic Resources Treaty are the conservation and 
sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) and 
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of their use, in accordance 
with the CBD.114 Under Article 5, Parties are required to: survey and inventory 
PGRFA; promote the collection of PGRFA and relevant associated information 
on those that are under threat or are of potential use; promote or support farmers 
and local communities’ efforts to manage and conserve their PGRFA; promote in 
situ conservation of wild crop relatives and wild plants for food production; and 
monitor the maintenance of the viability, degree of variation, and the genetic 
integrity of collections of PGRFA.115 Article 6 obliges Parties to develop and 
maintain appropriate policy and legal measures that promote the sustainable use 
of PGRFA. Article 10 establishes the Multilateral System to facilitate access to 
PGRFA. Multilateral access is limited to the crops and forages listed in Annex I 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
The Plant Genetic Resources Treaty does not require the submission of 
performance review reports from the Parties. In respect of verification, the 
Secretary has the right to access and inspect all activities that are directly related 
to the conservation and exchange of the material covered by Article 15.1. That 
provision deals with accessing ex situ collections of PGRFA held in trust by the 
International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).  
                                                 
113 Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, <http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/IU.htm> 
(8/9/05). 
114 PGRFA Treaty, Article 1. 
115 PGRFA Treaty, Article 5.1. 
116 PGRFA Treaty, Article 12.4. 
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To a limited degree, performance review might be constructed by collecting 
together the operational information required to be exchanged in the course of 
transactions regulated by the Treaty. Parties providing PGRFA under the 
Multilateral System must provide all available data and information on the 
product being supplied.117 Under Article 5.1(f), Parties are also required to 
monitor the maintenance of the viability, degree of variation, and the genetic 
integrity of collections of PGRFA. Under Article 17, Parties must cooperate to 
establish a global information system (called the Global Information System) to 
facilitate the exchange of information on scientific, technical and environmental 
matters related to PGRFA. The expectation is that such exchange of information 
will assist in benefit sharing, by making information on PGRFA available to all 
Parties. In developing the Global Information System, cooperation must be 
sought from the Clearing-House Mechanism of the CBD. Parties agree to make 
available information through the Global Information System, including 
catalogues and inventories, information on technologies, results of technical, 
scientific and socio-economic research, including characterization, evaluation 
and utilization, regarding PGRFA in Annex I.118  
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures 
 
Article 21 requires the Governing Body to, at its first meeting, consider and 
approve procedures and operational mechanisms, including monitoring, to 
promote compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. The Interim Committee for 
the Treaty, the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, has 
convened an Open-ended Working Group to consider the issue of non-
compliance at COP-1 (2005).119 
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms 
 
The Plant Genetic Resources Treaty contains extensive assistance provisions 
that might be applied as non-compliance response mechanisms. 
 
Technical Assistance Article 5.1 provides that Parties must, in cooperation 
with other Parties where appropriate, promote an integrated approach to the 
exploration, conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA while Article 5.1(e) 
encourages Parties to cooperate to promote the development of an efficient and 
sustainable system of ex situ conservation and the development and transfer of 
appropriate technologies for this purpose. The Treaty provides that international 
cooperation is to be directed to: assisting developing Parties in their conservation 
and sustainable use of PGRFA; promoting conservation, evaluation, 
                                                 
117 PGRFA Treaty, Article 12.3(c). 
118 PGRFA Treaty, Article 13.2(a). 
119 FAO Website, <http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/compliance.htm> (17/9/05). 
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documentation, genetic enhancement, plant breeding and seed multiplication; 
sharing, providing access to and exchanging PGRFA as well as information and 
technology in accordance with Part IV; and implementing the funding strategy in 
Article 18.120 Under Article 8, Parties agree to promote the provision of technical 
assistance to contracting Parties. 
 
Article 13 states that benefits accruing from PGRFA accessed through the 
Multilateral System must be shared through the exchange of information, transfer 
of technology, capacity building and funding. These benefits should flow to 
farmers in developing countries embodying traditional lifestyles.  
 
The provision then expands on each form of assistance. Exchange of information 
was dealt with in (a) above. In relation to technology transfer, Parties undertake 
to provide and/or facilitate access to technologies for the conservation, 
characterisation, evaluation and use of PGRFA that are within the scope of the 
Multilateral System.121 Access to technology for developing countries must be 
provided on fair and favourable terms, although intellectual property rights are 
still protected.122 In relation to capacity building, Parties agree to give priority to: 
programmes for scientific and technical education and training in conservation 
and sustainable use of PGRFA; strengthening facilities for conservation and 
sustainable use of PGRFA; and scientific research.123 Again, the emphasis is on 
assisting developing countries. Article 13.3(d) deals with the sharing of 
commercial benefits under the Multilateral System. The multilateral transfer 
agreements must include a requirement that any recipient who commercialises a 
PGRFA product by incorporating material from the Multilateral System must 
make a payment to the financial mechanism established under Article 19.3(f). 
The details of these terms and conditions are to be ironed out at the first meeting 
of the Governing Body. 
 
Financial Assistance Article 19.3(f) requires the Governing Body to set up a 
Trust Fund. Article 18 deals with funding priorities. Developed Parties are 
required to provide, and developing Parties to avail themselves of, financial 
resources, including through bilateral and multilateral channels and through the 
Trust Fund. Funding priorities will be given to the implementation of agreed plans 
and programmes for farmers in developing countries who conserve and 
sustainably utilize PGRFA.124 
 
                                                 
120 PGRFA Treaty, Article 7.2(a), (b) and (d). 
121 PGRFA Treaty, Article 13.2(b)(i). 
122 PGRFA Treaty, Article 13.2(b)(iii). 
123 PGRFA Treaty, Article 13.2(c). 
124 PGRFA Treaty, Article 18.5. 
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(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
Parties must ensure that opportunities to seek recourse are available under their 
legal systems where contractual disputes arising under multilateral transfer 
agreements arise.125  
 
In respect of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, 
Parties must firstly opt for negotiation and then, if necessary, mediation by a third 
Party. Parties may, at any time, declare that for disputes not resolved through 
negotiation or mediation, they accept arbitration in accordance with Part 1 of 
Annex II or the International Court of Justice as compulsory means of dispute 
resolution. Otherwise, the dispute must be submitted to conciliation in 
accordance with Part 2 of Annex II.  
 
                                                 
125 PGRFA Treaty, Article 12.5. 
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2. Hazardous Materials 
 
BASEL CONVENTION ON THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY 




The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (the Basel Convention) entered into force 
on 5 May 1992. The Convention regulates the transboundary import and export 
of hazardous wastes and obliges Parties to ensure that such wastes are 
managed and disposed of in accordance with the principles of environmentally 
sound management (ESM).126  
 
Article 2.1 defines wastes as ‘substances or objects that are disposed of or are 
intended to be disposed of or are required to be disposed of by the provisions of 
national law.’ To ‘dispose of’ a waste means any of the operations set out in 
Annex IV. Article 1 defines ‘hazardous wastes’ as those that belong to any of the 
waste streams contained in Annex I, unless they do not possess any of the 
hazard characteristics in Annex III. The Convention also addresses ‘other 
wastes', defined in Annex II as ‘categories of wastes requiring special 
consideration’  (i.e. household wastes and their residues). The Convention does 
not cover waste that is already covered by other international control systems.127 
Parties to the Convention adopted a decision in 1992 to ban the transfer of 
hazardous wastes for final disposal from OECD and non-OCED countries. Annex 
VII to the Convention was then adopted at COP-3 (1995), listing the countries 
from which the export of hazardous wastes to all other Parties to the Convention 
is prohibited. Annex VIII, which listed wastes covered by the ban, and Annex IX, 
which lists wastes that are not covered, were added in at COP-4 (1998).128 At the 
time of writing, the ban has not yet entered into force. However, Annexes VIII and 
XI entered into force on 6 November 1998.  
 
The Basel Convention contains 15 operative divisions, which have been grouped 
into three categories for the purposes of this Chapter.  
 
1. Waste management. Under Article 4(2)(a)-(d), each Party must take 
appropriate measures to: ensure that the generation of hazardous wastes 
is reduced to a minimum; ensure the availability of adequate disposal 
                                                 
126 Basel Website, <http://www.basel.int/pub/basics.html> (8/9/05).  
127 Basel Article 1. 
128 See Kummer, Katharina International Management of Hazardous Wastes: the Basel Convention and 
Related Legal Rules, Oxford University Press, Oxford, c1995 1999. 
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facilities as close as possible to the source of generation of waste; ensure 
that persons involved in the management of hazardous wastes take such 
steps as are necessary to prevent pollution; and ensure that a 
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes is reduced to a minimum 
and is conducted in a manner that will protect human health and the 
environment. 
2. Export controls. Under Article 4(5), Parties shall not permit the export of 
hazardous wastes to a non-Party, or the import of hazardous waste from a 
non-Party. Parties may exercise the right to refuse the import of 
hazardous wastes for disposal and must inform other Parties of this 
decision.129 Thus, the regulatory system under the Basel Convention is 
one of prior informed consent. There is a duty to re-import abortive or 
illegal exports.130 
3. Import controls and movement management. States are obliged to prevent 
the import of wastes if they will not be managed according to ESM 
principles.131 Wastes are to be packed and labeled according to 





(a) Performance Review Information 
 
Under Article 13(3), Parties must transmit reports to the COP each year. The 
reports must provide information on: competent authorities and focal points; 
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes; efforts to achieve reductions in 
waste; available qualified statistics compiled by them on how the production, 
transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes affects human health and the 
environment; bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements entered into pursuant 
to Article 11 of the Convention; accidents in the transboundary movement or 
disposal of waste and measures taken to deal with them; disposal options within 
national jurisdictions; measures undertaken to develop technologies to reduce or 
eliminate the production of hazardous wastes; and any other matters the COP 
deems relevant. 
 
Article 10.2(b) obliges Parties to monitor the effects of the management of 
hazardous wastes on human health and the environment, although this does not 
constitute third-party monitoring of performance. Article 19 imposes monitoring 
                                                 
129 Basel Articles 4(1)(a) and 6(3). 
130 Basel Articles 8 and 9(2)(a). 
131 Basel Article 4(2)(g). 
132 Basel Article 4(7)(b) and (c). 
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obligations on the Parties.133 The provision states that any Party, which has 
reason to believe that another Party has breached the Convention, may inform 
the Secretariat and the Party against whom the allegations are made. 
 
(c) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures 
 
In Decision V/16, COP-5 (1999) requested the Legal Working Group to develop a 
draft decision for the establishment of a compliance mechanism. A Compliance 
Committee was established at COP-6 (2002). Decision VI/12 states that the 
Committee shall be ‘non-confrontational, transparent, cost-effective and 
preventative in nature, simple, flexible, non-binding and oriented in the direction 
of helping Parties to implement the provisions of the Basel Convention’.134 The 
Committee receives submissions from the Secretariat or Parties in relation to 
non-compliance issues. The Party whose compliance is in question is given the 
opportunity to make its own submissions to the Committee. The Committee 
investigates the cause of the non-compliance and gives advice or non-binding 
recommendations to help the Party achieve compliance.  
 
At COP-7 (2004) Parties approved the 2005-2006 Work Programme for the 
Compliance Committee,135 focusing on identifying and analyzing difficulties 
relating to: reporting obligations under the Basel Convention; designation and 
functioning of national competent authorities and focal points; and development 
of national legislation to implement effectively the Basel Convention. 
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms 
 
Measures that may be taken by the COP, additional to the recommendations of 
the Compliance Committee, include prioritization of technical assistance, 
capacity building and funding, or a cautionary statement and  advice regarding 
future compliance.136 
 
Technical Assistance Under Article 10, the Parties must cooperate with 
each other to improve and achieve the ESM of hazardous wastes. They must, 
upon request, make information available with a view to promoting the ESM of 
hazardous and other wastes, and cooperate in monitoring the effects of 
managing hazardous wastes on human health and the environment. Parties must 
                                                 
133 Article 19 is entitled ‘verification’. This report broadly defines verification as a process of checking the 
accuracy of performance review reports. Monitoring is concerned with observing a Party’s performance 
and notifying the relevant Convention body of breaches. The substance of article 19 accords with the 
definition of monitoring in this report and is therefore classed as a monitoring obligation. 
134 Basel Decision VI/12, Appendix, para 2. 
135 Basel Decision VII/30 
136 Basel Decision VI/12, Appendix, paras 9-20. 
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also cooperate in: the development and implementation of environmentally sound 
low-waste technologies and the improvement of existing technologies; the 
transfer of technology and management systems related to the ESM of 
hazardous wastes and other wastes; developing technical capacity among 
Parties that need and request assistance in this area; and developing technical 
guidelines.137 Regional centres for training and technology transfers have been 
established to assist in training and technology transfer.138 The Secretariat has 
also produced a Manual for the Implementation of the Basel Convention, which 
was approved at COP-3, 139 and organises related training seminars.140 
 
Financial Assistance Parties are also required to consider the 
establishment of a revolving fund to provide assistance in emergency cases and, 
indeed, they requested the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical 
Experts to consider the elements that would be required in establishing such a 
fund at COP-1 (1992).141 The Basel Convention has established a Trust Fund for 
the Implementation of the Convention as well as a Technical Cooperation Trust 
Fund to Assist Developing Countries, which was enlarged at COP-6 to address 
compliance in cases of emergency.142  
 
Penalties At COP-5 (1999) the Parties adopted the Basel Protocol on Liability 
and Compensation, which establishes a liability and compensation regime for 
damage that arises from the movement of transboundary wastes.  
 
Article 8 imposes a duty on exporting Parties to re-import hazardous materials 
where the transboundary movement cannot be completed in accordance with the 
terms of the contract. Article 9 defines illegal traffic as transboundary movements 
that: occur without notification to all States concerned; occur without the consent 
of a State concerned; occur where consent was obtained through fraud or 
misrepresentation; do not  conform in a material way with the documents; or that 
contravene the Convention or the principles of international law. Where the 
conduct of an exporting Party results in illegal traffic, the exporting Party must re-
import the waste and otherwise dispose of it in accordance with the Convention. 
Where the conduct of the importing Party is responsible for illegal traffic, the 
importer must dispose of the waste in an environmentally sound manner. 
 
                                                 
137 Basel Article 10. 
138 Basel Article 14(1) and Decisions I/13, II/19 and III/19. 
139 Basel Decisions I/3 and III/8. 
140 Basel Decisions 1/20 and III/20. 
141 Basel Article 14(2) and Decisions 1/14, II/2, III/3. 
142 Basel Decisions II/27, V/18 and VI/14. 
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(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
Disputes relating to the interpretation, application or compliance with the 
Convention must initially be resolved through negotiation or any other peaceful 
means. However, if the Parties concerned cannot settle their dispute, the dispute 
must be submitted to the ICJ or to arbitration pursuant to Annex VI on Arbitration, 
provided that the Parties to the dispute consent. A Party may declare that it 
recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement in relation to 
any other Party accepting the same obligation the submission of the dispute to 
the ICJ and/or to arbitration.143 
 
 
                                                 
143 Basel Article 20 
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ROTTERDAM CONVENTION ON THE PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT 
PROCEDURE FOR CERTAIN HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS AND PESTICIDES  




The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (the PIC Convention) 
entered into force on 24 February 2004. The aim of the Convention is to promote 
shared responsibility and cooperative efforts among Parties in the international 
trade of certain hazardous chemicals in order to protect human health and the 
environment from potential harm and to contribute to their environmentally sound 
use.144  The Convention gives legal force to the implementation of the Prior 
Informed Consent procedure (PIC procedure). Through the PIC procedure, the 
Secretariat to the PIC Convention acts as a clearing-house through which 
decisions of importing countries as to whether they wish to import certain 
chemicals are compiled and circulated to other Parties. Parties can also use the 
Secretariat to exchange information about characteristics of chemicals to inform 
an importing Party about their dangers and use.  
 
The chemicals that are subject to the PIC procedure are listed in Annex III in 
accordance with recommendations from the Chemical Review Committee.145 
Once a chemical is listed in Annex III, Parties must communicate their import 
decisions to the Secretariat.146 The Secretariat then summarises and compiles 
the responses and provides them to the other Parties.147 The import decision can 
be a final decision to consent, to consent subject to conditions or to not consent. 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
There are no performance review self-reporting obligations in the PIC 
Convention. However, its working provisions entail detailed operational 
information exchanges that embody some information relevant to assessment of 
                                                 
144 PIC Convention, Article 1. 
145 PIC Convention, Articles 5.5, 6 and 7. 
146 PIC Convention, Article 10. 
147 PIC Convention, Article 10. Redgwell, C, ‘Regulating Trade in Dangerous Substances’, Kiss, A, 
Shelton, D and Ishibashi, K, Economic Globalization and Compliance with International Environmental 
Agreements, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003, p.83. 
148 PIC Convention, Article 10. 
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performance. For example, when a country takes action to ban or severely 
restrict a chemical, its Designated National Authority (DNA) must inform the 
Secretariat within 90 days of this action. The Secretariat then informs the other 
Parties.149 (Parties must establish DNAs to be the contact points for information 
exchange and for communicating consents under the PIC procedure.150) Where 
a chemical that is banned or severely restricted by a Party is exported from 
another Party’s territory, the exporting Party must provide exporting notification to 
the importing Party, in accordance with Annex V.151 If these notifications were 
compied into a database, they would go some way towards the formation of a 
perspective to the Parties’ performance.  
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
Article 17 requires the COP to develop and approve procedures and institutional 
mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of the PIC 
Convention and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance. At COP-1 
(2004), the Parties convened an Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Article 
17, with a view to preparing for and carrying forward deliberations on the 
issue.152 The Working Group met before and during COP-2 (2005) but failed to 
agree on critical issues (i.e. equitable geographical representation; “triggers” that 
would lead to NCP; available non-compliance response measures; and handling 
of performance information) and, so, will meet and report again to COP-3 
(2006).153 
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms 
 
The implementation support mechanisms of the PIC Convention may be used 
targeted to address non-compliance. However, they tend to be bilateral in 
operation and are, therefore, not ideally suited to deployment under a multilateral 
NCP. 
  
Technical Assistance Article 10(4)(b) provides that a Party 
may request assistance in evaluating whether an Annex III chemical should be 
imported. Article 11(1)(c) provides that each exporting Party shall advise and 
assist importing Parties, upon request and as appropriate: to obtain further 
                                                 
149 PIC Convention, Article 5. 
150 PIC Convention, Article 4. 
151 PIC Convention, Article 12. 
152 PIC Convention Decision 1/10. 
153 UNEP/FAO/RC/COP.2/19 Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Rotterdam Convention on the 
Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade 
on the work of its second meeting (12 October 2005 ) para. 61.  
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information to help them to take action in respect of imports; and to strengthen 
their capacities and capabilities to manage chemicals safely during their life-
cycle. 
 
Article 14 requires each Party to facilitate: the exchange of scientific, technical, 
economic and legal information concerning the chemicals within the scope of the 
Convention; the provision of publicly available information on domestic regulatory 
actions relevant to the objectives of the Convention; and the provision of 
information to other Parties, directly or through the Secretariat, on domestic 
regulatory actions that substantially restrict one or more uses of the chemical, as 
appropriate. 
 
Article 16 states that the Parties shall cooperate in promoting technical 
assistance for the development of the infrastructure and the capacity necessary 
to manage chemicals to enable implementation of this Convention. Parties with 
more advanced programmes for regulating chemicals should provide technical 
assistance, including training, to other Parties in developing their infrastructure 
and capacity to manage chemicals throughout their life cycle. 
 
Financial Assistance  At COP-1 (2004), the Parties called upon the 
Secretariat to conduct a study into the possible options for financial mechanisms 
to enable developing countries to implement adequately the provisions of the 
Convention.154 The study was discussed at COP-2 (2005) but the Parties could 
not agree on a choice of financial mechanism, instead calling on the Secretariat 
to revisit the options in light of discussion at COP-2 and to report on the revised 
study at COP-3 (2006).155 
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
Parties must settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Convention through negotiation or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
However, a Party may declare in writing that, with respect to any dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, it recognises 
arbitration or the International Court of Justice as a compulsory means of dispute 
resolution in relation to any Party accepting the same obligation. Otherwise, if the 
Parties to a dispute have not accepted arbitration or the International Court of 
Justice, or if they have not been able to settle their dispute within twelve months 
following notification by one Party to another that a dispute exists between them, 
the dispute must be submitted to a conciliation commission at the request of any 
Party to the dispute. The conciliation commission shall render a report with 
                                                 
154 PIC Convention Decision 1/15. 
155 UNEP/FAO/RC/COP.2/19 Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Rotterdam Convention on the 
Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade 
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recommendations.156 At COP-1 (2004), Resolution 1/11 adopted an arbitration 
and conciliation procedure for purposes of Article 20. These can be found in 
Annex VI. 
                                                 
156 PIC Convention, Article 20. 
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Article 19(3) of the CBD provides that the Parties shall consider the need for a 
Protocol to the Convention, particularly in relation to the safe transfer, handling 
and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from biotechnology that 
may impact on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. The 
First Extraordinary Meeting of the CBD COP adopted the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity on 29 January 2000 in 
Montreal, Canada. It entered into force on 11 September 2003.  
 
The Protocol aims to ‘contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the 
field of the safe transfer, handling and use of LMOs resulting from modern 
biotechnology’ in accordance with the precautionary approach as set out in 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.157 It 
applies to the transboundary movement, transit, handling and use of LMOs.158 
The Protocol establishes an Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) procedure (i.e. 
a prior informed consent procedure), whereby Parties are required to ensure that 
their exporters notify the National Authority of the importing Party prior to the 
transboundary movement of LMOs that fall within the scope of the Protocol.159 
The destination Party must then make a decision, based on a risk assessment, 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
Parties are required to monitor the implementation of their obligations under the 
Protocol and to submit reports to the CBD COP (serving as the meeting of the 
Parties (MOP) to the Protocol) on their implementation efforts.161 Parties are also 
required to nominate a national focal point to liaise with the Secretariat.162 
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures 
 
                                                 
157 Biosafety Protocol, Articles 1 and 10. 
158 Biosafety Protocol, Article 4. 
159 Biosafety Protocol, Article 8. 
160 Biosafety Protocol, Articles 10 and 15. 
161 Biosafety Protocol, Article 33. 
162 Biosafety Protocol, Article 19. 
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Article 34 provides that the COP-MOP must consider and approve at its first 
meeting cooperative procedures and institutional mechanisms to promote 
compliance and address non-compliance. The COP-MOP established a 
Compliance Committee and adopted procedures and mechanisms on 
compliance in Protocol Decision I/7.  
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms 
 
The Committee’s rules of procedure were adopted in Protocol Decision II/1. 
Under the rules of procedure, the Compliance Committee can take various 
measures to promote compliance and address non-compliance including: 
providing advice or assistance; making recommendations to the COP-MOP 
regarding the provision of financial and technical assistance, technology transfer, 
training and other capacity-building measures; request the non-compliant Party 
to develop a compliance action plan; invite the Party to submit reports; and report 
to the COP-MOP on the non-compliant Party’s efforts to address the issue. The 
COP-MOP may, upon the Committee’s recommendation, issue a caution, 
request the Executive Secretary to publish cases of non-compliance in the 
Biosafety Clearing-House or, in cases of repeated non-compliance, take such 
measures as to be decided at COP-MOP-3. Article 27 states that the COP-MOP 
will adopt a process in respect of liability and redress for damage resulting from 
the movement of LMOs. 
 
Technical Assistance  Article 20 establishes a Biosafety Clearing-House to 
facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental and legal 
information on, and experience with LMOs, and to assist Parties to implement the 
Protocol. It serves as a means through which information on import bans and 
conditions is made available to Parties. Parties are required to make available to 
the Clearing-House information on: existing laws and guidelines; bilateral, 
regional and multilateral agreements; risk assessments or environmental reviews 
of LMOs; decisions about the importation or release of LMOs; and performance 
review reports submitted pursuant to Article 33. There are exceptions for 
confidential information.163 
 
Article 22 specifically deals with capacity building. It states that Parties shall 
cooperate in developing and strengthening human resources and institutional 
capacities in biosafety in developing Parties, either through existing organisations 
or the involvement of the private sector. Cooperation in capacity building shall 
include scientific and technical training in the proper and safe management of 
biotechnology, and in the use of risk assessment and risk management for 
biosafety, and the enhancement of technological and institutional capacities in 
biosafety. Article 11.9 invites Parties to indicate their needs for financial and 
technical assistance and capacity building with respect to LMOs intended for 
direct use as food or feed or for processing. Parties must cooperate to meet 
                                                 
163 Biosafety Protocol, Article 21 
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those needs pursuant to Articles 22 and 28. The COP-MOP must take the needs 
of developing Parties into account in providing funding guidance to the financial 
mechanism, which is discussed below.164 The guidance to the financial 
mechanism of the Convention, as set out in relevant COP decisions, applies to 
the provisions of Article 28.  
 
At COP-MOP-1 (2004), the Parties endorsed an Action Plan for Building 
Capacities for the Effective Implementation of the Protocol and a Coordination 
Mechanism.165 
 
Financial Assistance  The Protocol adopts the financial mechanism created 
under Article 21 of the CBD as its own financial mechanism.166 The COP-MOP 
prepares draft guidance for financial support for consideration by the CBD COP, 
so that such guidance might be included in the latter’s guidance to the financial 
mechanism.167 Following COP-MOP-1 (2004), the CBD COP provided detailed 
guidance to the funding mechanism in Decision VII/20. In Protocol Decision II/5, 
the COP-MOP encouraged the GEF and the Executive Secretary to the CBD to 
continue their collaborative support for the Protocol’s implementation. The GEF 
has already provided funding to assist countries to prepare for the Protocol’s 
entry into force. A UNEP-GEF project provided developing countries with 
assistance in developing biosafety frameworks and participating in the Biosafety 
Clearing-House.168 
 
Penalties  In accordance with Article 27 of the Biosafety Protocol, COP-1 
established a negotiation process to adopt a liability protocol. Negotiations are 
currently ongoing. 
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
The Protocol adopts the CBD dispute resolution procedures by virtue of Article 
32 of the Protocol (CBD provisions relating to Protocol apply to Protocol) and 
Article 27.5 of the CBD, which states that the dispute resolution provisions of the 
CBD apply to any Protocol except as otherwise provided in the Protocol 
concerned. 
 
                                                 
164 Biosafety Protocol, Article 28 
165 Biosafety Protocol, Decision I/5 
166 Biosafety Protocol, Article 28.2 
167 Biosafety Protocol, Article 28.3 
168 CBD Website, <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/issues/finance.aspx> (8/9/05).  
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The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs Convention) 
entered into force on 17 May 2004. It aims to protect human health and the 
environment from the most dangerous persistent organic pollutants, including the 
‘dirty dozen’, by helping PParties to switch to safer alternatives and to clean up 
existing stockpiles.169 The Convention divides chemicals in three groups: 
intentionally produced chemicals; unintentionally produced chemicals; and 
stockpiles. Annexes A and B list intentionally produced chemicals, which are 
mainly pesticides. Annex A deals with chemicals which are to be eliminated while 
Annex B deals with those which are to be restricted. Parties are required to 
prohibit and/or take the necessary measures to eliminate the production, import 
and export of Annex A chemicals and to restrict the production and use of Annex 
B chemicals.170 In addition, Annex A or B chemicals may only be imported or 
exported for their environmentally sound disposal or for a use that is permitted for 
that Party under Annexes A or B.171  
 
Annex C lists persistent organic pollutants, which are formed and released 
unintentionally from anthropogenic sources. Pursuant to Article 5, Parties must 
take measures to reduce the total releases derived from anthropogenic sources 
of Annex C chemicals, with the goal of their continuing minimisation and ultimate 
elimination. Parties are also obliged to reduce or eliminate releases from 
stockpiles and wastes of Annex A, B and C chemicals.172 Wastes containing 
POPs are to be handled, collected, transported and stored in an environmentally 





(a) Performance Review Information  
 
Parties must provide the COP with reports on their implementation and on the 
effectiveness of their implementation measures in meeting the Convention’s 
aims. They must also provide the Secretariat with statistical data on their total 
                                                 
169 POP Convention, Article 1 and Greg’s chapter. 
170 POP Convention, Article 3(1). 
171 POP Convention, Article 3(2) and (3). 
172 POP Convention, Article 6. 
173 POP Convention, Article 6(1)(d). 
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quantities of production, import and export of the listed chemicals or reasonable 
estimates and a list of States from which or to which it has imported or exported 
each substance.174 This reporting obligation ties in with the Parties’ obligation to 
develop and endeavour to implement a plan for the implementation of their 
obligations under the Convention, submit that plan to the COP within two years of 
the date on which the Convention enters into force for it to review and update the 
plan. Interim guidelines have been developed to assist Parties.175 
 
Although primarily related to scientific baseline information, rather than 
performance review information, Parties are to undertake appropriate monitoring 
of POPs, including monitoring of their sources and releases into the environment; 
presence, levels and trends in humans and the environment; environmental 
transport, fate and transformation; effects on human health and the environment; 
socio-economic and cultural impacts; release reduction and/or elimination and 
harmonized methodologies.176 
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
The COP is required to develop and approve procedures and institutional 
mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of the 
Convention and for appropriate penalties.177 
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms  
 
Although not yet specified under its NCP, the POPs Convention’s provisions that 
support implementation are well adapted for use in a targeted fashion as non-
compliance response mechanisms.  
 
Technical Assistance  The Convention provides for the provision on 
technical assistance to developing Parties.178 Technical assistance includes 
technical assistance for capacity-building relating to the implementation of the 
obligations under the Convention.179 Under Article 9, Parties must facilitate or 
undertake the exchange of information relevant to the reduction or elimination of 
the production, use and release of POPs and alternatives to POPs. The 
Secretariat serves as a clearing-house mechanism for information on POPs 
                                                 
174 POP Convention, Article 15. 
175 Article 7(1). See also POP Website, <http://www.pops.int/documents/implementation/nips/> (8/9/05).  
176 POP Convention, Article 11.  
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including information provided by the Parties, intergovernmental organisations 
and NGOs. Parties must encourage and/or undertake appropriate research, 
development, monitoring and cooperation pertaining to POPs. In doing so, they 
must: support and develop international programmes or organisations aimed at 
defining, conducting, assessing and financing research and data collection and 
monitoring; support national and international efforts to strengthen scientific and 
technical research capabilities; and consider the concerns and needs of 
developing Parties with regard to technical and financial resources with a view to 
improving their capability to participate in the above mentioned efforts.180 
 
Financial Assistance  Parties undertake to provide financial support to 
national activities that are geared towards implementing the Convention. 
Developed Parties undertake to provide financial resources to developing Parties 
in accordance with the financial mechanism established under Article 13(6) or to 
provide financial resources through other bilateral, regional and multilateral 
means.181 At their first meeting, Parties must adopt and provide guidance to the 
financial mechanism.182 In the interim, the GEF is the principal entity entrusted 
with the operations of the financial mechanism.183 The GEF and the Swedish 
Government have funded workshops to assist Parties in strengthening their 
national chemicals management programs with respect to the implementation 
and ratification of this Convention.184 At COP-1 (2005), Parties requested the 
GEF to develop a new focal area and operational procedures to support the 
implementation of the Convention.185 
 
(d) Dispute settlement 
 
Parties must settle the disputes through negotiation or other peaceful means at 
first instance. Parties have the option of accepting arbitration (in accordance with 
procedures to be adopted by the COP) or the International Court of Justice as 
compulsory means of dispute resolution. These can only be used in relation to 
Parties accepting the same obligation. Where Parties do not accept these 
means, or if they have not been able to settle the dispute within 12 months 
following notification by one Party to another that a dispute exists between them, 
the dispute must be submitted to a conciliation commission. Procedures relating 
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184 POP Convention Website, <http://www.pops.int/documents/implementation/gef/> (8/9/05).  
185 POP Convention Decision I/2. 
Compliance Mechanisms 
69 
to the conciliation commission are to be included in an annex to be adopted by 
COP-2.186 
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3. Atmosphere  
 





The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer entered into force 
on 22 September 1988. Parties are obliged to take measures to protect human 
health and the environment against adverse effects likely to result from human 
activities that modify the ozone layer.187 There are no targets or timetables for 
action. Instead, there is an outline of general obligations on the Parties, which 
focus on obligations to undertake research on the ozone layer, in particular on 
the effects of human activities on the ozone layer and how these may be 
addressed.188 It establishes a framework for future international legal measures 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
Parties must transmit to the COP information on the measures adopted by them 
in the implementation of the Convention and of protocols to which they are 
Party.190 COP-1 (1989) decided that each Party shall submit these reports every 
two years and shall include the socio-economic and commercial information on 
the substances referred to in Annex I and directed the Secretariat to prepare a 
format for reporting.191  
 
Other extensive information collection obligations are related to scientific 
observations of various aspects of the ozone layer, human effects upon it and the 
impacts of modification of the ozone layer, rather than to performance review.  
For example, Parties also agree, under Article 3, to promote or establish joint or 
complementary programmes for systematic observation of the ozone layer and in 
ensuring the collection, validation and transmission of research and 
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observational data through appropriate world data centres.192 At COP-3 (1993), 
the Parties decided that for the purposes of Article 3 of the Vienna Convention, 
which deals with cooperation for research and systematic observations, it would 
be adequate for the Parties to the Convention to report data under the Montreal 
Protocol on all substances controlled by the Protocol.193 
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
There are no provisions or COP decisions for the adoption of a non-compliance 
procedure. 
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Measures  
 
In the absence of any NCP, it is noted here that there are mechanisms in place 
under the Vienna Convention for the mutual support of Parties in their 
implementation efforts. These are in place to assist with the primary task of 
implementation and are not in fact utilised non-compliance response 
mechanisms. They are noted here merely to indicate that there is assistance 
available to Parties for implementation.  
 
COP-2 (1991) noted that the information exchange obligations under Annex II of 
the Convention would largely be fulfilled by Parties reporting on data concerning 
the handling of ozone depleting substances each calendar year and by 
exchanging information and reporting on scientific activities in accordance with 
the Montreal Protocol. The COP called on all Parties to the Convention, whether 
or not Parties to the amended Protocol, to provide such data and information.194 
 
Financial Assistance  Under Article 4, Parties must facilitate and encourage 
the exchange of scientific, technical, socio-economic, commercial and legal 
information, which is elaborated in Annex II. Annex II, paragraph 1 states that 
Parties recognise that the collection and sharing of information is an important 
means of implementing the Convention and that Parties must therefore exchange 
scientific, technical, socio-economic, business, commercial and legal information. 
Annex II paragraphs 3 to 6 elaborate on the type of scientific, technical, socio-
economic and legal information to be provided. Parties must cooperate in 
promoting the development and transfer of technology and knowledge, 
particularly though: facilitation of the acquisition of alternative technologies by 
other Parties; provision of information on alternative technologies and equipment; 
                                                 
192 Vienna Convention, Article 3. 
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supplying necessary equipment and facilities for research and systematic 
observations; and appropriate training of scientific and technical personnel.195 
 
Financial Assistance COP-1 (1989) established a Trust Fund (later to 
become the ‘Multilateral Fund’) and Parties were invited to make voluntary 
contributions to it.196 The Parties agreed to cooperate to enhance the capabilities 
of developing countries to contribute to ozone science research through the 
organisation of workshops and the identification of appropriate institutions for 
scientific and financial assistance.197 At COP-4 (1996), the Parties invited the 
GEF to support the monitoring of ozone and UV radiation and related research in 
developing countries. 
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
Parties are to resolve disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention by negotiation. If negotiations fail, they may jointly request mediation 
by a third Party. Parties may declare in writing that, for a dispute not resolved 
through negotiation or mediation, they accept arbitration (with procedures that 
were adopted by the COP198) or the International Court of Justice as compulsory 
means of dispute resolution. Otherwise, the dispute will be submitted to 
conciliation. A conciliation commission will be created upon the request of one of 
the Parties to the dispute. The commission renders ‘a final and recommendatory 
award, which the Parties shall consider in good faith.’199 
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The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (the 
Montreal Protocol) entered into force on 1 January 1989. The Protocol lists 
controlled substances in Annexes A (CFCs and Halons), B (Other halogenated 
CFCs, carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform), C (Hydrochloroflurocarbons 
and Hydrobromoflurocarbons) and E (Methyl bromide). Annex D contains a list of 
products containing controlled substances specified in Annex A.  
 
Articles 2A to 2I set out the targets that Parties must achieve with respect to each 
of these controlled substances and the period of time within which the targets 
must be met. Developing Parties are given a grace period, allowing a delay of 10 
years before being required to take steps to meet these targets.200 Article 4 bans 
the import of the controlled substances listed in the Annexes with non-Parties. 
However, Article 4B requires each Party to establish and implement a licensing 
system for the import and export of new, used, recycled and reclaimed controlled 
substances in the Annexes, by 1 January 2000 or within three months of the date 
of entry into force of the Article for it, whichever is the later. Article 4A provides 
that where a Party is unable, despite having taken all practicable steps to comply 
with its obligations under the Protocol, to cease production of a controlled 
substance for domestic consumption by its specified phase-out date, other than 
for uses agreed by the Parties to be essential, it must ban the export of used, 
recycled and reclaimed quantities of that substance, unless it is being exported 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
Each Party must provide statistical data to the Secretariat on its annual 
production of each of the controlled substances. Data must also be provided on 
amounts of each substance used for feedstocks, destroyed by technologies 
approved by the Parties, or imported from and exported to Parties and non-
Parties for the year during which provisions concerning the substances entered 
into force for that Party, and for each year thereafter.201 Parties must provide 
statistical data on the annual imports and exports of each of the controlled 
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201 Montreal Protocol, Article 7. The Parties' reduction targets in relation to controlled substances are 
calculated as a percentage of baseline figures. Most controlled substances have a baseline set in 1986. 




substances in Group II of Annex A and Group I of Annex C that have been 
recycled.202  
 
As well as the annual reports, Parties must submit to the Secretariat every two 
years a summary of the research, development, public awareness and exchange 
of information activities that they have undertaken pursuant to Article 9.203 
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
The Montreal Protocol was the first MEA to design a NCP. Under Article 8, 
Parties were obliged to consider and approve procedures and institutional 
mechanisms for determining non-compliance. In 1989, Decision I/8 established 
an Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal Experts to develop NCPs. The 
Parties approved an interim mechanism for determining non-compliance, namely, 
an Implementation Committee, and directed the Working Group to elaborate on 
these procedures by MOP-4 (1992).204 The interim NCP provided that any Party 
and the Secretariat could report a non-compliant Party to the Implementation 
Committee. The non-compliant Party would then be given notice of the allegation 
and an opportunity to respond. The Committee was to seek an amicable 
resolution to the situation and report to the MOP.205 The MOP could decide upon 
steps for full compliance or request the Committee to make recommendations.  
 
A permanent non-compliance mechanism was adopted at MOP-4 (1992).206 It 
continued the Implementation Committee as the body to receive and consider 
reports of non-compliance. As with the interim procedure, non-compliant Parties 
are given notice of the allegations and an opportunity to respond and the 
Committee must report any recommendations to the MOP.  
 
The permanent non-compliance mechanism was reviewed and amended at 
MOP-10. The amendments, inter alia, required the Implementation Committee to 
report persistent patterns of non-compliance to the MOP and make appropriate 
recommendations in order to maintain the integrity of the Protocol.207 
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Measures 
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In response to the recommendations of the Implementation Committee, the MOP 
may authorise any of the following: assistance for the collection and reporting of 
data; technical assistance; technology transfer and financial assistance; 
information transfer and training; the issuing of a caution; or the suspension of 
specific rights and privileges under the Protocol.  
 
Technical Assistance Article 9 states that the Parties shall cooperate in 
promoting research, development and the exchange of information on: best 
technologies for improving the containment, recovery, recycling or destruction of 
controlled substances or reducing their emissions; possible alternatives to 
controlled substances, to products containing such substances and to products 
manufactured with them; and the costs and benefits of relevant control 
strategies. Parties must also cooperate in promoting public awareness of the 
environmental effects of the emissions of controlled substances. Article 10A 
provides that each Party shall take steps to ensure that the best available 
environmentally safe substitutes are transferred to developing Parties and that 
the transfers occur under fair and favourable conditions. 
 
 
Financial Assistance At MOP-1 (1989), the Parties agreed to consider at 
MOP-2 (1990) the development of a programme which would include workshops, 
demonstration projects, training courses, the exchange of experts and the 
provision of consultants on control options, taking into account the special needs 
of developing countries as well as the exploration of ways to promote the 
exchange and transfer of environmentally sound substitutes and alternative 
technologies.208 This issue was primarily addressed through the amendment of 
Article 10.209 Amended Article 10 establishes a financial mechanism. It requires 
that Parties shall establish a mechanism for the purposes of financial and 
technical cooperation, including the transfer of technologies, to enable 
developing Parties to comply with control measures. This financial mechanism 
includes a Multilateral Fund, which finances, inter alia, clearing-house functions 
to facilitate technical cooperation, distribute information, hold workshops and 
training sessions and facilitate and monitor other multilateral, regional and 
bilateral cooperation for developing Parties. The Multilateral Fund is financed by 
developed Parties and controlled by its own Executive Committee, which is 
elected on a geographically representative basis by the MOP. It works in 
cooperation and with the assistance of the World Bank, UNEP, UNDP or other 
appropriate agencies.  
 
Penalties The Montreal Protocol was the first MEA to incorporate 
multilaterally determined penalties into its range of non-compliance responses. 
Under the NCP the MOP can issue warnings, although this has happened only 
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once. The power to suspend rights and privileges includes those concerning 
production, consumption, trade, transfer of technology, assistance for industrial 
rationalisation, financial mechanism and institutional arrangements. The 
suspension of rights has never been exercised. 
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
The dispute resolution procedure in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention applies 
to the Protocol by virtue of Article 11(6) of the Convention, which states that the 
provisions of Article 11 apply with respect to any protocol. Article 14 of the 
Protocol provides that the provisions of the Convention relating to its protocols 









The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
entered into force on 21 March 1994. It aims to achieve stabilisation of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.210 Such a 
stabilisation level should be achieved ‘within a time-frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, ensure food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner.’211 The level and the timeframe are omitted from the provision.  
 
All Parties have general obligations to develop domestic and, if possible, regional 
programmes and measures to mitigate climate change; promote and cooperate 
in the development, application and diffusion of technologies, practices and 
processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases outside the scope of the Montreal Protocol; promote 
conservation and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouses gases 
outside the scope of the Montreal Protocol; cooperate in preparing for adaptation 
to climate change; and promote scientific and technical cooperation.212  
 
Developed countries are required to lead climate change mitigation by adopting 
policies and measures limiting anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Under 
Article 4.2, these policies and measures should ‘recognise’ that, a return to 
‘earlier emission levels’ by the year 2000 would ‘contribute’ to modification of 
longer-term climate change trends.213 The year 2000 passed without any Party 
achieving the Convention’s stated aim. However, the Parties were to ‘review the 
adequacy’ of the aim under Article 4.2 at their first Conference.214 The result of 
that review was the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, discussed below. 
 
The guiding legal principles for implementation are set out in Article 3 and 
include: inter-generational equity; common but differentiated responsibility 
between developed and developing countries; the precautionary principle; 
sustainable development; and an open international economic system. Of these 
principles, the most clearly reflected in the UNFCCC text is differentiated 
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responsibility. Differentiated responsibilities for developed Parties are specified in 
two matters. Special obligations are imposed upon them to: (1) adopt ‘policies 
and measures’ to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions under Article 4.2; and 
(2) provide ‘new and additional financial resources’ to developing Parties under 
Article 4.3. Annex I contains a list of the developed countries that includes most 
‘western’ countries and ex-Soviet bloc countries. Annex II lists from among those 
Annex I Parties only the 'western' countries that are obliged to provide financial 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
Article 12 requires all Parties to submit: a national inventory of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases (but not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol) using agreed methodologies; a general 
description of their steps to implement the aims of the Convention; and any other 
relevant information. This obligation falls upon both developed and developing 
country Parties but, as indicated below, the former are to assist the latter to meet 
their inventory obligations. Developed country Parties must also provide a 
detailed description of policies and measures that they have adopted to 
implement their commitment under Article 4.2. Developed Parties, particularly 
each listed in Annex II, must provide information on measures that they have 
taken in accordance with their assistance commitments in Article 4.3, 4.4 and 
4.5. At COP-5 (1999), a consultative group of experts was established to assist 
developing countries in meeting their reporting obligations.215 
 
Developed Parties must submit information on greenhouse gas emissions and 
removals on an annual basis.216 Least-developed countries (LDCs) submit 
National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) on their needs and priorities 
for adaptation.217 Article 4.9 and decision 5/CP.7 recognised the specific needs 
and special situations of the LDCs with regard to funding and transfer of 
technology. That decision established an LDC work programme that included the 
development of NAPAs. Decision 28/CP.7 sets out the guidelines while decision 
29/CP.7 establishes an LDC Expert Group (LEG) to provide guidance and advice 
on the preparation and implementation of NAPAs. 
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The UNFCCC may authorize verification missions to review implementation.218  
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
Article 13 provides that the COP shall consider the establishment of a multilateral 
consultative process (MCP) for the resolution of questions regarding 
implementation. Decision 10/CP.4 established the multilateral consultative 
process in the form of a Multilateral Consultative Committee. Parties may submit 
questions concerning their own or another Party’s implementation to the 
Committee, which may then provide advice or recommendations on the 
procurement of technical and financial resources for the resolution of a Party’s 
difficulties or provide advice on the compilation and communication of 
information. The conclusions and recommendations must be sent to the Party 
concerned for comment. Although COP-5 was supposed to bring the multilateral 
consultative process into operation following resolution of outstanding issues 
regarding the composition of the MCP, the COP has not yet done so.219  
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Measures 
 
The technical or financial resources in relation to which the MCP is to advise are 
well established under the UNFCCC.  
 
Technical Assistance  At COP-7 and, as a part of the Marrakesh Accords, 
the Parties agreed to work together on a set of technology transfer activities. 
These activities have five main themes: technology needs and needs 
assessments; technology information; enabling environments; capacity building; 
and mechanisms for technology transfer.220 The Marrakesh Accords also provide 
for the establishment of an Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) to 
facilitate and advance technology transfer activities.221 Further, the Secretariat 
has developed a clearing-house mechanism to facilitate the flow of, and access 
to, information on developing and transferring safe technologies.222 
 
Financial Assistance  Developed Parties, specifically those listed in Annex 
II, must additionally provide ‘new and additional financial resources’ to 
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developing countries to meet the full implementation costs of the Convention.223 
These concern inventories and any voluntary measures the developing countries 
take towards mitigation of the greenhouse gas emissions. Further, they must 
take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the 
transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to 
other Parties, particularly to developing countries to enable them to implement 
the provisions of the Convention.224  
 
Article 11 of the Convention establishes a financial mechanism for the provision 
of financial resources to developing countries on a grant or concessional basis, 
including for the transfer of technology. The operations of the financial 
mechanism are entrusted in the COP to develop. The provision also states that 
developed Parties may also provide, and developing country Parties avail 
themselves of, financial resources related to the implementation of the 
Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.  
 
COP-4 designated the GEF as an operating entity of the financial mechanism on 
an ongoing basis.225 The Marrakesh Accords adopted at COP-7 expanded the 
scope of activities to which the GEF may provide funding to include activities to 
adapt to climate change and to build their national capacities to address it.226 
COP-4 also established the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed 
Countries Fund and the Adaptation Fund, which are separate from the GEF Trust 
Fund but managed by the GEF.227   
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
Parties must resolve disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Convention by negotiation or other peaceful means. They may declare in writing 
that they accept the arbitration procedures adopted by COP-1,228 or that they 
accept submission to the International Court of Justice as compulsory means of 
dispute resolution. Otherwise, the dispute will be submitted to compulsory 
conciliation after twelve months following notification by one Party to another that 
a dispute exists between them. A conciliation commission will be created to 
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render ‘a final and recommendatory award, which the Parties shall consider in 
good faith.’229  
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KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 





The third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol 
to the Climate Change Convention on 11 December 1997. The Kyoto Protocol 
entered into force on 16 February 2005.  
 
The Protocol quantifies emission limitations and reduction commitments of the 
greenhouse gases listed in Annex A for the Parties listed in Annex I of the 
UNFCCC. While each Annex I Party is assigned an individual target amount, the 
aim is that the aggregate Annex I targets will reduce overall emissions of such 
gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels by the commitment period of 2008 
to 2012.230  
 
Article 2 outlines the policies and measures that may be implemented by each 
Party to achieve their commitments, elaborating on UNFCCC Article 4.1. These 
include: protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse 
gases; promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture; and development of 
sources of renewable energy. Although the Protocol was intended to fill in the 
regulatory framework of the UNFCCC, it was insufficient of its own and further 
regulatory development was required for the Protocol itself once the text had 
been adopted. In 1998 UNFCCC COP-4 adopted the ‘Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action,’ which sought to operationalize the Protocol. 
 
The Protocol provides for a number of flexibility mechanisms to assist Annex I 
Parties to achieve their emission reduction commitments.  
 
Annex I Parties may reach agreement to meet commitments jointly, thus 
adjusting their relative emissions commitments between themselves, provided 
their total combined emissions do not exceed the sum of the amounts set out for 
them in Annex B.231 This mechanism is useful only in the context of a highly 
integrated economic bloc such as the European Union, which seeks to protect 
industrial development within particular members.  
 
The Protocol provides for joint implementation projects that enhance sinks or 
reduce emissions to be undertaken jointly by Annex I Parties. The resultant 
‘emission reduction units’ can be transferred from the project’s host country to 
benefit the project’s investor country. However, any such project must be 
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supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of achieving the commitments 
under Article 3.232  
 
The Protocol establishes the Clean Development Mechanism, which allows 
Annex I Parties to invest in projects that enhance sinks or reduce emissions in 
non-Annex I countries.233 Annex I Parties may use the certified emission 
reductions accruing from such projects to contribute to compliance with their 
commitments under Article 3.  
 
Annex I Parties are also allowed to trade emissions reductions between them.234 
Thus, where a developed country has reduced its emissions beyond its 
obligations as set out in Annex B, it is in ‘credit’. It can then sell this credit to a 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
Accurate reporting is essential under the Kyoto Protocol, given the quantified 
nature of its targets. Its performance review information requirements are the 
most robust and sophisticated among all current MEAs.  
 
There are different reporting obligations for Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. 
Article 7 provides for regular self-reporting by UNFCCC Annex I Parties. It states 
that each Party shall, inter alia, submit the necessary supplementary information 
to demonstrate compliance with its commitments in its annual emissions 
inventory and its national communication submitted under the UNFCCC. 
Reporting guidelines were adopted by the UNFCCC COP.235 The reporting 
requirements of the Protocol supersede the reporting requirements under the 
UNFCCC for Annex I Parties to both instruments. Closely linked, are the 
obligations to establish national systems for estimating emissions and national 
registries to track transactions in emissions units.236 
 
In addition, the Marrakesh Accords require Annex I Parties to submit three 
additional reports: a report at the beginning of the commitment period to 
determine allocated target amounts; a report at the end of the commitment period 
to assess compliance with Article 3; and a report on ‘demonstrable progress’ 
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under Article 3.2, which is to be submitted approximately half-way through the 
commitment period.237  
 
Article 8 establishes a third-party process for independent review of self-reported 
information. This has been mandatory for Annex I Party inventories since 
2003.238 The process aims at providing a ‘thorough and comprehensive technical 
assessment of all aspects of the implementation by a Party to this Protocol’ and 
should be completed within one year of submission of the national report to the 
Secretariat. There are three stages in the review process. First, there is an ‘initial 
check’ to verify whether the inventory is complete and properly formatted.239 A 
‘synthesis and assessment’ follows, which involves compiling and comparing 
inventory information.240 The final stage is individual review, which involves an 
inventory review by an expert review team or experts in their home country.241 
Expert review teams are led by two experts, one from a non-Annex I Party and 
one from an Annex I Party.242 Essentially, the Protocol inherits the UNFCCC’s 
monitoring and verification procedures. However, the Protocol makes provision 
for the elaboration of such procedures following the first COP-MOP.243 
 
Non-Annex I Parties also have reporting obligations: they must include details 
about their programs and activities undertaken pursuant to Article 10 in their 
national communications.244 (Annex I Parties also have this obligation.245) 
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
The NCP under the Protocol is the most elaborate of those adopted under MEAs 
thus far. Article 18 provides that the UNFCCC COP, which serves as the MOP to 
the Protocol, shall approve appropriate and effective procedures and 
mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the 
                                                 
237 Yamin, F and Depledge, J, The International Climate Change Regime Guide to Rules, Institutions and 
Procedures (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) p.344. 
238 http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/review_process/items/2762.php (3/11/05) 
239 http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/review_process/items/2762.php (3/11/05) 
240 http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/review_process/items/2762.php (3/11/05) 
241 http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/review_process/items/2762.php (3/11/05) 
242 http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/review_process/items/2762.php (3/11/05) 
243 See also Articles 6.2, 12.7 and 17. 
244 Kyoto Protocol, Article 10.1(f). 
245 Kyoto Protocol, Article 10(b)(ii). 
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Protocol. The NCP was adopted at the UNFCCC COP-7 (2001).246 It entered into 
force at the first meeting of the Protocol’s COP-MOP (2005) and its Compliance 
Committee will meet for the first time in 2006.  
 
The NCP may be triggered by a Party with respect to itself, or by another Party, 
by the Secretariat or by Expert Review Teams under Article 8. Its functional body 
is a Compliance Committee consisting of two branches: the Facilitative Branch 
and the Enforcement Branch.247  
 
The Facilitative Branch is responsible for facilitating the Protocol’s 
implementation and determines whether Annex I Parties are complying with the 
following obligations:248 
 
• Qualified emissions limitation or reduction commitments under 
Article 2; 
• Reporting requirements and methodologies under Articles 4, 5.1, 
5.2 and 7.1; and 
• Eligibility requirements to access the mechanisms under Articles 6 
(emission reduction units), 12 (clean development mechanism) and 
17 (emissions trading). 
 
Eligibility to access the mechanism is determined by the following criteria: 
whether the Party has ratified the Protocol; its calculated assigned amount of 
GHG emissions; whether it has developed a national system for estimating 
emissions and removals of GHG within its jurisdiction; whether the Party has 
established a national registry to record and monitor the movement of certain 
substances; and meeting the annual reporting requirements on emissions and 
removals.249  
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms 
 
The Facilitative Branch may provide advice, facilitate the provision of technical 
and financial assistance including technology transfer and capacity building 
(having regard to UNFCCC Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5) or provide 
recommendations to the non-compliant Party (having regard to Article 4.7 of the 
UNFCCC).250  
                                                 
246 UNFCCC Decision 24/CP.7. 
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250 Yamin, F and Depledge, J, The International Climate Change Regime Guide to Rules, Institutions and 




Technical Assistance  Article 10 reaffirms and expands upon the existing 
commitments under UNFCCC Article 4.1. It requires Parties to take into account 
UNFCCC Articles 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7 in formulating cost-effective national and 
regional programmes to improve the quality of local emission factors and to 
mitigate the effects of climate change. Parties must cooperate in the promotion of 
effective modalities for the development, promotion, facilitation and financing of 
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies pertinent to 
climate change.251 Parties must also cooperate in scientific and technical 
research and in the development of training and development programmes, 
including capacity building.252  
 
Financial Assistance Article 11 incorporates the financial mechanism under 
the UNFCCC to assist developing countries to meet their commitments under 
UNFCC Article 4.1. Article 11.2 provides that developed Parties and Annex II 
Parties must provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed 
full costs incurred by developing Parties in implementing their commitments 
under UNFCCC Article 4.1, as now covered by Article 10(a) of the Protocol. The 
guidance provided to the financial mechanism (i.e. the GEF) under the UNFCCC, 
applies to all relevant respects to Article 11.253 As previously noted, the 
Marrakesh Accords established an Adaptation Fund, reflecting the need for 
additional funding for the climate change focal area of the GEF.254 The 
Adaptation Fund was under the guidance of the UNFCCC COP until the entry 
into force of the Protocol.255 The Adaptation Fund is to be operated by the GEF 
but is separate from the GET Trust Fund.256  
 
Penalties  The Kyoto Protocol sets out the most prescriptive and 
potentially costly penalties for non-compliance under current MEAs. However, to 
the extent that they purport to modify the legal rights of the Parties under the 
Protocol, there is a legal question hanging as to whether the penalty mechanisms 
currently adopted by resolution must be adopted by amendment in order to entail 
                                                 
251 Kyoto Protocol, Article 10(c) 
252 Kyoto Protocol, Article 10(d) and (e). 
253 Kyoto Protocol, Article 11.2. 
254 Yamin, F and Depledge, J, The International Climate Change Regime Guide to Rules, Institutions and 
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binding legal consequences.257 Article 18 of the Protocol specifies that any 
mechanisms entailing binding consequences must be adopted by means of an 
amendment to the Protocol. UNFCCC Decision 24/CP.7 adopted the procedures 
and mechanisms relating to compliance that were negotiated in the Marrakech 
Accords, and recommended that COP-MOP-1 adopt those procedures and 
mechanisms as well. At COP-MOP-1, the procedures set out in Decision 24/CP.7 
were approved and adopted in full, although ‘without prejudice’ to consideration 
of the need to amend of the Kyoto Protocol in accordance with Article 18. The 
Subsidiary Body on Implementation was tasked with considering the amendment 
issue and reporting to COP-MOP-3 (2007). 
 
The NCP provides that the Enforcement Branch may, when a Party is non-
compliant, determine whether to adjust or correct a Party’s emission 
commitments, where the Party and the expert review team under Article 8 
disagree.258  Where any Party breaches Articles 5.1, 5.2, 7.1 or 7.4,259 the 
Enforcement Branch may declare that the Party is non-compliant, and request a 
compliance action plan.260 Where an Annex I Party does not meet the eligibility 
requirements to use the flexibility mechanisms under Articles 6, 12 and 17, the 
Enforcement Branch can suspend the Party from accessing the flexibility 
mechanisms.261 
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
The Protocol adopts the dispute resolution procedure in the UNFCCC. UNFCC 
Article 14.8 provides that the dispute resolution procedures in Article 14 apply to 
any related legal instrument that the COP adopts. 
                                                 
257 Gregory Rose, ‘A Compliance System for the Kyoto Protocol’ 7(2) UNSW Law Journal Forum (2001) 
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4. Marine  
 





The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling entered into force on 
10 November 1948. The preamble states that the aim of the Convention is to 
‘establish a system of international regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure 
proper and effective conservation and development of whale stocks…and thus 
make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry.’  
 
Article III establishes the International Whaling Commission. The Commission 
may adopt regulations for protected and unprotected species, open and closed 
seasons, open and closed waters, size limits, time, methods and intensity of 
whaling, types of equipment to be used, methods of measurement and catch 
returns and other records.262 Article IX requires Parties to take measures to 
implement the Convention and punish infractions.  
 
The Convention lacks provisions for the regular assessment of whale 
populations, and whale hunting for the purposes of scientific research is excluded 
from the operation of the Convention.263 In 1982, the Convention Schedule was 
amended to require a ‘comprehensive assessment’ of whale populations prior to 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
The Whaling Convention does not have in place a system for coherent review of 
performance of the Parties in implementing the Convention. It does, however, 
require that the Parties submit certain information on some of their activities 
under the Convention.  
 
Parties must provide information on all permits issued for the purposes of the 
exemption for scientific research to the Commission as well as the results of the 
                                                 
262 Whaling Convention, Article V.1 
263 Whaling Convention, Article VIII.1 
264 Gregory Rose and Paleokrassis G. ‘Compliance with International Environmental Obligations - A Case 
Study of the International Whaling Convention’ James Cameron, Werksman J. and Roderick, P., Improving 
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Compliance Mechanisms 
89 
scientific research.265 Parties are also obliged to report to the Commission on the 
details of infractions of the Convention under their jurisdiction, and to provide 
information on penalties imposed.266  
 
In addition, the Convention imposes domestic monitoring and verification 
obligations on the Parties.267 Initially, Parties were obliged to have two national 
observers on each ‘factory ship’ to which the Convention applies and ‘adequate 
inspection’ levels at land stations.268 However, this system was open to abuse by 
national authorities. The International Observers Scheme was subsequently 
adopted in 1972, between the major whaling countries, for the mutual exchange 
of observers in the Southern Hemisphere, North Pacific, North Atlantic and 
Antarctic. The observers were obliged to submit compliance and non-compliance 
reports to the Commission at the end of the season, and report serious 
infractions.269 This system was also open to abuse (e.g. many Soviet vessels 
simply operated in secret), and it lapsed in 1986 when the last of the bilateral 
agreements establishing it lapsed.270 The Scientific Committee has since 
embarked upon the task of developing management objectives and procedures 
(i.e. the Revised Management Procedure (RMP)) and a new inspection and 
observation system, which would involve an international inspection and 
observer system.271  
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
There is currently no non-compliance procedure.  
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Measures 
 
As there is no NCP, there are also no multilateral non-compliance response 
measures under the Whaling Convention.  
 
                                                 
265 Whaling Convention, Article VIII.1 and VIII.3. 
266 Whaling Convention, Article IX.4 and Schedule, item 15. 
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However, independently from  a formal NCP, measures have been taken against 
States taking actions that conflict with the aims of the Convention. Due to the 
strong political sensitivities associated with commercial whaling, especially in 
‘western’ countries, some Parties have resorted unilaterally to political pressure 
or sanctions against States offending against Commission resolutions, such as 
trade and fisheries access restrictions.272 Parties have adopted measures 
against unregulated and unreported ‘pirate whaling’ in a series of resolutions 
between 1976 and 1981 to boycott the importation of whaling goods from non-
member countries.273 NGOs have also been relatively effective in their boycott 
campaigns in response to whaling operations conducted by Japan and 
Norway.274 
 
In addition to the General Fund credited or charged with all income and 
expenditure, the Whaling Convention’s Financial Regulations create a Research 
Fund and a Voluntary Fund for Small Cetaceans.275 The Research Fund collects 
voluntary contributions for research and scientific investigation. The Voluntary 
Fund, created at its 46th Annual Meeting, allows developing countries to 
participate in future small cetacean work. 
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
There is no formal dispute resolution procedure in the Whaling Convention. 
 
                                                 
272 Id., at p.171. 
273 Id., at p.172. 
274 Id., p.171. 
275IWC Website, <http://www.iwcoffice.org/commission/procedure.htm> (17/9/05). 
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LONDON CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION 





The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter came into force on 30 August 1975. Under Article I, Parties 
must promote the effective control of all sources of pollution of the marine 
environment. Article II obliges the Parties to take individual and collective 
measures to prevent marine pollution caused by dumping. Article IV.1(a) 
provides that Parties must prohibit the dumping of the wastes listed in Annex I.276 
Generally, the dumping of the wastes listed in Annex II requires a special permit 
while the dumping of all other wastes requires a general permit. Permits are only 
issued after the Party considers the factors specified in Annex III. The provisions 
of Article IV do not apply in certain circumstances, i.e. when it is necessary to 
secure human life or vessels in cases of force majeure.277 In 1996, Parties 
adopted the Protocol to the London Convention, which will replace the London 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
Parties are required to designate an appropriate authority to keep records of the 
nature and quantity of waste that is dumped, including the location, time and 
method of dumping.278 Under Article VI.4, Parties are obliged, either directly or 
through a Secretariat established under a regional agreement, to report this 
information to the OrganisationOrganisation, i.e. the London Convention 
Secretariat, as well as the criteria that they have adopted for the purpose of 
issuing permits. The prohibition of dumping for substances not mentioned in 
Annex I and dumping in cases of force majeure and emergencies should be 
referred to the OrganisationOrganisation.279 
 
                                                 
276 London Convention, Article V.2. 
277 London Convention, Article V.1. See also Article V.2, which states that a Party may issue a special 
permit as an exception to article IV(1)(a) in emergencies. 
278 London Convention, Article IV.1(c). 
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Each national authority is obliged to monitor the condition of the seas either 
individually or with other Parties.280 Under Article VII.3, the Parties agree to 
cooperate in the development of procedures for the reporting of vessels and 
aircraft observed dumping in contravention of the Convention. 
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
There is no non-compliance procedure under the London Convention. 
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Measures 
 
Technical Assistance Article IX provides that the Parties must promote, 
through collaboration within the Organisation and other international bodies, 
support for those Parties that request assistance for the training of scientific and 
technical personnel, technology for research, monitoring and the disposal and 
treatment of waste. At the consultative meeting in 1996, the Parties voted to 
establish a Technical Cooperation Programme as well as a Long-Term Strategy 
for Technical Cooperation activities.281 
 
Penalties Under Article X, Parties undertake to develop procedures for the 
assessment of liability and the settlement of disputes regarding dumping, in 
accordance with the international legal principles relating to state responsibility 
for damage to the environment. There is a similar provision in the London 
Protocol under Article 15. In addition, under Article 11, the London Protocol 
provides for the development of a NCP within two years of its entry into force. 
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
Under Article XI, Parties must consider procedures for the settlement of disputes 
at the First Consultative Meeting. A dispute resolution procedure was adopted at 
the Third Consultative Meeting in 1978 as an amendment to the Convention but it 
never came into force. The amendment provides that if negotiations fail, the 
dispute must be submitted to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration in 
accordance with the arbitration procedures in Annex III, if one of the Parties so 
requests.282 This amendment instead formed the basis of the Arbitral Procedure 
in Annex 3 to the London Protocol.283 
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The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entered into 
force on 16 November 1994. The product of nine years of negotiations, UNCLOS 
codified customary law and treaty law stemming from the Geneva Conventions 
on the Law of the Sea284 into 320 articles and nine annexes. It created new legal 
regimes in respect of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone and the 12-mile 
territorial sea, exploitation of the deep seabed, transit through international 
straits, archipelagic and landlocked States, marine pollution, marine fisheries 
management and the continental shelf.285 Part XII of UNCLOS focuses solely on 
control of marine pollution and, together with Part XV, which concerns dispute 
settlement, is considered here.  
 
Part XII contains provisions on preventing, reducing and controlling marine 
pollution. Article 204 obliges Parties to observe, measure, evaluate and analyse, 
by recognised scientific methods, the risks or effects of pollution of the marine 
environment. In essence, Article 204 imposes impact assessment and monitoring 
obligations in respect of the risks or effects of pollution. Article 205 requires 
Parties to publish reports on the results obtained pursuant to Article 204 and 
provide them to ‘competent international organisations.’ It has been left to 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
There are no performance review obligations incumbent upon the Parties. The 
UN Secretary-General provides an annual report to the General Assembly 
concerning the implementation of UNCLOS. 
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
UNCLOS and its MOP have not established a multilateral non-compliance 
procedure. 
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms 
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Although UNCLOS does not set out any non-compliance response mechanisms, 
it does contain implementation support provisions that promote assistance to 
Parties in the discharge of their primary marine environmental obligations. Those 
provisions are noted here because they support implementation, not because 
they set out non-compliance responses. The provisions relate to technical 
assistance and legal liability for breaches causing damage to a Party. There are 
no financial assistance provisions and no multilateral processes. 
 
Technical Assistance UNCLOS contains technical assistance provisions in 
relation to marine conservation and pollution, marine research and exploitation of 
the deep seabed. In relation to marine conservation and pollution, Article 61.5 
states that available scientific information relevant to the conservation of fish 
stocks and catch and fishing statistics must be exchanged on a regular basis. 
There are provisions for technical assistance to developing Parties.286 Further, 
Parties have a duty to cooperate with other States in the conservation and 
management of living resources in the high seas.287 States whose nationals 
exploit living resources in the same area must enter into negotiations with a view 
to conserving the resources so exploited.288 In relation to marine research, Part 
XIV provides for the development and transfer of marine technology and calls on 
Parties to cooperate and facilitate exchanges through existing bilateral, regional 
or multilateral programmes.289 
 
Penalties Under UNCLOS, Parties are to be mutually liable under 
international laws for their failures to fulfil their obligations to protect and 
conserve the marine environment.290 They must ensure that recourse to 
compensation is available in accordance with their national laws.291 In addition, 
Parties are liable for damages caused by failures to ensure that their activities 
undertaken in the seabed area comply with Part XI.292 Finally, they are to be 
liable in respect of failing to adhere to the Convention’s procedures on the 
conduct of marine scientific research.293 In none of these cases, however, does 
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287 UNCLOS, Article 117. 
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UNCLOS go beyond statements of general principles to specify the procedures 
for establishing and imposing liability. 
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
The UNCLOS dispute resolution system is extraordinary for its comprehensive, 
compulsory and binding nature. The dispute resolution procedure comprises two 
parts. Section 1 of Part XV contains general provisions relating to the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. Section 2 of Part XV contains provisions concerning 
compulsory dispute resolution procedures.  
 
Under Section 1, Article 279 states that the Parties must settle any disputes 
between them regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention in 
accordance with Article 2(3) of the UN Charter and by any of the means indicated 
in Article 33(1) of the UN Charter.294 Article 280 provides that Parties have the 
right to settle any dispute between them through peaceful means of their choice, 
while Article 283 reiterates this point, stating that, when a dispute arises, the 
Parties must ‘proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its 
settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means.’ Those ‘other peaceful 
means’ may have been agreed to in advance. For example, the European Union 
would submit any fisheries dispute arising between members to the European 
Court of Justice.295 If they have not been agreed to, Parties can opt for any 
judicial or non-judicial procedures.296  
 
If the Parties fail to resolve the dispute once these agreed procedures have been 
undertaken, one of the Parties can invite the other to submit to the conciliation 
procedure outlined in Article 284 and Annex V. If the invitation is accepted, each 
Party can nominate four conciliators from who each must choose two. The four 
conciliators then choose a fifth person who acts as the chairman. The conciliators 
have one year to make a report and recommendations.  
 
If conciliation fails or the invitation is rejected, Parties then have the right to 
invoke the compulsory dispute settlement procedures in Section 2 of Part XV. 
The compulsory procedures entail binding decisions. Articles 286 and 287 oblige 
the Parties to have recourse to the compulsory procedures if the peaceful means 
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that they chose to resolve the matter failed. However, this obligation has 
exceptions: 
 
• Article 297(1) states that Parties cannot invoke the compulsory procedures for 
a dispute concerning the exercise of another Party’s rights or jurisdiction 
within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), unless it is alleged that: the State 
has contravened the Convention with respect to the freedoms and rights of 
navigation, overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or in 
regard to other internationally lawful uses of the sea outlined in Article 58; in 
exercising any such freedoms the State has contravened the Convention on 
national laws adopted in conformity with the Convention; or the State has 
exercised its jurisdiction inconsistently with internationally adopted rules on 
marine pollution. 
• Article 297(2) states that Parties are not obliged to submit disputes 
concerning the refusal to give permission to conduct scientific research in 
their EEZs or continental shelves. If the dispute is not submitted to the 
compulsory procedures, it must be submitted to the conciliation procedure 
under Annex V.  
• The compulsory procedures are not applicable to disputes arising from 
failures to determine total allowable catches and coastal harvesting 
capacities, allocating surpluses to other States and the terms of conservation 
measures. However, where it is alleged that a State has failed to ensure that 
its EEZ fish stocks are not seriously endangered, or it has arbitrarily refused 
to determine total allowable catches or harvesting capacity or to allocate a 
surplus to other States, the ‘compulsory conciliation procedure’ may be 
invoked.297 
 
Parties can also opt out of the compulsory dispute resolution procedures for 
disputes concerning sea boundary delimitation and claims to historic waters, 
military and law enforcement activities and the exercise of Security Council 
functions.298 Disputes falling within the first category may be referred to 
conciliation at the request of one of the Parties if a resolution is not achieved 
within a reasonable period of time through negotiation.299 Article 298 allows 
Parties to impose these limitations when signing, ratifying or acceding to the 
Convention or anytime thereafter. 
 
Parties are given a choice of forum. They can choose to have the matter heard 
before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of 
Justice, an arbitral tribunal established in accordance with Annex VII or a special 
                                                 
297 UNCLOS, Article 297(3). 
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arbitral tribunal established in accordance with Annex VIII.300 These bodies apply 
the rules of the Convention and the rules of international law, although Article 
293 allows the Parties to request a decision that is made on the general 
principles of equity and fairness. Parties must declare which of the four bodies 
they choose as a dispute resolution mechanism at any time.301 However, where a 
Party has not made an election, it is deemed to accept arbitration under Annex 
VII.302 
 
The Tribunal was established under Annex VI and has 21 members who are 
elected by the Parties.303 However, only 11 members are required at any plenary 
session, although the Tribunal has the power to establish smaller ‘chambers’ to 
deal with specific issues.304 Thus, the Tribunal has a chamber of summary 
procedure and chambers for fisheries, environmental disputes and sea-bed 
disputes.305 Disputes concerning the exploration of the international seabed must 
be submitted to the SeaBed Disputes Chamber of the Tribunal and not to any 
other process.306 
 
An arbitral tribunal under Annex VII may be established for disputes between 
States and disputes involving international organisations. Each UNCLOS Party 
nominates four people to sit on the panel from the Parties to the dispute must 
each choose one person.307 Three members are then chosen jointly.308 The 
award is final and without appeal unless the Parties have agreed to an appellate 
procedure.309 
 
Disputes concerning fisheries, protecting and preserving the marine environment, 
marine scientific research or navigation must be submitted for special arbitration 
in accordance with Annex VIII.310 There are four lists dealing with one of the 
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above categories and all Parties to the Convention may nominate two experts in 
a relevant field to each of these lists.311 Parties may then choose two arbitrators 
for each case.312 The special arbitral tribunal can be used as a fact-finding 
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AGREEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OF 10 
DECEMBER 1982 RELATING TO THE CONSERVATION AND 
MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY 




The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks (the Fish Stocks Agreement) entered into force on 11 December 
2001. It aims to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of 
straddling fish stocks, i.e. stocks that straddle high seas and zones under 
national jurisdiction, and of highly migratory species, i.e. as listed in UNCLOS 
Annex II. It focuses on areas beyond national jurisdiction although Articles 6 and 
7 apply to the conservation and management of such stocks within areas under 
national jurisdiction.315  
 
Article 5 outlines general principles. Parties must: adopt measures to ensure 
long-term sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks 
and to promote the objective of their optimum utilisation; ensure that such 
measures are based on the best scientific evidence available and are designed 
to maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing the maximum 
sustainable yield; apply the precautionary approach in Article 6; assess the 
impact of fishing and environmental factors on target stocks; adopt conservation 
and management measures to maintain or restore such species above 
sustainable levels; minimise pollution, waste, catch by lost or abandoned gear or 
catch of non-target species; take measures to protect biodiversity in the marine 
environment and to eliminate over-fishing; and promote and conduct scientific 
research and develop appropriate technologies to support conservation and 
management. 
 
Article 9 provides a framework for cooperating in or establishing sub-regional or 
regional fisheries management organisations and arrangements while Article 10 
sets out their functions. Some of these functions include agreeing on standards 
for collection, reporting, verification and exchange of data, compiling and 
disseminating accurate and complete statistical information in accordance with 
Annex I and establishing cooperative mechanisms for monitoring, control, 
surveillance and enforcement.316 
 
                                                 
315 Fish Stocks Agreement, Articles 2 and 3.1. 
316 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 10(e), (f) and (h). 
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Under Article 18, a State whose vessels fish in the high seas must take 
measures to ensure that vessels flying its flag comply with sub-regional and 
regional conservation and management measures and that any such vessels do 
not engage in activity which undermine the effectiveness of those measures. 
Such measures include national laws and policies, including the establishment of 




(a) Performance Review Information 
 
The Fish Stocks Agreement does not impose requirements upon its Parties to 
prepare or submit performance review information. Instead, its information 
requirements concern (1) conduct and sharing of relevant scientific research and 
(2) review at the internal national level of domestic fishing unit performance. 
These two types of information contribute to an informed review of national 
performance but, of themselves, do not amount to a performance review.  
 
In relation to information concerning scientific baselines for the design of 
sustainable fisheries management measures, Parties must collect and share 
complete and accurate data on fishing activities on, inter alia, vessel position, 
catch of target and non-target species, and fishing effort, as set out in Annex I. 
They must also submit information from national and international research 
programs.317 They must develop data collection and research programs to 
assess the impact of fishing on non-target and associated or dependent species 
and their environment318 and must enhance the monitoring of uncertain stocks in 
order to review their status and the efficacy of conservation and management 
measures and establish mechanisms for the verification of catch data. States are 
also to ensure that fishing vessels flying their flag collect and exchange scientific, 
technical and statistical data with respect to fisheries for straddling fish stocks 
and highly migratory fish stocks; ensure that data are collected with sufficient 
detail to facilitate effective stock assessment; and provide such information to 
sub-regional or regional fisheries management organisations or arrangements 
and to verify the accuracy of such data.319 Parties must take appropriate 
measures to verify the data that is supplied. In addition, Parties must agree, 
either directly or through sub-regional or regional fisheries management 
organisations or arrangements on data specifications and format and develop 
and share analytical techniques and stock assessment methods.  
 
In relation to performance review of the operations of domestic fishing units, the 
Parties and regional fishing organisations are required to collect operational 
                                                 
317 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 5(j). 
318 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 6.2(d). 
319 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 14. 
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information to meet their obligations to conduct effective monitoring, control and 
surveillance within their jurisdictions.320 Under Article 18.3, Parties are obliged to 
monitor vessels flying their flag, their fishing operations and related activities by, 
inter alia, implementing national inspection schemes, observer programs and 
vessel monitoring systems. They must also verify the catch of target and non-
target species through observer programs, inspection schemes, unloading 
reports, supervision of trans-shipment and monitoring of landed catches and 
market statistics. Subregional and regional fisheries management organisations 
and arrangements must agree on verification standards for fish stocks.321 
Further, these subregional and regional fisheries management organisations and 
arrangements are required to develop appropriate monitoring, control, 
surveillance and enforcement procedures.322 Finally, under Articles 20.1 and 21, 
Parties may establish boarding and inspection procedures through regional 
bodies for boarding and inspection for the purpose of ensuring compliance with 
conservation and management measures. 
 
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
The Fish Stocks Agreement does not institute a NCP. Part VI of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement requires the design of compliance and enforcement systems. These 
systems do not relate to the compliance of Parties with the Agreement but, 
rather, to the compliance of a State’s fishing vessels with sub-regional and 
regional conservation management measures.323 
 
(c) Non-Compliance Response Measures 
 
Despite not having a NCP, the Fish Stocks Agreement does set in place certain 
technical and financial assistance obligations to help developing country Parties 
meet their commitments. They are not responsive to a finding of non-compliance 
and, therefore, are not non-compliance response measures. However, they have 
been included here to give a full picture of measures available to assist a Party 
with its compliance with the Fish Stocks Agreements.  
 
Technical Assistance  Parties acknowledge the special assistance which 
developing Parties require in conserving and managing straddling fish stocks.324 
Assistance is to be in the form of financial assistance, human resources 
                                                 
320 Article 5(l). 
321 Article 10(e). 
322 Article 10(h). See also Article 16.1. 
323 Fish Stocks Agreement, Articles 19-23. 
324 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 24. 
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development, technical assistance, transfer of technology and advisory and 
consultative services.325  
 
Financial Assistance Article 26 requires Parties to cooperate to establish 
special funds to assist developing The United Nations General Assembly urged 
States Parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement to develop terms of reference for a 
voluntary trust fund within the United Nations system, which would assist 
developing Parties in meeting their obligations.326 At their second informal 
consultations, the Parties to the Agreement agreed on the terms of reference for 
an Assistance Fund, and recommended that the General Assembly establish 
it.327 
 
(d) Dispute Resolution 
 
Like UNCLOS, there is an obligation on Parties to settle disputes peacefully.328 
Disputes of a technical nature can be referred to an ad hoc expert panel 
established by them.329 However, the compulsory dispute resolution procedure 
established in Part XV of UNCLOS applies to any dispute between Parties over 
the interpretation of the Fish Stocks Agreement or of any sub-regional, regional 
or global fisheries agreement relating to straddling fish stocks or highly migratory 
fish stocks to which they are Parties.330 Parties must adopt a procedure pursuant 
to Article 287 of UNCLOS.331 
                                                 
325 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 25.2. 
326 Resolution 57/143 (17 December 2002). See also UN Website, 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/fishstocktrustfund/fishstocktrustfund.htm> (8/9/05). 
327 See also UN Website, 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/fishstocktrustfund/fishstocktrustfund.htm> (8/9/05).  
328 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 27. 
329 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 29. 
330 Fish Stocks Agreement, Articles 30.1 and 30.2. 
331 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 30.3. 
Comparative Analysis 
103 




This chapter compares the components of compliance mechanisms by category 
across MEAs. Where available, the academic, governmental and inter-
governmental literature concerning the operational qualities of particular MEA 
compliance mechanisms is surveyed. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are four 
categories of components in compliance mechanisms.  
 
(a) Performance review information obligations in MEAs require Parties to report 
on their implementation performance and to provide a range of related statistical 
data to the Secretariat or COP/MOP. Other compliance-related information 
obligations involve third-party verification or monitoring of a Party's performance.  
 
(b) Multilateral non-compliance procedures are institutional mechanisms set up to 
examine performance review information and make determinations as to a 
Party's compliance status. These procedures may be formal, entailing a special 
committee to investigate allegations of non-compliance and make 
recommendations. Others, however, are informal and ad hoc.  
 
(c) Once a NCP has made a determination that a Party is substantially non-
compliant, it may suggest responses. These outputs may take the form of 
recommendations of a Committee to the COP/MOP or the adoption of relevant 
resolutions by the COP/MOP. The non-compliance response measures adopted 
under  a NCP vary. They include a range of incentives and disincentives, or 
'carrots and sticks'. 
 
(d) Finally, there are dispute resolution procedures. These are adversarial and 
arise between Parties without engaging the COP or Secretariat.  
 
Table 3.1 synthesises some of the information contained in Chapter 2 to provide 
a broad overview of the framework for compliance in each MEA. Greater depth 
concerning the nature of the occurrence of each component of the compliance 




TABLE 3.1. OVERVIEW OF MEA COMPLIANCE FRAMEWORKS 
 












     
Ramsar √ √ √  
World Heritage √ √ √ √ 
CITES √ √ √ √ 
CMS √   √ 
CBD √   √ 
UNCCD √ Pending  √ 
ITPGRFA  Pending  √ 
     
Basel √ √ √ √ 
PIC  Pending  √ 
Biosafety √ √ √ √ 
POPs √ Pending  √ 
     
Vienna Ozone √   √ 
Montreal Protocol √ √ √ √ 
UNFCCC √ √ √ √ 
Kyoto Protocol √ √ √ √ 
     
Whaling √ √   
London √    
UNCLOS    √ 
Fish Stocks    √ 
 
 
National Performance Information 
Information on a Party’s performance is essential to determine whether it is 
complying with its obligations. As noted in Chapter 2, the provision of related 
information is often also required at other phases in the implementation of an 
MEA, i.e. as part of the primary operations requiring information exchange, as 
part of the provision of technical assistance, or for overall review and redesign of 
the regime. A particular group of data can be used across several phases of the 
implementation of the MEA. For example, information on national compliance will 
be useful at the MEA regime review stage. Reliable information is central to the 
operation of an MEA and this is especially true regarding compliance, as the core 
of any compliance mechanism is information on performance.  
 
Self-Reporting 
Most MEAs oblige Parties to provide the secretariat with annual reports that the 
Parties themselves prepare on their national implementation. These may involve 
details on the development of national programs, policies and measures (see: 
CITES, CMS, Ramsar Convention, CBD, Biosafety Protocol, Basel Convention, 
Vienna Convention, Montreal Protocol, UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, Fish Stocks 
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Agreement and Whaling Convention). In particular, UNCCD and the POPs 
Convention specifically require the Parties to submit information specifically on 
national implementation plans.  
 
Some Conventions require Parties to submit further scientific, technical and 
transactional data to the Secretariat. For example, CITES requires Parties to 
submit annual import/export statistics, while the Fish Stocks Agreement and the 
Whaling Convention require Parties to submit annual catch/permit reports. CMS 
obliges Parties to provide data on the numbers of migratory species passing 
through their respective jurisdictions. The Montreal Protocol, UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol require Parties to submit initial baseline and annual production data for 
listed pollutants. While this data can be used to interpret performance 
information, in itself it is not performance information.  
 
Only three MEAs do not impose obligations on their Parties to prepare reports on 
their respective individual performances. These are the ITPGRFA, the PIC 
Convention and UNCLOS. The ITPGRFA obliges Parties to provide only 
transactional information to each other on the resources being supplied under its 
Multilateral System. Similarly, the PIC Convention obliges Parties to provide the 
Secretariat with information on specific import decisions rather than annual 
reports. That information is then circulated to the other Parties. In both cases, the 
information required is operational data to facilitate transactions regulated under 
the treaty, rather than a system of reflective reporting of national performance. 
UNCLOS is a framework Convention, leaving reporting requirements to be 
developed by other, usually regional, organiations.  
 
Generally, specific instructions on the content and format of national performance 
reports are available from the Secretariat or from the MEA Website. Some 
Secretariat Websites (e.g. CBD, CITES, Ramsar and Basel) provide report 
templates that require Parties to tick boxes in response to specific questions or 
require the Parties to otherwise attach information. The majority of MEA websites 
have posted guidelines that specify the type of information to be included in 
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reports.332 For example, the World Heritage Convention has guidelines that 
specify the purpose, format and general requirements of periodic reports.333  
 
Third-party Verification 
Verification is the process of testing the accuracy of performance information 
provided, usually through on-site inspections. Some MEAs have verification 
requirements. For example, the Ramsar and UNFCCC/Kyoto Secretariats 
conduct on-site verifications, mainly to obtain performance information.334 The 
Whaling Convention is currently in the process of developing a new verification 
procedure. The process is undertaken by a third Party, such as the Secretariat or 
an NGO, or by them in combination with other Parties to the treaty.  
 
Third-party Monitoring  
In contrast to self-reporting, third-party monitoring of performance engages a 
non-Party in reporting on national implementation of MEA obligations. In contrast 
to verification, performance monitoring may address a Party’s establishment of 
systems to implement the MEA but does not involve review of accuracy of 
particular information for its own sake. (Third-party monitoring of national 
performance must also be distinguished from third-party monitoring of 
environmental conditions, which is sometimes undertaken by independent 
scientific and technical bodies that work in cooperation with the MEA.) Third-
party monitoring of performance is uncommon, perhaps because it is resource 
intensive. Under CITES, third Parties – TRAFFIC (an NGO affiliated to WWF) 
and the WCO – have roles in monitoring compliance. The Ramsar Convention 
introduces third-party monitoring of degraded wetlands as a non-compliance 
response335, and the Whaling Convention is currently developing a new 
monitoring procedure.  
                                                 
332 CMS, <http://www.cms.int/bodies/COP/cop7/list_of_docs/pdf/en/CP7CF7_06_2_national_report.pdf>; 
World Heritage, <http://whc.unesco.org/reporting/prexpl.htm>; Ramsar, 
<http://www.ramsar.org/cop9_nrform_ready_e.htm>; CBD, <http://www.biodiv.org/world/intro.asp>; 
Biosafety, <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/cop-mop/result.aspx?id=8291>; POPs, 
<http://www.pops.int/documents/guidance/>; PIC, 
<http://www.pic.int/en/viewpage.asp?Id_Cat=104&mTitre=FORMS+%26+GUIDANCE>; Vienna, 
<http://hq.unep.org/ozone/Information_for_the_Parties/3A_data_reporting.asp>; Montreal Protocol, 
<http://hq.unep.org/ozone/pdfs/Handbook-on-Data-Report-from-UNEP-TIE.pdf>; UNFCCC, 
<http://unfccc.int/national_reports/items/1408.php>; and Kyoto, 
<http://unfccc.int/national_reports/accounting_reporting_and_review_under_the_kyoto_protocol/items/102
9.php> (25/10/05). 
333 World Heritage, <http://whc.unesco.org/reporting/prexpl.htm>; POPs, 
<http://www.pops.int/documents/guidance/> (25/10/05). 
334 The Basel Convention provision entitled ‘Verification’ (Art. 19) addresses  a trigger mechanism for the 
NCP. The Fish Stocks Agreement  includes an obligation on Parties to develop their own national 
verification procedures with respect to vessels flying their own flags (Art.18.3). This concerns national 
implementation rather than performance information.  




Non-Compliance Response Information 
Failures to comply with obligations concerning submission of national 
performance information undermines the regime of an MEA because the 
information deficit can conceal national non-performance of primary operational 
obligations. Consequently, failure to comply with performance review obligations 
is a substantive default that can trigger an MEA’s NCP, as is the case under 
CITES and the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols. Upon processing through the 
NCPs, a response that imposes further performance information obligations on 
the defaulting PParty can result.  
 
The information required under a NCP can be additional to that ordinarily 
required, or simply require the original performance information as part of a 
package of additional measures. For example, the NCPs of the Biosafety and 
Kyoto Protocols require that the defaulting Party submit a compliance action plan 
outlining how the non-compliant Party will achieve compliance within a set 
timeframe.336 The CITES Secretariat conducts ad hoc verification missions to 
assess a Party’s compliance with its obligations, both as a primary 
implementation support and as a non-compliance response.337  
 
TABLE 3.2. PERFORMANCE REVIEW INFORMATION 
 
Convention Review Format National Performance Review  Non-Compliance Response Information 








         
Ramsar √  √  √   √ 
World Heritage  √ √  √   √ 
CITES √  √ √ √  √  
CMS  √ √      
CBD  √ √      
UNCCD  Pending √      
ITPGRFA    √     
         
Basel √  √ √ √    
PIC         
Biosafety   √ √   √   
POPs  √ √      
         
Vienna  √ √      
                                                 
336 Kyoto Website, <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_mechanisms/compliance/items/3024.php> and Biosafety 
Website, <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/issues/compliance2.aspx> (25/10/05). 
337 Reeves, R, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, 
Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, p.75.  
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Montreal Protocol  √ √      
UNFCCC  √ √ √     
Kyoto Protocol  √ √ √ √ √   
         
Whaling   √ √ √    
London   √      
UNCLOS          
Fish Stocks         
 
Table 3.2 focuses on performance information provisions under the headings of 
Review Format, Performance Review and Non-Compliance Response 
Information. It should be noted that there is a divergence among MEAs that 
regulate international transactions. The CITES, Basel Convention and Montreal 
Protocol each require the Parties to include information on regulated transactions 
in their national performance reports. In contrast, the PIC Convention and 
ITPGRFA do not require Parties to include in the details of regulated 
transactions. The latter omissions generate significant gaps in the available 
performance information for those treaties.  
 
Potential interlinkages in gathering performance review information arise 
between MEAs engaged in regulating closely related activities. For example, 
where MEAs regulate overlapping sites, species, substances or emissions, there 
is heightened potential for coordination. This performance review information will 
be most useful across MEAs when review requires the provision of statistical, 
transactional or other quantifiable data, rather than qualitative descriptive 
evaluations. The latter are typically more related to descriptions of policy 
measures that are customised to particular MEAs and may also be less factually 
objective.  
 
In relation to self-reporting, the interlinkages may be created in the form of 
harmonization of reporting formats and joint MEA reporting by a Party. Extensive 
work has been undertaken by the World Conservation Monitoring Centre and the 
United Nations University on harmonization of reporting formats. This work is 
canvassed in Chapter 4.  (It should also be noted that where self-reporting 
addresses a transnational ecosystem, joint reports might be appropriate.)  
 
In relation to monitoring and verification, potential interlinkages exist in carrying 
out third-party monitoring operations and verification missions. Thus, while on 
mission, a verification team might be multi-tasked to assess aspects of 
compliance common to several MEAs. For example, world natural heritage sites, 
wetlands, migratory species and biodiversity reserves might be inspected on a 
single mission. Similarly, customs controls might be inspected in relation to 
capacity to comply with MEAs concerning international trade in endangered 




UNEP might usefully establish a roster of technical experts to conduct monitoring 
and verifications for the MEAs that it administers. Analogy can be made with the 
peer reviews that are conducted by the OECD Secretariat on progress in all 
member countries and three non-member countries.338 These reviews are 
conducted cyclically to assess whether the reviewed country is meeting its 
domestic environmental regulations and international environmental obligations. 
Multi-tasking a monitoring or verification mission across MEA Secretariats would 
be little more difficult than bringing together a team of experts for different MEAs 
administered by one organisation. 
 
                                                 




Multilateral Non-Compliance Response Procedures 
 
Non-Compliance Procedures require administration by a body established under 
the MEA. That body is usually the COP/MOP but it may be assisted by a 
specialised compliance committee that the COP/MOP has established by 
resolution for that purpose. The compliance committees consist of one to two 
dozen members elected by the COP/MOP according to geographically 
representative formulae that are varied or adjusted to meet the MEA concerns 
and interests to be represented. Regional groupings sometimes nominate for 
election individuals with legal expertise. Although regionally representative, the 
members sit in their individual capacities.  
 
MEAs that do not have specialised compliance committees may incorporate a 
NCP administered directly by the COP/MOP. Specialised MEA compliance 
committees, usually named the Implementation Committee or Compliance 
Committee, operate during the meeting of a COP/MOP in most cases. They 
consider cases of non-compliance referred to them, reach a determination on the 
compliance status of the Party and make a recommendation to the COP/MOP for 
appropriate responsive action. Thus, the determination and recommendation of 
the non-compliance committee must be approved by the COP/MOP. The 
COP/MOPs for CITES, the Biosafety Protocol, the Basel Convention, the 
Montreal Protocol, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol all have such 
specialised committees.  
 
A suggestion that a Party is non-compliant can come to the attention of a body 
administering a NCP in a variety of ways. The Party experiencing compliance 
difficulties itself can initiate the procedure. Otherwise, the Party's non-compliance 
might come to the attention of any of the other Parties or the Secretariat, which 
refer the matter to the NCP. A third-party body performing a monitoring role can 
report cases of possible non-compliance to the Secretariat, which may then 
invoke the NCP. For example, under CITES, the Secretariat receives and may 
pass on information on non-compliance from TRAFFIC and other NGOs and, 
under the Kyoto Protocol, expert review teams may trigger the NCP. 
 
Table 3.3 shows the MEAs that have adopted NCPs. It elaborates on how they 
are triggered and the body that administers them.  
 
Thirteen of the MEAs have developed, or are in the process of developing, NCPs 
to deal with instances of apparent non-compliance. However, potential for 
interlinkages between NCPs is slight. Each is specific to the political context of its 
MEA, i.e. to the sensitive balance struck during its negotiation processes and to 
the composition of its COP/MOP or elected sub-committee membership. Thus, it 
would be premature (if not inappropriate) to seek to harmonize NCPs or combine 
committees across MEAs. However, two other types of NCP interlinkages might 




First, closer coordination between MEA secretariats could enhance their capacity 
to trigger NCPs. For example, evidence of corruption of customs authorities 
resulting in a Party's non-compliance concerning its trade-related obligations 
might implicate that Party in similar non-compliance under more than one MEA. 
Protocols for coordination of performance information between secretariats could 
enable them to be more effective in triggering their respective NCPs. Such 
coordination would be likely to be useful across MEAs within a cluster but could 
also be useful across MEAs that regulate related activities, such as international 
trade. 
TABLE 3.3. MULTILATERAL NON-COMPLIANCE RESPONSE PROCEDURES 
 
Convention Procedure Trigger Body Decision-Making Body 
 Established Pending Any Member Secretariat Other COP Committee 
        
Ramsar √   √  √  
World Heritage √  √ √ √ √  
CITES √  √ √ √ √ √ 
CMS        
CBD        
UNCCD  √      
ITPGRFA  √      
        
Basel √  √ √  √ √ 
PIC  √      
Biosafety  √  √ √  √ √ 
POPs  √      
        
Vienna        
Montreal Protocol √  √ √  √ √ 
UNFCCC √  √ √  √ √ 
Kyoto Protocol √  √ √ √ √ √ 
        
Whaling        
London        
UNCLOS        
Fish Stocks        
 
 
Second, NCP decision-making bodies could coordinate their responses so as to 
maximise their effect for the non-compliant Party. Thus, the coordination of 
implementation assistance across MEAs to address non-compliance caused by a 
systemic lack of environmental capacity would be more effective than piecemeal 
or duplicative implementation assistance. Similarly, the coordination of penalties 
would have greater impact. Again, such coordination would be likely to be useful 
across MEAs within a cluster but could also be useful across MEAs that regulate 
related activities. Coordination of non-compliance responses is discussed in 




Non-Compliance Response Measures 
 
Once a determination of non-compliance is made under a NCP, the COP/MOP 
formally decides upon or adopts the Committee’s recommended response 
measures. These typically take the form of targeted implementation assistance. 
Less common are response measures in the form of penalties.  
 
IMPLEMENTATION ASSISTANCE 
The forms of implementation assistance are provision of information, technical 
support and financial assistance. For the purposes of this study, technical 
support is broadly defined to include capacity building and training, cooperation 
in scientific endeavours and research, or transfer of technology.  
 
Implementation assistance is usually available under an MEA at earlier stages in 
the implementation cycle, as basic implementation assistance, rather than as a 
response to non-compliance. All of the MEAs surveyed in this paper provide 
some measure of basic implementation assistance to Parties in need at those 
earlier stages. Upon a determination of non-compliance, targeted implementation 
assistance to a non-compliant Party might be prioritized and made subject to 
conditions. Thus, arrangements under an MEA for the provision of basic 
implementation assistance can be specifically directed, as the output of a NCP, 
to help fix a Party's non-compliance problems.  
 
For the purposes of this study of compliance mechanisms, it is only 
implementation assistance that is an output of the NCP that it is addressed. 
However, as the NCP’s output typically draws upon general arrangements for 
assistance that operate under an MEA at earlier stages of the implementation 
cycle, those general arrangements must be noted. Of particular relevance is 
implementation assistance to help non-compliant Parties meet their performance 
review obligations. For that reason, Table 3.4 identifies assistance to meet 
performance review requirements separately from other technical and financial 
assistance. It also compares the provision of implementation assistance at the 
earlier stages of implementation with assistance that is an output of the NCP.  
 
As can be seen in Table 3.4, every MEA contains implementation support 
assistance obligations. All but one MEA has a funding mechanism to provide 
financial assistance to Parties for the implementation of approved projects and 
programs. Thus, all MEAs that include  a NCP can draw upon their existing 
technical and financial support arrangements in crafting  non-compliance 
response measures.  
 
It follows that, just as Parties to MEAs might coordinate their technical and 
financial support arrangements so as to maximise their positive impacts, those 
same arrangements could be coordinated  in the context of non-compliance 
response measures. Where a systemic lack of environmental capacity is 
considered to be the cause of non-compliance, coordination of responsive 
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assistance across related MEAs would be more effective than piecemeal or 
duplicative efforts. In fact, non-compliance measures could be easier to 
coordinate across MEAs than general implementation assistance measures. This 
is because they are nominated as priorities by NCP determinations and they are 
fewer in number than general requests for assistance (because they carry the 
stigma of non-compliance). 
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TABLE 3.4. IMPLEMENTATION ASSISTANCE 




 Primary Implementation Assistance 
 Technical Financial  Technical Financial 
Ramsar √   Implementation guidelines 
developed by Ramsar Bureau; 
information exchange and CHM 





 Technical and scientific 
cooperation and capacity building 
World Heritage Fund, Reserve 
Fund and Funds in Trust 
CITES √   Capacity building Trust fund 
CMS    Capacity building (Global 
Information System and Register) 
Trust fund 
CBD    Technical and scientific 
cooperation, capacity building, 
technology transfer and 
development of guidelines; CHM 
Global Environment Facility 
UNCCD    Technical and scientific 
cooperation, capacity building, 
technology development and 
transfers; coordinate, collect and 
exchange data 
Global Mechanism 
ITPGRFA    Technical and scientific 
cooperation, capacity building 
and technology transfer; Global 
Information System 
Trust Fund 






√  Establishment of regional centres 
for training and technology 
transfers; information sharing 
Trust Fund for the Implementation 
of the Convention and Technical 
Cooperation Trust Fund to Assist 
Developing Countries 





√ √  Scientific and technical 
cooperation and capacity 
building; CHM and performance 
review reports 
Global Environment Facility 
POPs     Capacity building and information 
exchange 
Global Environment Facility 
Interim 
      
Vienna    Technical and scientific 
cooperation, training and 










√  Technical cooperation and 
technology transfers; information 
exchange 




UNFCCC √ √  Technology transfers and CHM Global Environment Facility, 
Special Climate Change Fund and 




√ √  Technical and scientific research 
and cooperation, technology 
transfers and capacity building 
Global Environment Facility and 
Adaptation Fund 
      
Whaling 
Convention 
    Research, General and Voluntary 
Funds 
London    Technical Cooperation 
Programme  
 
UNCLOS    Technical and scientific 
cooperation to developing 
Parties, transfer of marine and 





   Human resources development, 
technology transfers and 
advisory and consultative 





NON-COMPLIANCE PENALTIES  
 MEAs with an established NCP often enable the imposition of penalties on non-
compliant Parties. The penalties imposed under these procedures can be 
grouped into four categories: Warnings; Suspension of Privileges; Trade 
Sanctions; and Liability. 
 
Warnings can be considered as the first along a spectrum of severity in the 
penalties that may be applied. As a next step, some MEAs provide for 
suspension of Parties’ rights and privileges, notably, participation in voting or 
committees (see CITES, World Heritage Convention and the Montreal Protocol). 
The imposition of trade sanctions encompasses the suspension of trading 
privileges and other economic rights regulated by the MEA.339 Finally, the 
imposition of liability requires non-compliant Parties to compensate for their non-
compliance. This liability can take two forms: greater burdens in meeting the 
MEA obligations (see Kyoto Protocol) or reparations for any damage caused (see 




                                                 
339 It should be noted that the Whaling Convention does not have a multilateral NCP that can apply non-
compliance response measures but that Parties tend to use unilateral trade sanctions in conjunction with 
diplomatic and/or political pressure to achieve the desired outcomes. 
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TABLE 3.5. NON-COMPLIANCE PENALTIES 
Convention Warning Suspension of Privileges Trade Sanctions Liability 
     
Ramsar     
World 
Heritage 
 Exclusion of membership from 
World Heritage Committee 
  
CITES √ Secretariat takes control of 
issuing permits 
Suspension of trade in 
CITES-listed species and 
imposition of conditions 
 
CMS     
CBD      
UNCCD     
ITPGRFA     
     
Basel √   Re-import illegal 
exports. Liability 
Protocol. 
PIC     
Biosafety √   Liability Protocol 
pending. 
POPs     
     
Vienna     
Montreal 
Protocol 
√ Suspension of rights in 
institutional arrangements, 
financial mechanism and transfer 
of technology 




UNFCCC     
Kyoto 
Protocol 
  Suspending right to trade 









 Unilateral fisheries trade 
or access restrictions 
 
London    Liability subject to 
further negotiation: 
Article X. 
UNCLOS    Several related 
liability treaties.  
Fish Stocks     
 
Liability to make reparations for any damage caused is not truly part of a 
multilateral NCP in any MEA. Rather it is a responsibility that is articulated in the 
MEA or its protocols and that is determined bilaterally, often in an adversarial 
process. Thus, determinations of liability are usually outputs of a dispute 
resolution process rather than an NCP. However, liability to make reparations is 
surveyed here, in the context of non-compliance penalties, because in effect 
exposure to liability is a disincentive to non-compliance.   
 
A coordinated approach across MEAs to the imposition of penalties against a 
Party that is recurrently non-compliant would have greater impact than ad hoc 
penalties. As noted above, coordination would be likely to be useful across MEAs 
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within a cluster but could also be useful across MEAs that regulate common 
activities, such as international trade or manufacturing.  
 
A coordinated approach to the suspension of privileges, where these are properly 
mandated by a COP/MOP, would strengthen the deterrent effect of penalties. 
Thus, for MEAs regulating related activities, the respective COP/MOPs might, by 
prior agreement, suspend the privileges of a Party under each MEA when that 
Party is determined by one of the COP/MOPs to be non-compliant (Such a 
coordinated approach to penalties would also strengthen the deterrent impact of 
penalties for related regional MEAs that are applicable in one region or across 
several regions.)  
 
Dispute Resolution Procedures 
Dispute resolution procedures vary in sophistication, from simple provisions that 
require Parties to negotiate bilaterally to resolve disputes peacefully, to the 
elaborate, compulsory binding third-party dispute resolution procedures that can 
be found in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. They are 
grouped in three clusters of compulsory procedures: Negotiation, Conciliation 
and Arbitration. At one end of the spectrum, CITES and CMS have dispute 
settlement provisions that provide that in the event of a dispute, Parties must 
submit to negotiation. They may voluntarily submit to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration if negotiations fail. Thus, there is no obligation to pursue binding 
arbitration. At the other end of the spectrum is UNCLOS, which has compulsory, 
binding arbitration for specific disputes (i.e. disputes concerning the seabed). 
Generally, however, the arbitration procedure is invoked if the dispute has not 
been resolved through negotiation. Conciliation is an option where negotiations 
fail, but is invoked only if one Party requests it and the other accepts the 
invitation. Compulsory conciliation has emerged as the preferred compromise 
struck by the negotiators of MEAs.  
 
The invocation of compulsory dispute resolution procedures signals a crisis in 
environmental diplomacy. In addition, the outcomes of such procedures remain 
unpredictable and potentially expensive. Therefore, with few exceptions, the 
provisions of MEAs on binding dispute resolution tend to be weak and/or 
permissive. States are generally reluctant to formulate legal obligations in MEAs 
that might compel them to submit their environmental conflicts to binding dispute 
resolution procedures for the reasons stated above. The increasing trend 
towards the use of multilateral NCPs, as opposed to adversarial dispute 
settlement procedures, seems to herald a new focus in international 
environmental law on managing political relationships so as to maintain the 
viability and integrity of an MEA. 
 




TABLE 3.6 DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 
 
Convention Negotiation Conciliation Binding Arbitration 
 Voluntary Compulsory Voluntary Compulsory Voluntary Compulsory 
       
Ramsar       
World Heritage       
CITES  √   √  
CMS  √   √  
CBD  √  √ √  
UNCCD  √  √ √  
ITPGRFA  √  √ √  
       
Basel  √  √ √  
PIC  √  √ √  
Biosafety Protocol  √  √ √  
POPs   √  √ √  
       
Vienna  √  √ √  
Montreal Protocol  √  √ √  
UNFCCC  √  √ √  
Kyoto Protocol  √  √ √  
       
Whaling Convention       
London       
UNCLOS  √ √   √ 
Fish Stocks  √ √   √ 
 
As Table 6 illustrates, all but four Conventions have provisions on settling 
disputes between Parties. The London Convention has developed a dispute 
settlement procedure but it has never entered into force. With the exception of 
the dispute resolution procedures under UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks 
Agreement, the MEA dispute resolutions procedures are weak and tend to 
orientate Parties towards the voluntary, less adversarial methods of negotiation 
and conciliation.  
 
Given that dispute resolution procedures tend to comprise mainly compulsory 
conciliation and voluntary binding arbitration, potential linkages are feasible in 
respect of common dispute resolution bodies. For example, MEAs within each 
cluster could specify the same arbitration body within their respective arbitration 
annexes. The arbitration body could include the International Court of Justice or 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The marine environment cluster could utilise 
the Law of the Sea Tribunal. However, this may be of little utility as there appears 
to be widespread avoidance of binding dispute resolution. Instead, greater 
emphasis is placed on non-compliance responses to ensure that Parties comply 





Chapter 4.  
Synthesis and Analysis of Law and Practice 
 
 
This chapter examines international practice in interlinking MEAs to achieve 
synergies between their approaches to compliance. It does this by surveying 
current international institutional efforts to promote interlinkages. These 
institutional efforts fall into two categories: those conducted by broad-mandate, 
multi-sectoral international organisations, and those conducted by the individual 
MEA Secretariats themselves. The chapter also notes examples of national 
practice in interlinking domestic compliance activities across MEAs. 
 
International Efforts towards Interlinkages in Compliance  
The focus of this report is on interlinkages between MEA compliance systems. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter’s survey of international practice in 
interlinking MEA compliance systems, a distinction is maintained between 
interlinkage of actual MEA compliance systems, as compared to interlinkage of 
MEA implementation efforts more generally. Where interlinkages between MEA 
information systems have been promoted, these are treated here as related to 
compliance information systems, as performance information is a subset of the 
wider body of information related to implementation. It must be recognised that 
international efforts to interlink MEA compliance systems form a subset of 
international efforts to produce synergies in national implementation of MEAs. 
  
Further, as the focus is on interlinkages between MEA compliance systems, we 
are concerned with international, rather than domestic sub-national compliance 
arrangements. Domestic compliance systems form a part of national 
implementation that serves to meet international obligations. 
 
International Organisations 
The primary multi-sectoral international organisations engaged in promoting 
interlinkages are the United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations 
Development Programme, United Nations University, the World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre and the World Customs Organisation. 
 
In 1997, UNDP convened an Expert Meeting on Synergies in National 
Implementation between the Rio Agreements to seek ways to create synergies 
for the implementation of the CBD, UNFCCC, UNCCD and the Forest Principles 
at the national level.340 The meeting was based on the key ideas that recognising 
                                                 
340 “Legislative complementarity and harmonization of biodiversity-related multilateral environmental 
agreements”, UNEP/UNDP/GEF Biodiversity Planning Support Program, 1 February 2002, pp.49-50, 
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synergies is an important part of implementing MEAs and that in-country capacity 
building is fundamental to promoting synergies.341 Four workshops covered 
topics such as institutional requirements and structures, capacity requirements, 
national planning requirements and information and reporting requirements.342 
The final workshop, on information and reporting requirements, discussed the 
commonalities in the data sets between the Rio agreements and proposed 
information system models that would explore synergies during the various steps 
in the data collection and dissemination process: data need analysis; cross-
comparison to identify synergy; identifying gaps; data integration; creating 
information products; policy development; policy implementation; reporting; and 
review.343 Overall, the meeting resulted in the proposal of measures to improve 
national implementation, reduce duplication and increase harmonisation.344  
 
Following the Expert Meeting, the World Conservation Monitoring Centre 
produced the 1997 Feasibility Study for the Information Management 
                                                                                                                                                 
<http://www.unon.org/dgefftp/NCSAResources/Conventions%20Literature/UNCBD/CBD%20Obligations
%20&%20other%20MEAs%20Feb02.pdf> (19/10/05). 
341 “Legislative complementarity and harmonization of biodiversity-related multilateral environmental 
agreements”, UNEP/UNDP/GEF Biodiversity Planning Support Program, 1 February 2002, pp. 49-50, 
<http://www.unon.org/dgefftp/NCSAResources/Conventions%20Literature/UNCBD/CBD%20Obligations
%20&%20other%20MEAs%20Feb02.pdf> (19/10/05). 
342 “Synergies in National Implementation of the Rio Agreements”, Sustainable Energy and Environment 
Division Website, <http://www.undp.org/seed/guide/synergies/siner3.htm> (19/10/05).  
343 “Synergies in National Implementation of the Rio Agreements”, Sustainable Energy and Environment 
Division Website, <http://www.undp.org/seed/guide/synergies/siner3.htm> (19/10/05). 
344 “Synergies in National Implementation of the Rio Agreements”, Sustainable Energy and Environment 
Division Website, <http://www.undp.org/seed/guide/synergies/siner3.htm> (19/10/05). The first workshop 
on institutional requirements and structures discussed the potential of creating synergies in the areas of 
awareness raising, education, reporting, data gathering and inventories, public participation, research and 
training. Mechanisms that were canvassed to facilitate integrated environmental planning included: a cross-
sectoral national committee; separate institutions conducting joint task forces to avoid duplication; or one 
high-level institution that is responsible for all instruments. The second workshop on capacity requirements 
discussed capacity building initiatives to assist countries in complying with international obligations 
pertaining to monitoring, policy and law reform, impact assessment and research, reporting, education and 
public awareness and training. The workshop identified the key indicators of a country’s existing capacity 
to plan, implement and monitor implementation initiatives as including: knowledge and technical skills 
among decision-makers on the country’s environmental problems; the degree to which existing plans are 
participatory and involve stakeholders; familiarity and skill in using existing planning tools; and clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities between the public and private sectors and civil society. The workshop 
ultimately recommended improving capacity in human resources, infrastructure development and 
cooperation and coordination through technical assistance, information exchange and technology transfers. 
The third workshop proposed three options on national planning strategies: producing separate plans for 
each instrument; developing an umbrella plan encompassing all the Rio agreements; develop a mechanism 
to absorb the planning process for each instrument into existing plans and frameworks.  
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Infrastructure for biodiversity-related MEAs.345 The study was commissioned by 
UNEP and the Secretariats of the CBD, CITES, CMS, Ramsar Convention and 
the World Heritage Convention to review the information and reporting 
requirements of the Parties under each Convention and propose options for 
harmonisation.346 Commonalities in information were noted between CITES and 
the CMS with regard to overlapping species and the World Heritage Convention 
and the Ramsar Convention in relation to sites.347 The study ultimately 
recommended streamlining of national performance reporting under the 
conventions by clarifying the reporting requirements of each MEA, developing 
and testing an integrated handbook for national reporting and capacity building in 
national biodiversity information banks.348 It also recommended the development 
of an MEA information resource, covering five priority areas including: 
harmonising document cover sheets; adopting standard definitions; harmonising 
web sites; developing a meta-database to indicate the information that is 
available and its location; and developing an inter-convention website and search 
engine.349 Finally, the study proposed developing a lessons-learned network to 
encourage the sharing of experience.350 
                                                 
345 “Legislative complementarity and harmonization of biodiversity-related multilateral environmental 
agreements”, UNEP/UNDP/GEF Biodiversity Planning Support Program, 1 February 2002, pp. 50-52, 
<http://www.unon.org/dgefftp/NCSAResources/Conventions%20Literature/UNCBD/CBD%20Obligations
%20&%20other%20MEAs%20Feb02.pdf> (19/10/05). 
346 “Legislative complementarity and harmonization of biodiversity-related multilateral environmental 
agreements”, UNEP/UNDP/GEF Biodiversity Planning Support Program, 1 February 2002, pp. 50-52, 
<http://www.unon.org/dgefftp/NCSAResources/Conventions%20Literature/UNCBD/CBD%20Obligations
%20&%20other%20MEAs%20Feb02.pdf> (19/10/05). 
347 J. Harrison and M. Collins, “Harmonizing the information management infrastructure for biodiversity-
related treaties”, WCMC Website, <http://www.unep-
wcmc.org/latenews/previous/japanpaper.pdf#xml=/cgi-
bin/pdf_hl?STEMMER=en&RGB=ff00ff&WORDS=feasibility+study+&DB=unep-
wcmc&URL=http://www.unep-wcmc.org/latenews/previous/japanpaper.pdf> (19/10/05).  
348 J. Harrison and M. Collins, “Harmonizing the information management infrastructure for biodiversity-
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The WCMC has since maintained the leading role in developing interlinkages 
and synergies for implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs. It provides 
support to the biodiversity-related MEAs by exploring ways to harmonize their 
information management and national reporting obligations, most notably through 
reports and workshops.351 For example, UNEP convened a workshop in 2000 
entitled ‘Towards the Harmonization of National Reporting’, which led to the 
development of pilot projects in four countries.352 Another workshop was 
convened in 2004 to review the conclusions and recommendations of the pilot 
projects and to discuss future harmonization priorities.353 
 
In 1997 UNU established the Interlinkages Initiative. In 1999, it held an 
International Conference on Synergies and Coordination.354 The objectives of the 
Conference were to, inter alia, examine existing initiatives on synergies and 
interlinkages and promote discussion on these issues among relevant 
stakeholders.355 The conference was divided into four working groups to cover 
information systems and exchange, financing, issues management, and scientific 
mechanisms, with each working group producing a series of recommendations 
on ways forward.356 Since the Conference, UNU has continued with its work on 
exploring potential synergies. Other outcomes of the Interlinkages Initiative 
include applied research and case studies on identifying constraints and 
overcoming challenges in implementing MEAs, holding of workshops, capacity-
building activities, and engagement in related consultancies and policy design.357 
The information systems aspects of this work relates directly to compliance 
interlinkages. 
 
The UNEP Division of Environmental Conventions was established in 1999 to 
identify synergies between MEAs at the global, national and regional levels, and 
to promote increased cooperation between UNEP and MEAs, harmonized 
information systems and coordinated approaches to capacity building.358  
                                                 
351 http://www.unep-wcmc.org/ under ‘Harmonization of National Reporting’ (6/11/05) 
352 http://www.unep-wcmc.org/ under ‘Harmonization of National Reporting’ (6/11/05) 
353 http://www.unep-wcmc.org/ under ‘Harmonization of National Reporting’ (6/11/05) 
354 http://www.unu.edu/inter-linkages/1999/frameset.htm (6/11/05) 
355 http://www.unu.edu/inter-linkages/1999/frameset.htm (6/11/05) 
356 Interlinkages: Synergies and Coordination between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, UNU, 
Tokyo, Japan, 1999, p.6 at http://www.unu.edu/inter-linkages/1999/frameset.htm (6/11/05) 
357 http://www.unu.edu/inter-linkages/ilink/frameset.htm (6/11/05) 





The World Customs Organisation (WCO), an intergovernmental organisation 
established in 1952 to improve customs administration,359 signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding with UNEP in 2003, that recognised the need for customs 
officers around the world to be better equipped at detecting environmental crime. 
360 To that end, the Green Customs Project is a joint initiative between the WCO, 
Interpol, the CITES and Basel Secretariats and the UNEP Division of 
Technology, Industry and Economics and Division of Environmental 
Conventions, which aims to train customs officers in identifying and dealing with 
illegal trade in wildlife and hazardous substances.361 This national customs 
strengthening exercise seeks to develop national implementation capacity but 
does not focus on MEA compliance systems at the international level.  
 
MEA Secretariats 
In 2001, a Joint Liaison Group (JLG) between the CBD, UNCCD and UNFCCC 
was established with the aim of exchanging information as well as exploring 
synergies and opportunities for cooperation between the Conventions.362 The 
JLG has produced a joint paper entitled ‘Options for Enhanced Cooperation 
among the Three Rio Conventions’,363which has recommended, inter alia, the 
development of joint working groups and actions plans, cooperation between 
national focal points and between scientific subsidiary bodies.364 Biannual 
meetings are held between the secretariats of five biodiversity-related MEAS 
(CBD, CMS, CITES, World Heritage and Ramsar) that form the Biodiversity 
Liaison Group.365 They are considering possible cooperation in harmonization of 
national reporting, including performance reporting.  
 
Interlinkages between specific MEA Secretariats are set out below. Information 
concerning interlinkages between them to assist general implementation is 
provided but is distinguished from compliance interlinkages. Treaty provisions 
governing relations with other MEAs are also noted. 
                                                 
359 Fact Sheet – “The World Customs Organisation” at 
http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/AboutUs/aboutus.html (5/11/05). 
360 http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/search/search.html (5/11/05) 
361 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004, p.36. 
362 http://www.biodiv.org/cooperation/liason.shtml (5/11/05). 
363 http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/sbstta/sbstta-10/information/sbstta-10-inf-09-en.pdf  
364 http://www.biodiv.org/cooperation/liason.shtml  





1. NATURE CONSERVATION 
Among MEAs, the most intense interlinkage activity takes place within the 
biodiversity-related cluster.   
 
(a) Ramsar Convention 
 
Compliance  Ramsar Convention COP Resolution 7.4 relating to partnerships 
and cooperation with other conventions promotes harmonised information 
management infrastructures. 
 
Implementation  The Ramsar Bureau has signed MOUs with the following 
secretariats: CMS in February 1997; UNCCD in December 1998; and the World 
Heritage Center in May 1999. A Memorandum of Cooperation between the 
Ramsar Bureau and the CBD Secretariat was signed in January 1996 and a Joint 
Work Plan for 1998-1999 was developed and endorsed by COP-4 (1990). COP 
Resolution 7.4 endorses the Joint Work Plan with the CBD and requests that the 
Bureau give priority in its programme of work for the next triennium to the 
development of joint actions with the CMS, and to the implementation of the 
MOUs with the Secretariat of the UNCCD and the World Heritage Centre. It also 
requests the development of a Memorandum of Cooperation with the UNFCCC. 
 
(b) World Heritage 
 
Implementation  The World Heritage Centre has signed MOUs with the Ramsar 
Bureau and the CMS Secretariat. An MoU is in development with the CBD 
Secretariat.366 Operational Guidelines 42 and 43 of the World Heritage 
Committee stress the need for appropriate coordination and information sharing 
with other conservation instruments including the Ramsar Convention and 
CITES.367 To facilitate coordination, the Committee may invite representatives of 
the intergovernmental bodies under such conventions to attend its meetings as 
observers and appoints its own representatives to observe at meetings of the 
other intergovernmental bodies when invited to do so. 
 
(c) CITES  
 
Compliance CITES COP Decision 13.92 directs the CITES Secretariat to 
collaborate with the Secretariats of other biodiversity-related conventions to 
ensure the harmonization of information management and reporting. 
 
                                                 
366 http://www.biodiv.org/cooperation/related-conventions/mandates.shtml#  
367 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 95. 
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Implementation The CITES Secretariat cooperates with the Secretariats to 
the Basel Convention and Montreal Protocol to combat illegal trade.368 The 
CITES Secretariat also cooperates closely with the Ramsar Bureau.369 CITES 
COP Resolution 13.3 calls upon the Secretariat to regularly review the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Secretariats of CITES and 
the CMS, to seek submissions from CITES Parties on a joint work programme 
with the CMS Secretariat and to invite the CMS Secretariat to meetings 
pertaining to commonly protected species. In relation to the CBD Secretariat, a 
Memorandum of Cooperation with an attached Work Plan for Implementation of 




Compliance CMS COP-6 (1999) established the CMS Information Management 
System, which is maintained by UNEP-WCMC. The Information Management 
System collects data and information from expert organisations, CMS national 
reports and other biodiversity agreements such as the CBD and CITES and 
offers Parties information on: species listed in the Appendices; species groups 
and issues relevant to CMS; links to the CBD’s Clearing-House Mechanism; and 
information provided by Parties on the implementation of resolutions and 
recommendations and the mobilisation of financial and technical resources.370  
 
Implementation An MOU on co-operation between the CMS and CBD 
Secretariats was signed on 13 June 1996. CMS COP Resolution 6.4 requested 
the Secretariat to actively ‘foster synergy between global environmental 
conventions, giving particular emphasis to the relationship with the Convention 
on Biological Diversity.’ CMS COP-7 (2002) invited the CMS Secretariat to 
collaborate with the Secretariat of the CBD to integrate migratory species into the 
latter’s National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans.371 An MOU between 
the CMS and Ramsar Secretariats was signed on 18 February 1997,372 between 
                                                 
368 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 78. 
369 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 77. 
370 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 87. 
371 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 84. 
372 Ramsar Website, <http://www.ramsar.org/key_cms_mou.htm> (8/9/05).  
Synthesis 
126 
the CMS and CITES Secretariats on 18 September 2002, and between the CMS 
and UNCCD Secretariats on 2 September 2003.373 There is also an MoU 
between the CMS Secretariat and World Heritage Committee and there are joint 





Compliance  COP-4 (1998) directed the Executive Secretary to improve 
information exchange synergies with other biodiversity-related conventions.375 At 
COP-5 (2000), the Informal Advisory Committee was directed to facilitate and 
encourage cooperation with other international and regional information networks 
and initiatives.376 To this end, UNEP-WCMC has recommended the development 
of a biodiversity-related MEA database or clearing-house mechanism to 
streamline national reporting.377 
 
Implementation  Given the broad scope of issues that are covered in the 
CBD, COP-4 (1998) sought to address its rapidly over-loaded decision-making 
process by intensifying relationships with other Conventions.378 There are 
Memoranda of Understanding/Cooperation and Joint Programmes between the 
CBD Secretariat and the Secretariats to the CITES, CMS, Ramsar Convention, 
and World Heritage Convention.379  
 
Decision VI/20 reinforces the need to design and implement mutually supportive 
activities with other conventions and international organisations. Those noted 
include the: UNFCCC; UNCCD; Ramsar Convention; CMS; and CITES. With 
Decision VII/26, the COP extended the mandate of the Working Group on 
Review of Implementation of the Convention to examine ways of increasing 
cooperation between the biodiversity-related Secretariats. 
 
                                                 
373 CMS Website, <http://www.cms.int/bodies/ScC/12th_scientific_council/12th_ScC_documents.htm> 
(8/9/05). 
374 http://www.biodiv.org/cooperation/related-conventions/mandates.shtml# (5/11/05) 
375 CBD Decision IV/2. 
376 CBD Decision V/14. 
377 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 200,  p.56. 
378 CBD Decision IV/15. 
379 http://www.biodiv.org/cooperation/related-conventions/mandates.shtml# (5/11/05). 
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Legal  Article 22 of the CBD provides that its provisions do not affect its Parties’ 
rights and obligations under other international agreements, unless exercise of 
those rights or obligations would cause damage or serious threat to biological 
diversity. Its provisions are to be implemented consistently with UNCLOS, 
discussed below. In that respect, cooperative arrangements have been 
concluded for marine and coastal biodiversity, including a joint study between the 
CBD Secretariat and the United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the 
Sea on the relationship between the CBD and UNCLOS regarding the 
conservation and sustainable use of deep seabed biodiversity.380 Article 28 
allows Parties to adopt protocols to the CBD. However, Parties to any protocol 




Implementation  The UNCCD Secretariat has signed MOUs with the Secretariats 
to the Ramsar Convention, the UNFCCC, the CBD and the CMS. Parties are 
encouraged to coordinate activities under UNCCD with those under other 




Implementation  The Treaty states that its objectives will be attained by 
closely linking its implementation to the work of the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations and to the CBD.383 Article 17.1 ties the Global 
Information System for Plant Genetic Resources with the clearing-house 
mechanism established under the CBD. Article 19.3 directs the Governing Body 
to establish and maintain close links with the CBD COP, take note of relevant 
CBD COP decisions and inform the CBD COP of ‘matters regarding the 
implementation of this Treaty.’ 
2. HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES MANAGEMENT 
In 2002 the UNEP Governing Council adopted Decision SS.VII/3, which 
established a ‘Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management’ 
(SAICM).384 Paragraph 1 of the Decision states that there is a need to develop a 
strategic approach and endorses the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical 
                                                 
380 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 66. 
381 CBD Article 32. 
382 UNCCD, Article 8. 
383 PGRFA Treaty, Article 1.2. 
384 http://www.chem.unep.ch/saicm/ (5/11/05) 
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Safety Bahia Declaration and Priorities for Action Beyond 2000 as the foundation 
of the approach. The Strategic Approach is to take into account the economic, 
social and environmental factors of chemical management as well as sustainable 
development.385 In 2003, Decision 22/4 IV called for a draft approach to be 
prepared for discussion at preparatory meetings with a view to eventually 
convening an international conference.386 An International Conference on 




Implementation  The Secretariats to the Basel Convention, CITES and the 
Montreal Protocol work together to combat illegal trade and have signed an MOU 
to that effect.388 The Basel, POPs Convention and the PIC Convention 
Secretariats, discussed below, undertake joint activities including regional and 
sub-regional workshops on the integrated implementation of the three 
Conventions.389 The Basel Convention Parties have adopted resolutions on 
cooperation and coordination with the London Convention, particularly 
concerning scrapping of ships, the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention and 
the Global Waste Inventory and Database. 
 
Legal  Parties may enter into bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements 
provided such agreements do not derogate from the ESM principles espoused in 




Implementation  Coordinated implementation activities have been undertaken 
with the Basel and POPs Conventions.391 At COP-1 (2004), the Parties to the 
PIC Convention decided to invite other relevant regional entities, in particular the 
                                                 
385 Decision 22/4 IV, paragraph 1. 
386 Decision 22/4 IV  paragraphs 2 and 3. 
387 http://www.chem.unep.ch/saicm/ (5/11/05)  
388 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 78. 
389 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 125. 
390 Basel Article 11 
391 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 125. 
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Basel Convention regional centres and regional coordinating centres, 
international organisations and MEAs to participate in a regional delivery 
system.392 
 
(c) Biosafety Protocol 
 
Legal  The provisions of the CBD relating to its protocols apply to the Biosafety 
Protocol.393 Parties may enter into bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements 





Implementation  Joint activities are conducted between the Basel, POPs and 
PIC Conventions.395 The POPs Convention Secretariat is directed to cooperate 
closely with the Secretariat of the Basel Convention in relation to disposal of 
POPs. This includes establishing levels of destruction and irreversible 
transformation necessary to ensure that the characteristics of POPs (set out in 
Annexes A, B, C and D, paragraph 1 of the POPs Convention) are not exhibited; 
to determine criteria for environmentally sound disposal; and to ensure that 
Annex A, B and C chemicals are disposed of according to ESM principles.396  
  
3. ATMOSPHERIC EMISSIONS CONTROL 
 
(a) Vienna Convention 
 
Legal  Parties may not become a Party to any protocol under the Convention if 
they are not Parties to the Convention.397 
 
(b) Montreal Protocol 
 
Implementation  The MOU concerning cooperative capacity building of 
customs controls with the Basel Convention and CITES has been previously 
                                                 
392 PIC Convention Decision 1/14. 
393 Biosafety Protocol, Article 32 
394 Biosafety Protocol, Article 14 
395 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 125. 
396 POP Convention, Article 6(2) and Decision I/5. 
397 Vienna Convention, Article 16. 
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noted.398 At MOP-10 (1998), Parties noted that the greenhouse gases included in 
Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol include hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and that the Montreal Protocol’s Technology and 
Economic Assessment Panel had identified HFCs and PFCs as alternatives to 
ozone-depleting substances.399 Decision X/16 requested the relevant Montreal 
Protocol committee to assess the implications of the inclusion of HFCs and PFCs 
in the Kyoto Protocol for the implementation of the Montreal Protocol and to 





Implementation  Decision 13/CP.8 affirms the need for enhanced cooperation 
between the UNFCCC, the CBD and the UNCCD and requests the UNFCCC 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice to continue cooperating with 
the equivalent CBD and UNCCD bodies. A Joint Liaison Group has been 
established between the CBD, UNFCCC and UNCCD to explore coordination 
issues, with the Ramsar Convention having observer status.400 
 
(d) Kyoto Protocol 
 
Legal  The legal relationship between the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance 
mechanism and the UNFCCC’s Multilateral Consultative Process is unclear, due 
to the overlap between the facilitative functions of each. The relationship 
between the Protocol’s non-compliance mechanism and the dispute resolution 
procedures it inherited from the UNFCCC also remains to be explored.401 
However, in terms of function, it can be assumed that the elaborate and 
established multilateral institution for the management of compliance operated by 
the Kyoto Compliance Committee will be preferred to the vague UNFCCC 
Multilateral Consultative Process and to adversarial confrontations under the 
UNFCCC dispute resolution procedures. 
 
                                                 
398 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 78. 
399 See also UNU Report, ‘Inter-linkages between the Ozone and Climate Change Conventions’, 2001. 
400 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 103. 
401 See Fitzmaurice, M, ‘The Kyoto Protocol Compliance Regime and Treaty Law’, Singapore Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol.8, 2004, p.23. 
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Implementation  At its meeting in 2000, the Commission noted the 
importance of co-operation with other organisations in scientific research and that 
the Commission has agreed an MOU with the CMS Secretariat.402 
 
(b) London Convention 
 
Implementation  In 1991, the Parties to the London Convention voted to 
request the Basel Secretariat to consider the London Convention when preparing 
its technical guidelines.403 They have since cooperated with Basel Convention 
particularly concerning the scrapping of ships, the drafting of the 1996 Protocol to 





Implementation  Studies have been conducted into the relationship between 
the CBD and the UNCLOS, with specific regard to the conservation of marine 
biodiversity.404 
 
(d) Fish Stocks 
 
Legal  Article 4 of the Fish Stocks Agreement states that the Agreement must be 
interpreted and applied consistently with  UNCLOS. 
 
 
                                                 
402 IWC Website, <http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/meeting2000.htm#coop> (17/9/05).  
403 List of London Convention Resolutions, <http://www.londonconvention.org/> (25/10/05). 
404 UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities 
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular 
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 66. 
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TABLE 4.1: IMPLEMENTATION COOPERATION BETWEEN MEA SECRETARIATS 
KEY:  Bold = compliance interlinkages   √ = MOU;  
* = Other forms of cooperation (e.g. Joint Working Groups etc.)   














































































Ramsar  √ √ √* √* √          * *      
World 
Heritage 
√  * √* √* *                 
CITES √ *  √* √*    √      √        
CMS √* √* √*  √* √             √    
CBD √* √* √* √*  √* *    -*     * *    *  
UNCCD √ *  √ √*          √ √ *      
ITPGRFA     *                  
                       
Basel   √       *  *   √     *   
PIC         *   *           
Biosafety      -*                  
POPs          * *             
                       
Vienna               -        
Montreal 
Protocol 
  √   √   √     -  * *      
UNFCCC *    * √         *  -      
Kyoto 
Protocol 
*    * *         * -       
                       
Whaling 
Convention 
   √                   
London 
Convention 
        *              
UNCLOS     *                  
Fish 
Stocks 
                      
 
Table 4.1, above, shows that the greatest concentration of interlinkages between 
international compliance systems occurs between the biodiversity-related MEAs, 
other than the UNCCD. Those MEAs also enjoy the greatest concentration of 
interlinkages for general implementation. Again in relation to general 
implementation, the other areas of concentrated MEA interlinkages occur within 
clusters, i.e., the hazardous substances and atmosphere clusters, with the 
notable exception of the marine cluster. There is also a relatively high level of 
implementation interlinkage between the biodiversity-related and atmosphere 





National Efforts Supporting Interlinkages in Compliance  
At the national level, interlinkages in domestic compliance systems can be made 
to generate synergies across national efforts to implement MEAs. They are to be 
contrasted with multilateral compliance mechanisms. Domestic compliance 
systems operate at a level below the international personality of the State. They 
form a part of national implementation to meet international obligations.  
 
Domestic compliance interlinkages pose a challenge to the national governance 
capabilities. This is because national governance structures are traditionally built 
upon distributions of responsibilities based on a concept of management sectors 
or portfolios. Those sectors or portfolios are usually firmly defined to limit the 
mandate of a government institution within its allotted management 
responsibilities. Building bridges across these institutional ‘silos’ can be difficult 
and resource intensive.  
 
Some international organisations are engaged in national capacity building to 
enhance interlinkages in national implementation of MEAs. This capacity building 
frequently seeks to enhance general systems for domestic compliance with 
MEAs and, to a lesser extent, interlinkages between them. The work of the 
UNDP, UNEP and WCO has been mentioned above.  
 
The International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement 
(INECE) takes generic action to build national compliance and enforcement 
capabilities. It has developed a set of environmental compliance and 
enforcement (ECE) indicators for assessing program performance. They are 
societal response indicators that describe the “level of activity or commitment 
made by Government, and a set of results which contribute to an important social 
goal such as reducing or preventing environmental pollution.”405 The INECE has 
also developed a guidebook to assist countries in identifying, developing and 
testing ECE indicators406 and a guidebook to assist countries in developing and 
implementing compliance and enforcement strategies in relation to their own 
laws and policies.407 The latter guidebook discusses the key components of a 
country’s compliance and enforcement program as: creating requirements that 
are enforceable; knowing who is subject to the requirements and setting 
priorities; promoting compliance in the regulated community; monitoring 
                                                 
405 “Performance Measurement Guidance for Compliance and Enforcement Practitioners”, INECE Website, 
<http://www.inece.org/indicators/guidance.pdf>, p.2 (19/10/05). 
406 “Performance Measurement Guidance for Compliance and Enforcement Practitioners”, INECE Website, 
<http://www.inece.org/indicators/guidance.pdf>, p.2 (19/10/05). 




compliance with the requirements; responding to breaches; identifying roles and 
responsibilities; and evaluating the performance of the program.408 
 
The UNU has conducted specific case studies of institutional coordination in 
relation to the implementation of MEAs that touch upon domestic compliance 
systems in Malaysia and Thailand,409 in the Pacific Islands410 and more broadly in 
Asia and the Pacific.411 It is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct detailed 
national case studies of domestic compliance interlinkages in the implementation 
of MEAs. However, a few regional sketches are set out to indicate the nature of 
national developments. These suggest that, except for countries in North 
America and Europe, domestic interlinkages are at early stages of development 
and mostly concern the establishment of integrated environmental monitoring 
databases rather than integration of performance information.  
 
(a) Asia and Pacific 
 
Environmental agencies have emerged in South East Asian countries to play a 
coordinating role between the various agencies tasked with environmental 
responsibilities, develop and implement policies and conduct awareness-raising 
activities.412 For example, both Malaysia and Thailand have developed 
institutional frameworks to deal with specific environmental issues, although 
there is a need for increased cross-sectoral harmonization.413 In Malaysia, the 
Inter-Agency Planning Group oversees the implementation of Agenda 21 while 
the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment formulates policy and 
                                                 
408 “Principles of Environmental Enforcement”, INECE Website, 
<http://www.inece.org/enforcementprinciples.html> (19/10/05). 
409 Brook Boyer Institutional Coordination, Multi-stakeholder Participation and the Implementation of 
MEAs:National Experiences of Malaysia and Thailand, United Nations University Paper prepared for the 
Regional Consultation / Workshop on Inter-linkages, Kuala Lumpur, 26-27 February 2001, Discussion 
Paper 2001-003. 
410 Jerry Velasquez; Piest Uli and Mougeot, Jacques (edited by Shona E.H. Dodds and based on the draft 
national reports made by Martin Tsamenyi and Richard Kenchington) Synergies and Coordination among 
MEAs: Pacific Islands Case Study United Nations University 2002, Tokyo. 
411 Brook Boyer; Velasquez, Jerry and Piest, Uli Synergies and Coordination among MEAs: Regional & 
National Approaches in Asia and the Pacific United Nations University 2002, Tokyo 
412 Economic and Social commission for Asia and the Pacific State of the Environment in Asia and the 
Pacific 1995, Bangkok, p.469. 
413 Brook Boyer Institutional Coordination, Multi-stakeholder Participation and the Implementation of 
MEAs: National Experiences of Malaysia and Thailand, United Nations University Paper prepared for the 
Regional Consultation / Workshop on Inter-linkages, Kuala Lumpur, 26-27 February 2001, Discussion 
Paper 2001-003, p.25 
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deals with inter-ministerial coordination issues for the Rio Conventions.414 
Thailand has a National Environmental Board, which oversees the 
implementation of MEAs through numerous committees and sub-committees, 
including the National Committee on the Convention of Biological Diversity and 
the National Committee on Climate Change.415 
 
In South East Asia, national databases on natural resources and environment 
are developing, although problems exist in relation to lack of coordination, poor 
and uneven reporting, outdated information and lack of standardised 
methodologies.416 In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, for example, water, 
meteorological, soil and land databases have been streamlined into an integrated 
database that is managed by the Division of Inventory and Planning of the 
Department of Forestry.417 In Vietnam, the National Information and 
Documentation Centre manages two networks of environmental information.418 
At the regional level, information and experiences are shared through 
organisations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).  
 
Most countries in South East Asia have monitoring systems for gathering 
environmental data. Malaysia routinely monitors air and water quality and has 
also developed a system of monitoring oil spills.419 Singapore and Thailand also 
have air quality monitoring systems.420 Vietnam has outlined a policy on 
environmental assessment in its National Action Plan on Environment and 
                                                 
414 Brook Boyer Institutional Coordination, Multi-stakeholder Participation and the Implementation of 
MEAs: National Experiences of Malaysia and Thailand, United Nations University Paper prepared for the 
Regional Consultation / Workshop on Inter-linkages, Kuala Lumpur, 26-27 February 2001, Discussion 
Paper 2001-003, p.9 
415 Brook Boyer Institutional Coordination, Multi-stakeholder Participation and the Implementation of 
MEAs: National Experiences of Malaysia and Thailand, United Nations University Paper prepared for the 
Regional Consultation / Workshop on Inter-linkages, Kuala Lumpur, 26-27 February 2001, Discussion 
Paper 2001-003, p.17 
416 Economic and Social commission for Asia and the Pacific State of the Environment in Asia and the 
Pacific 1995, Bangkok, p.534. 
417 Economic and Social commission for Asia and the Pacific State of the Environment in Asia and the 
Pacific 1995, Bangkok, p.531. 
418 Economic and Social commission for Asia and the Pacific State of the Environment in Asia and the 
Pacific 1995, Bangkok, p.530. 
419 Economic and Social commission for Asia and the Pacific State of the Environment in Asia and the 
Pacific 1995, Bangkok, p.524. 
420 Economic and Social commission for Asia and the Pacific State of the Environment in Asia and the 
Pacific 1995, Bangkok, p.531. 
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Sustainable Development.421 The Philippines has formulated its own Action Plan 
following UNCED recommendations.422 The International Environmental Affairs 
Staff of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources coordinate 
monitoring activities.423 
 
Within South Asia, ministries of environment have been established in 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka to implement 
environmental laws and develop and implement policies aimed at environmental 
conservation.424 In Bhutan, a National Environment Commission was established 
in 1992, which is a high-level cross-sectoral body that is responsible for creating 
legislation and ensuring that the Government’s international obligations with 
various Conventions are satisfied.425 Similarly, in Nepal, the National Planning 
Commission assesses and approves environmental policies, coordinates cross-
sectoral activities and performs monitoring functions.426 There is regional 
progress in the collection and dissemination of environmental information. For 
example, India introduced its Environmental Information System in 1984, which 
uses a network of databases on ecological and biodiversity research to integrate 
national efforts to collect environmental data.427 At the regional level, the South 
Asian Cooperative Environment Program, established in 1982 by the 
Governments of South Asia, promotes cooperative activities to strengthen 
institutions and capacity and provide a forum for information exchange.428 Its 
activities are complemented by the activities of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation, which focuses on economic but also covers 
environmental cooperation.429 
 
Within the Pacific, the UNU has recently noted significant information 
management problems. Databases exist but remain unconnected. No Pacific 
                                                 
421 Economic and Social commission for Asia and the Pacific State of the Environment in Asia and the 
Pacific 1995, Bangkok, p.531. 
422 Economic and Social commission for Asia and the Pacific State of the Environment in Asia and the 
Pacific 1995, Bangkok, p.531. 
423 UNU Inter-linkages Policy Brief No. 3, National and Regional Approaches to in Asia and the Pacific, 
2002, p.9. 
424 Regional Overview (CD). 
425 Regional Overview (CD). 
426 Regional Overview (CD). 
427 Economic and Social commission for Asia and the Pacific State of the Environment in Asia and the 
Pacific 1995, Bangkok p.529. 
428 Regional Overview (CD). 
429 Regional Overview (CD). 
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Island country has yet developed a standardized format for collecting and storing 
data.430 Palau has attempted to address some of these issues, at least in relation 
to the atmosphere MEAs, with the creation of the Office of Environmental 
Response and Coordination that acts as a national focal point for the 




The European Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of 
Environmental Law (IMPEL) is a network of regulators that focuses on training 
inspectors, exchanging  information and experience between Member States and 
reviewing EU environmental legislation.432 IMPEL’s role is recognised in the 6th 
Environment Action Programme, which was passed by the European Parliament 
on 22 July 2002. Article 3.2 provides that the objectives of the Programme shall 
be pursued by addressing infringements of environmental legislation, promoting 
improved monitoring and inspection standards by Member States, systematically 
reviewing the application of environmental legislation across the Community and 
improving exchange of information on best practice on implementation including 
by IMPEL. Article 9.1 outlines priority international environmental areas and 
Article 9.2(j) states that these international objectives shall be achieved by 
means of promoting policy coherence. This involves linking the work done within 
the framework of different MEAs, including assessing inter-linkages between the 
biodiversity and climate change conventions. 
 
(c) North America 
 
The Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was created by the USA, 
Canada and Mexico under the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation to deal with regional environmental issues, trade and environmental 
conflicts and to promote environmental law enforcement.433 The CEC has a Law 
and Policy program to address compliance with and enforcement of 
environmental laws within the region434 and includes an Enforcement and 
Compliance Cooperation Program that aims to provide support to the North 
                                                 
430 UNU Inter-linkages Policy Brief 4, Pacific Islands Case Study, 2002, p.35  
431 UNU Inter-linkages Policy Brief 4, Pacific Islands Case Study, 2002,  p.29 
432 See IMPEL Website, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/impel/about.htm#introduction> and 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/impel/about.htm#activities> (19/10/05).  
433 Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 
<http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/index.cfm?varlan+english> (19/10/05).  




American Working Group on Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation.435 It 
focuses on capacity building in areas including CITES tracking and enforcement, 
wildlife training exchanges, smuggling ozone depleting substances and 
transboundary law enforcement cooperation workshop.436 The Working Group 
comprises senior level enforcement officials and members of the North American 
Wildlife Enforcement Group (NAWEG), which is a regional network of wildlife 
enforcement officials.437  Additionally, the CEC has organised projects on 
cooperating on north American air quality that focus on exchanging technical 
data and developing strategies to address common concerns.438 There are also 
projects dedicated to capacity building for pollution prevention among key 
stakeholders.439 
 
In Canada, the position of Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable 
Development was established in 1995 within the Canadian Office of the Auditor 
General.440 The Commissioner provides performance audits to the Canadian 
Parliament on whether environmental policies are being implemented and 
delivering the desired results. The Commissioner has recently reviewed the 
Canadian Biodiversity Strategy 1996, ultimately identified a lack of information on 
what has been achieved under the policy and on what remains to be achieved.441 
The Report noted that responsibility for biodiversity in Canada spans several 
departments442 and that there are also issues relating to cooperation between the 
                                                 
435 Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 
<http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/law_policy/project/index.cfm?projectID=32&varlan=english> 
(19/10/05).  
436 “Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation”, <http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/LAWPOLICY/421-03-
05_en.pdf> (19/10/05). 
437 “Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation”, <http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/LAWPOLICY/421-03-
05_en.pdf> (19/10/05). 
438 CEC Website, 
<http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/pollutants_health/project/index.cfm?projectID=22&varlan=english
>  (19/10/05). 
439 CEC Website, 
<http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/pollutants_health/project/index.cfm?projectID=22&varlan=english
>  (19/10/05). 
440 Office of the Auditor-General, http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/domino/cesd_cedd.nsf/html/cesd_index_e.html (19/10/05). 
441 “Canadian Biodiversity Strategy – A Follow-Up Audit”, Report of the Commissioner of the 
Environment and Sustainability, <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/c20050903ce.html> 
(19/10/05), at 3.53. 
442 “Canadian Biodiversity Strategy – A Follow-Up Audit”, Report of the Commissioner of the 
Environment and Sustainability, <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/c20050903ce.html> 
(19/10/05), at 3.6. 
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levels of government within the Canadian Federation. Senior officers from across 
portfolios and Governmental tiers form a Biodiversity Working Group to develop 
and coordinate implementation plans.443 Environment Canada responded by 
building biodiversity into a key component in other environmental management 
sectors, including the Oceans Action Plan, National Forest Strategy, the 
Agricultural Policy Framework and the Invasive Alien Species Strategy.444 In 
June 2005, the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Ministers and Deputy Ministers 
of wildlife, forestry and fisheries and aquaculture agreed to collaborate on the 
implementation framework of the Biodiversity Strategy that focuses on 
outcomes.445 
 
(d) South America 
 
The INECE held its Sixth International Conference on Environmental Compliance 
and Enforcement in 2002.446 It demonstrated that, although most South American 
countries lack ECE indicators, they do have institutional mechanisms to 
coordinate environmental activities.447 In Chile, for example, an Environmental 
National Commission was established as an inter-ministerial and cross-sectoral 
coordination body, consisting of a Council of Ministers with environmental 
functions, cross-sectoral Consulting Council and an Executive Direction.448 Brazil 
has an Environmental National System, which is composed of different levels of 
Government and executive organs at the Federal level.449 The World Bank 
Institute Environmental Governance Program has also recently co-hosted 
workshops in Brazil to build capacity on compliance and enforcement, including 
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compliance indicators.450 In Argentina, a Federal Environmental Council was 
created to exchange information and coordinate environmental policies.451 
Additionally, Argentinean authorities have signed inter-Governmental 
agreements to coordinate environmental compliance across the levels of 
Government on the issue of hazardous wastes.452  
 
 
                                                 
450 INECE Website, <http://www.inece.org/region_americas_south.html> (19/10/05). 
451 Maria Eugenia Di Paola, “Towards a Program of Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in Latin 
America”, p.25, FARN Website, <http://www.farn.org.ar/docs/p32/en05_DiPaola1.pdf > (19/10/05). 
452 Maria Eugenia Di Paola, “Towards a Program of Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in Latin 
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Annex 1.  
Action Plan 
 
The conclusions reached though comparative analysis of MEA compliance 
mechanisms and the synthesis of law and practice form the basis for 
recommending the following suggested Action Plan on Building Interlinkages and 
Synergies Across Global MEA Compliance Regimes.  
 
1. Consistent Concepts and Terminology 
 
Hold a workshop in 2006 on multilateral non-compliance mechanisms. 
The workshop’s objective would be to authoritatively define concepts and 
terminology for compliance mechanisms and their sub-components. 
Distinctions need to be drawn, inter alia, between: implementation and 
compliance; international and domestic compliance mechanisms; 
performance information and environmental baseline data, verification and 
monitoring missions; primary implementation assistance and non-
compliance response assistance; and penalties and compensation 
liabilities. The workshop would bring together experts in a consultative 
process, rather than national representatives in a negotiation.  
 
The intended output of the workshop would be a publication definitive of 
the concepts and terminology. 
 
2. MEA Compliance Regime Manual 
 
Hold a workshop in 2006 with the objective of considering models of 
compliance regimes and developing definitions for criteria and indicators 
to assess multilateral compliance regime performance. The models need 
to describe the varieties of compliance mechanisms and the performance 
criteria to include indicators of performance quality. 
 
The intended output of the workshop would be a manual that sets out 
considerations and recommendations for non-compliance regime models 
and describes interlinkages between compliance regimes that generate 
synergies.  
 
3. Harmonisation of Performance Self-Reporting 
 
Continue to support current international efforts of UNEP-WCMC and 
others to promote harmonised self-reporting of performance review 
information. Currently, these efforts proceed mainly within the biodiversity-
related cluster of MEAs but they should be extended to harmonise self-
reporting within other clusters and across clusters. Of particular note are 
suggestions that: overlaps, gaps and inconsistencies be identified;  
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overlaps be addressed by joint information modules;  gaps be addressed 
by consolidated national reports across MEA clusters; and  reporting 




4. Performance Information Exchange and Integration 
 
Continue to support current international efforts of UNEP-WCMC and 
others to facilitate exchange between MEAs of performance review 
information and the integration of that information. Again, these efforts 
currently occur mainly within the biodiversity-related cluster of MEAs but 
should be extended to exchange of information on performance review 
within other clusters and across clusters. Of particular note are 
suggestions that national reports: be available on-line; web-links  be 
constructed between MEA performance information sites; combined 
common portals  be built for closely clustered MEAs offering integrated 
search functions; and that ‘best practice and lessons learned sites’  be 
developed. 
 
5. Model Standards for Inter-Secretariat Cooperation 
 
Develop and adopt in 2006 a model Memorandum of Understanding to 
extend MEA inter-secretariat cooperation. That model should include 
options for interlinkages relating specifically to compliance, including 
exchanges of performance information that address cross-MEA 
information integration and alerts for triggering their respective non-
compliance procedures (NCPs). 
 
6. Interlinkages Administrative Support  
 
Dedicate adequate administrative resources in 2006 to support regular 
biannual meetings and inter-sessional activities of an inter-MEA 
secretariat consultative committee. Continue current efforts by UNEP to 
strengthen cooperation with MEAs through, in particular, an Inter-
Divisional task force on MEAs and UNEP (Division on Environmental 
Conventions) desk officers for major MEAs. 
  
7. Interlinked Verification and Monitoring  
 
Place on the agenda of meetings of joint MEA secretariats in 2006 the 
proposal that they promote to their respective COP/MOPs that the latter 
consider the introduction of third-party performance review verification and 
monitoring. Those COP/MOPs that do not currently provide for such 
verification or monitoring could be encouraged to adopt decisions to 
facilitate verification or monitoring missions by end 2007. Those missions 
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could be tasked to review implementation across designated MEAs and 
could be conducted cyclically to review the extent to which a Party is 
meeting its implementation commitments.  
 
UNEP to draw up, in 2007, rosters of technical experts, grouped 
corresponding to MEA clusters, to conduct monitoring missions and 
verifications missions concerning national MEA compliance.  
 
8. Coordinated Non-Compliance Response Measures 
 
Place on the agenda of meetings of joint MEA secretariats in 2006 the 
proposal that they communicate to other secretariats and to international 
capacity-building bodies information concerning measures adopted in 
response to non-compliance under an MEA NCP. Receipt of such 
information on Parties’ non-compliance patterns by other NCP decision-
making bodies and by capacity-building bodies would facilitate improved 
coordination and targeting of assistance to countries that are non-
compliant with multiple treaties. Conversely, it would facilitate coordination 
of penalties so as to maximise their effect for the non-compliant Party. 
Such coordination would be useful across MEAs within a cluster but could 
also be useful across clusters that regulate related activities. 
 
 
